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INTRODUCTION
In his life of Socrates, Diogenes Laertius recounts that Euripides once gave Socrates a copy
of Heraclitus’ Peri Physeos. When asked his opinion of it, the “gadfly” of Athens replied, “The part I
understand is excellent, and so too is, I dare say, the part I do not understand; but it needs a Delian
diver to get to the bottom of it.”1 This is, I think, an excellent metaphor for the experience of
reading the fragmentary remains of Heraclitus’ work. Some of it appears clear and clever, while
some requires greater effort to understand. My goal in this essay is to persuade the reader that the
best way to take this “dive” is to do so with the proper equipment; the elements of which can be
found in Heraclitus’ historical context. This context helps us discover, I believe, that beneath the
obscurity we can see in Heraclitus early attempts at religious, political, and ethical philosophy
alongside the metaphysical and natural speculations for which he is more famous.
That fame is mostly due the many fragments that say things like DK12: It is always
different waters that flow toward those who step into the same rivers, DK49a We step and do
not step into the same rivers, we are and we are not, and DK31A: Turnings of fire: first sea;
then half of the sea, earth; and the other half, lightning storm (prester).” 2 Much ink can, and has
been spilled on fragments like these and thus I will not be considering them in this essay. Their
omission is not an indication I wish to dispute their metaphysical or naturalistic importance. Rather I
wish to examine fragments which I believe have been given less attention and thus could benefit
most from the method I will use herein.
Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Volume I, Books 1-5, trans. R. D. Hicks (Cambridge/Mass. London:
Harvard University Press, 1925), 153 (II.22). Delos is an island in the Cyclades reputed to be the birthplace of Apollo
and Artemis.
1

Unless otherwise indicated, references to Heraclitus fragments will follow the numbering found in Hermann Diels and
Walther Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, vol. 1 (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1903). and will be of the
format “DK48.” Almost all English translations will be from Xenophanes and Heraclitus, Early Greek Philosophy, Volume
III: Early Ionian Thinkers, Part 2, trans. André Laks and Glenn W. Most (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
2016). I have also kept the formatting of their text the same. They usually indicate by bold text that the fragment is a
direct quote. Where they think the Greek version of the word needs to be included, they Romanize it and place it in
regular parentheses, i.e (prester) above. Throughout this essay, I will be keeping that as well. Any editorialization by me
will be indicated in the usual fashion in block brackets like so [nomos]. Hopefully, this is not too confusing for the reader.
2

2

That method is to foreground what historical information we can muster about Heraclitus’
life and the world he lived in to help us interpret his thinking. Thus the goal of Chapter 1 will be
fourfold. First, I will introduce the problem of Heraclitean obscurity, the approach of past
commenters and promote the need for historical contextualization to solve this problem. Second, I
will defend this project against possible objections that either it is unnecessary or impossible due to
the supposed lack of credibility of our sources. Third, I will provide a brief biography of Heraclitus
and a history of his hometown Ephesus which I will rely on in later chapters. Finally, I will give a
summary of my overall argument that historical contextualization is interpretively fruitful.
Chapter 2 acts as set-up for Chapter 3’s discussion of Heraclitus on religion. This chapter
consists of an extended discussion of other approaches of interpreting Heraclitus on religion and an
examination of their strengths and weaknesses. It ends with my own view that Heraclitus was
positively influenced by certain religious practices he would have encountered during his lifetime.
Chapter 3 will be the “first fruits”, so to speak, that I believe my approach can offer:
Heraclitus on Religion. First, I provide an examination of the influence exerted by the Eleusinian
Mysteries on Plato and (I argue) Heraclitus. Second, I examine how Heraclitus’ oracular style and his
basic ethical ideas trace to the worship of Apollo at Delphi.
Chapter 4 moves to the political realm to examine fragments about conflict (polemos/eris), law
(nomos), and justice (dike). In the first section I argue for an understanding of the Heraclitean notion
of “conflict” as both the opposition between things, but also the interdependence of those opposed
things. In the second section I explore Heraclitus’ understanding of law (nomos) and justice (dike)
considering the prevalent understanding of those terms during his period. In the closing section I
briefly examine the question of how to characterize Heraclitus ideologically on the spectrum
between oligarchs and democrats.

3

In chapter 5 I begin with a summary of what I take to be Heraclitus’ ethical/political views
given all I have discussed in previous chapter. The concluding section of this essay traces the
influence of Heraclitean ideas on the ethical and political philosophy of later thinkers stretching
from Democritus to the Stoics as evidence that ancient thinkers appreciated the ethical side of
Heraclitus to a greater degree than might be supposed.

4

CHAPTER 1: HERACLITUS IN CONTEXT
In this chapter, I will introduce the historical elements of my project and explain their
relevance to interpreting Heraclitus and I will defend my methodological approach. That approach
involves the use of historical, political, and religious context to illuminate Heraclitus’ work. In
section I, I will examine the difficulty of interpreting Heraclitus and the traditional view that he is
exclusively a natural philosopher or metaphysician who claims that “everything changes.” In section
II, I will consider potential objections to my project of using historical context to gain insight into
Heraclitus as philosopher of religion and ethics/politics. My response will include an explanation of
why a work called Peri Physeos (lit. “on nature.”) might have passages about religion, ethics and
politics. In addition, I will also examine the objection that we either have too little historical material
or our sources are too unreliable to be of any serious use in interpreting Heraclitus. That done, in
section III I will set down what I take to be the relevant historical and biographical details that will
guide my analysis in the rest of the essay. Following that, I will end this chapter with Section IV’s
summary of my argument.
I.

Interpreting Heraclitus
In this section, I will examine the interpretive difficulties associated with Heraclitus’ work,

his traditional reception as only a natural philosopher or a metaphysician and have a brief look at the
work of Charles Kahn and Roman Dilcher who separately have tried to recover a Heraclitus that
does not fit so neatly within the traditional mold.
A.

Heraclitus the Obscure

Interpreters of Heraclitus hitherto have faced two main difficulties. The most obvious
difficulty is the infamous “obscurity” of Heraclitus’ prose.3 Heraclitus relies on multiple meanings,
apparent paradox, and other strange methods that can veil the point he is making. He delights in
3

A problem I will return to in Chapter 4 of this essay.

5

puns and double meanings such as we find in DK48: βιός τῷ τόξῳ ὄνομα βίος ἔργον δὲ θάνατος
(The name of the bow [bios] is life [bios], but its work is death.) This can make some fragments
devilishly difficult to interpret plainly in English or in Greek.
This obscurity led some ancient writers, according to Diogenes Laertius, to suppose that
Heraclitus “deliberately made [his book] more obscure in order that none but adepts should
approach it, and lest familiarity should breed contempt.”4 Considering Laertius’ hostile attitude
toward Heraclitus, I am skeptical of this interpretation. More fruitful is the approach taken by
Charles Kahn and other modern interpreters who think that this obscurity and wordplay are meant
to draw attention to the doctrine of the “unity of opposites.” This Heraclitean doctrine does not
hold, as some think, that contradictory qualities are identical, but asserts something like the
“interconnectedness of contrary states in life and in the world.”5 The punning and wordplay, the
argument goes, are intended to draw attention to that interconnectedness.
Kahn and others have persuasively argued that Heraclitus probably developed this doctrine
in response to Anaximander, who is said to have claimed that
… the principle (arkhê) and element of beings is the unlimited (to apeiron) … And the things
out of which birth comes about for beings, into these too their destruction happens,
according to obligation: for they pay the penalty (dikê) and retribution (tisis) to each
other for their injustice (adikia) according to the order of time.6
In other words, Anaximander is suggesting a world where individual things come into existence by
limiting or portioning off bits of an unlimited nature.7 He borrows from the language of legal
dispute resolution to suggest the manner in which change occurs to this apeiron over time. Kahn
argues that the unity of opposites doctrine takes over the basic language and themes from this idea.
4

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 2 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1980), 413.

Daniel W Graham, “Heraclitus,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N Zalta, Fall 2015, n.d.,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/heraclitus/.
5

André Laks and Glenn W. Most, trans., Early Greek Philosophy, Volume II: Beginnings and Early Ionian Thinkers, Part 1
(Cambridge, Massachusetts ; London, England: Harvard University Press, 2016), 285. (B1).
6

7

I like to imagine an infinite clay sheet with shapes picked out by the impressions made by cookie cutters.
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Heraclitus, however, offers an important “correction” in DK80: “One must know that war is
common, that justice is strife, and that all things come about by strife and constraint.” Whereas
Anaximander suggests that this or that opposing force can gain the upper hand, leading to
temporary excess (hence “adikia”), Heraclitus claims that “justice” (dike) is not merely the redress of
an injustice but a name for the entire system of balances between injustices and redresses, crimes
and punishments.8 This is much like the way we refer to the “justice system” when we are referring
to this same species of dependent phenomena. This idea is strikingly like the Taoist concept of
“Tao” (a.k.a. “Dao”) which, according to one commentator, is the
…constant blending of opposites, the mingling of all things from and into the one thing,
constitutes the rhythm of the universe. All things stem from the oneness of the Dao, and
exist as a result of the interaction of opposites. The nature of the universe is utter
interdependence, because everything exists because of and in relation to everything else.9
Usual examples include: without ugliness there is no beauty, without darkness there is no light,
without night, no day, etc. Indeed, Heraclitus comes close to making a Daoist-like statement himself
in DK23: “They would not know the name of Justice if these things [i.e. unjust actions?] did
not exist.”
Thus far from being a suggestion that contradictory qualities are identical, Heraclitus is
suggesting that contradictory qualities are, at the very least conceptually dependent. This conceptual
dependence is thus taken to be a sign of a unity which underlies the opposing concepts. It is under
this interpretive framework that we can best understand fragments like DK61: “The sea, the
purest water and the foulest: for fish it is drinkable and life-giving, but for humans
undrinkable and deadly.” Part of what makes something “sea” is that it be potable for fish and
Charles H. Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus: A New Arrangement and Translation of the Fragments with Literary and
Philosophical Commentary (Cambridge University Press, 1981), 206–7. Here Kahn is relying heavily on Gregory Vlastos,
“On Heraclitus,” in Studies in Presocratic Philosophy Volume 1: The Beginnings of Philosophy, ed. David Furley and Reginald E.
Allen (Routledge, 2016).
8

Steven C. Combs, “The Useless-/Usefulness of Argumentation: The Dao of Disputation,” Argumentation and Advocacy
41, no. 2 (September 1, 2004): 60, https://doi.org/10.1080/00028533.2004.11821619.
9

7

non-potable for humans. It would be a mistake to see this only as a statement of relativism. The
further, more critical point is that there is still a “sea” even though it has these opposed relative
qualities. Heraclitus is always seeking a unity or order in oppositions. As he says in DK124: “Like
flesh of things [sarma, lit. sweepings, refuse] spread out at random, the most beautiful order
(kosmos).” Though something may look disordered or excessive, there is an underlying order to it.
These are not the easiest ideas to convey, so Heraclitus makes use of poetic, and cryptic
language to indicate what he could not easily express directly. In this, he was greatly influenced by
the religious traditions associated with Apollo at Delphi and Demeter at Eleusis which we will
discuss in greater detail below. Suffice it to say for now that it is my contention that examining
Heraclitus’ religious and political background will help illumine his fragments further.
B.

The Commentarial Tradition and the Subject Matter of Heraclitus’ Book

The next interpretive issue is what the “point,” “main idea” or “subject matter” of Peri
Physeos (“On Nature”) might be. We have no complete work but only “fragments” gathered together
from citations to and paraphrases of Heraclitus in dozens of works by other authors that span
several hundred years. Each new translation of Heraclitus since Diels-Kranz in 1903 seems to be an
exercise in re-arranging the fragments by subject matter or theme. The consensus view among
ancient and modern commentators assumes that Heraclitus was continuing the work started by the
Milesians or perhaps transitioning from their natural philosophical work to the metaphysical
interests of the Eleatics. I do not wish to dispute that this was part of Heraclitus’ project, just that it
was the whole, or even necessarily the primary aspect, of his project. Indeed, Diogenes Laertius
claims that Peri Physeos was a “divided into three discourses, one on the universe, another on politics,
and a third on theology.”10 Despite this, most of the attention has been focused on the first and (to
a much lesser extent) third discourses, with little if anything on the second. This scarcity is strange
10

Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 2:413.

8

since there was at least one ancient commentator, Diodotus, who suggested that Peri Physeos was a
political-ethical treatise that drew on examples from nature.11 This is a rather extreme claim and
quite possibly mistaken, but it at least shows that there was enough recognition of political and
ethical content in Peri Physeos for this mistake to have occurred.
Many modern commentators are little better in the attention they give to Heraclitus’ ethical
and political ideas. Kahn and Dilcher are among a minority of such commentators who see
Heraclitus as discussing the “human experience.”12 Almost all commentators agree that we can
roughly divide Heraclitus’ ideas into the following doctrines: (a) the unity of opposites; (b) the logos is
xynos, (c) the supremacy of fire, and (d) flux. Kahn, in The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, argues that
(b)-(d) are all in the service of revealing the truth of (a), which in turn is a truth about human
experience as mortal beings.13 Kahn is following Diels in asserting that Heraclitus’ “central insight”
is the “identity of structure between the inner, personal world of the psyche and the larger natural
order of the universe.”14 Thus the tension and conflict in the kosmos, is mirrored by tension and
conflict in the psyche. Naturally, Kahn’s answer to the first interpretive issue (i.e. obscurity) flows
from this view. Put simply, only tension and conflict in language—like ambiguity—can express inner
tensions and conflicts.
Dilcher’s Studies in Heraclitus largely agrees: “[Heraclitus] did not intend to engage in natural
philosophy, but rather to explore the condition of human existence.”15 The ambiguity in the text of

11

Laertius, 2:423.

More on which will be discussed below. The best may be, Kurt A. Raaflaub, who has recently published an essay on
Heraclitus’ political ideas. While I agree with many of Raaflaub’s points, I disagree on his dismissal of the historical
context we have on Heraclitus as irrelevant to interpreting his thought. Kurt A. Raaflaub, “Shared Responsibility for the
Common Good: Heraclitus, Early Philosophy, and Political Thought,” in Heraklit Im Kontext, ed. E. Fantino et al., Studia
Praesocratica Series (Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Company KG, 2017), 103–28. I will discuss this issue in detail below.
12

13

Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, 1981, 20–23.

14

Kahn, 21.

Roman Dilcher, Studies in Heraclitus, Spudasmata : Studien Zur Klassischen Philologie Und Ihren Grenzgebieten
(Olms, 1995), 9.
15

9

Peri Physeos is employed for a “dialectical process of understanding.”16 Dilcher’s argument is roughly
as follows (1) Heraclitus saw understanding as the highest life-related function of the soul, (2)
Heraclitus saw the life process as dynamic and filled with tension by analogy to the flux he perceived
in nature, (3) if the logos is related to understanding, it must therefore reflect this life-process, thus (4)
this tension must be reflected in linguistic tension (i.e. the “obscure” way that Heraclitus writes).17
I agree with the broad strokes of Kahn and Dilcher’s interpretations, but their views are only
partial, and their conclusions are somewhat vague. Their approach is very interesting, but it tells us
little about any of Heraclitus’ supposedly less fundamental conclusions. What did he think about
human conduct? What did he think about political behavior? Many of his fragments seem to address
these issues apart from the fundamental conclusion about the dialectical process of understanding.
In other words, Kahn and Dilcher have neglected the less grandiose bits of Heraclitus for this “big
picture” view.
In addition, Kahn seems to have followed Diogenes Laertius in holding that Heraclitus had
no real interest in the politics of his time. Kahn seems to think that Heraclitus was somewhere
between a conservative aristocrat and a Solonic neutral arbiter, but he places no real emphasis on the
roles that politics and religion may have played in shaping Heraclitus’ views. Indeed, he concludes
that Heraclitus had only “a lucid, almost Hobbesian appreciation of the fact that civilized life and
communal survival depend upon loyalty to the nomos, the law in which all citizens have a share …
but which may be realized in the leadership of a single outstanding man.”18
But this gives too short a shrift to Heraclitus as a political thinker. He may not have been
John Rawls, but he says more about politics than this. Indeed, even many of the “bigger picture”
fragments suggest that he had ethical and political views. Thus, a fragment like DK53 “A lifetime
16

Dilcher, 9.

17

Dilcher, 100–101.

18

Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, 1981, 3.
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(aion) is a child playing, playing checkers: the kingship belongs to a child,” may have cosmic
importance—Kahn suggests that the first two clauses suggest the rule-based back and forth of
cosmic flux19—but it may also suggest a negative view of kingship or tyranny. A view which is
supported by several anecdotes about Heraclitus challenging tyrants, turning down a job with the
Persian emperor, etc. During Heraclitus’ lifetime the issue of rule by foreign-backed tyrant was
foregrounded by the Ionian Revolt and the Persian Wars. Thus, historical context suggests that
Heraclitus may be expressing a political opinion relevant to these issues. The point is not that these
anecdotes are verified historical events, merely that they suggest that Heraclitus had a certain
reputation. This reputation in turn allows a reasonable inference that he had certain negative views
about things like kings, for example.
C.

The Need for Historical Context

I maintain that Kahn’s neglect of this context prevents him from confirming, as Diodotus
asserts, that Heraclitus was greatly interested in both politics and ethics. Indeed, insofar as the
doctrine of the unity of opposites is, as Kahn claims, a truth about human existence it can also be
understood as political/ethical truth abstracted from the turbulent and transitional period in which
Heraclitus lived. Before the Persian Wars, mainland Greece and Ionia had almost completely broken
from the Bronze Age shackles of the oikos and individual family-focused model to the synoecistic
model of the polis. Innovative ideas of law and new social customs began to develop. Greece’s
encounters with political “others” like Persians and other “eastern” cultures began to reveal to
Hellas that it was defined by two main differences from its neighbors: (1) common myths found in
Homer, Hesiod, and the other poets, and (2) the regional peculiarity of the polis.
In myth, we see this in the repeated comparison of Greek life to that of cultures alien too it.
Thus, in the Odyssey Homer (ca. 800-750 B.C.E.) describes the Cyclopes as athemiston
19

Kahn, 227–29.
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(lawless/unlawful) since they have no councils or assemblies to make their laws but are each their
own lawgiver.20

Homer is clearly projecting something of his own time onto the much earlier

period (somewhere between 1750 B.C.E. - 1300 B.C.E.) he describes in the Iliad and the Odyssey.
Accordingly, the plain comparison is between the cyclopes and Homer’s (probably Geometric
Period 900-700 B.C.E) audience who were then living in poleis and making their laws in assemblies
and councils (i.e. in common with one another).
Real-world “others” like the Persians also provided a neat contrast. To the Persian king, the
Greek method of hashing things out in discussion, in common, was strange at best, untrustworthy at
worst.21 Hence, Cyrus’ insult to the Spartans that Greeks meet in the agora to “swear false oaths and
cheat[] one another.”22 This was a strange insult, as the Spartans were not known for either public
deliberation or mercantile dealings which were the hallmarks of the Athenian employment of the
agora. Cyrus was basically employing a stereotype of Greek culture; treating all Hellenes as the same.
Thus, the notion that there might be a Greek culture in common was slowly emerging when the
Great King decided to invade the Greek homeland in retaliation for Attic solidarity with Ionia. This
invasion would cement that emerging view of Greek-ness and make way for philosophers like Plato
and Aristotle to critique and theorize about it. It was during this remarkable transition period in
Greek thought that Heraclitus was born.

Homer, The Odyssey: Books 1-12, ed. George E. Dimock, trans. A. T. Murray, 2nd edition (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press, 1995), bk. 9.106.
20

This was probably and perhaps paradoxically due to the Persian obsession with truth. To Persian culture telling a lie
was one of the most terrible acts imaginable. The “marketplace of ideas” represented by the agora would thus have
seemed to invite deception. Interesting, Heraclitus himself also emphasizes the importance of truth. Consider DK112:
To be moderate: the greatest virtue. / Wisdom: to speak the truth and to act in conformity with the nature [scil.
Of each thing], understanding it.
21

Herodotus, The Landmark Herodotus: The Histories, ed. Robert B. Strassler and Rosalind Thomas, trans. Andrea L.
Purvis, Reprint edition (New York: Anchor Books, 2009), bk. 1.153.
22
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II.

Initial Objections to this Project
There are, of course, potential objections to my methodological approach to Heraclitus that

we must consider. In this section I will consider two of them. First, I will explain why it is plausible
that a book called Peri Physeos (lit. “on nature”) could contain thoughts on more than just natural
philosophy. I will examine the genre represented by books “on nature” that was invented in the
generation before Heraclitus was born.23 Next, I will consider two connected objections about the
value of our historical sources for Heraclitus and the periods he lived. My focus will be in
challenging an argument made by Kurt Raaflaub that our sources either tell us nothing useful or are
too unreliable to use. In short, I believe that he radically underestimates the usefulness of our
sources for interpreting Heraclitus while overestimating their unreliability.
A.

On the Title ‘Peri Physeos’

What are we to make of the fact that Heraclitus’ book was probably called Peri Physeos (“On
Nature”)? In modern English, this title suggests a treatise on the environment or perhaps on
physical laws. In other words, it indicates a kind of scientific inquiry. But in the time of the
Presocratics, it arguably had a different, broader meaning. The etymological root of the term for
nature, physis¸ implies growth or coming into being, as a plant grows from a seed.24 The first known
use of the word “physis” is in the Odyssey when Hermes explains to Odysseus how the physis of a
plant will prevent him from being turned into a pig by Circe: “So saying, Argeiphontes gave me the

While the genre of historia peri physeos is generally agreed to exist prior to Heraclitus, scholars debate when the title Peri
Physeos was first used. For example, Alexandrian scholars generally entitled all works by the Milesians Pre-Socratics as
such. Others like Burnet doubt that ancient philosophers used titles for their works at all and thus any title would be a
spurious later addition. Gerard Naddaf, The Greek Concept of Nature: The Politics of Theory-Building and Pedagogy in Composition
(SUNY Press, 2012), 16.
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herb, pulling it out of the ground, and showed me its nature [physin].”25 Here context strongly
suggests that the word “designates the process by which the object becomes what it is.”26
The first known Pre-Socratic use of the word is in Heraclitus27 in DK1 when he claims “For,
although all things come about according to this account (logos), they resemble people
without experience of them, when they have experience both of words and of things of the
sort that I explain when I analyze each in conformity with its nature [physis] and indicate how
it is.” Noticing the continuity between this use of the term and Homer’s, Gerard Naddaf has argued
that the best way to understand the Pre-Socratic conception of the term is as referring to the entire
development of the object of inquiry. The word “physis/phusis” “is never employed in the sense of
something static, although the accent may be on either the phusis as origin, the phusis as process, or
the phusis as result. All three, of course, are comprised in the original meaning of the word phusis.”28
Nadaff is not alone in this contention either; Raflaaub writes that the Pre-Socratics “were primarily
interested in physis, the natural world and its origin and functioning; man and human society were
part of physis, subject to its laws, and not considered separately.”29
The “title” Peri Physeos, was part of a genre (historia peri physeos) of writing possibly originated
by Anaximander—a thinker who profoundly influenced Heraclitus.30 Unfortunately, all we have of
his work is a brief paragraph describing his cosmology. Anaximander’s cosmological model is one of
concentric rings with the earth placed at the center.31 But why? Typical answers rely on the mythical
significance of the numbers in the arrangement, astronomical observations made by Anaximander,
25
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and architectural proportions.32 The hypothesis that I (and Naddaf) find the most compelling is that
political considerations inspired his cosmological model. On this view, older cosmological
arrangements like that of Greece’s near eastern neighbors, and those assumed by Hesiod, were
hierarchical because human society was hierarchical.33 With the rise of the polis one of the most
distinct differences would have been the political and (often literal) centrality of the agora (public
gathering place).34 In the agora, citizens were at least nominally recognized as isoi (equals) or homoioi
(peers).35 As Naddaf puts it
The agora is thus the symbol of a spatial structure radically different from the one which
characterizes the oriental monarchies. The power (kratos, archē, and dunasteia) is no longer
situated at the top of the ladder. The power is disposed es meson, in the center, in the middle
of the human group.36
Aristotle seems to support this contention when he writes that the earth, according to Anaximander
remains at rest in the center “because of equality (homoiotês).”37 This center was metaphorically ringed
by the three Milesian social classes present during Anaximander’s lifetime: the aristocracy, a “middle
class,” and the peasantry.38 The rings of the stars, moon, and sun in his cosmology would then
correspond to the sociopolitical relationship between these classes and the agora/earth.39
In other words, Anaximander saw the development of the political institutions of his time as
related to the natural order. Proper politics then would be the attempt to live as nearly as possible
with this natural order. This might have been something like a law-governed arrangement where the
duties and honors of political office were equitably distributed and rotated to prevent domination by
32
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one social class.40 That aside, Naddaf is able to detect topical commonalities in all the pre-Socratics:
they largely wrote in this new peri physeos or historia peri physeos style. That is to say, “all pre-Socratics
attempted to account for the origin and development of the present order of things and their
respective accounts were comprised in the scheme of three elements: a cosmogony, a zoogony, and
a politogony.”41 Hence if we contextualize Heraclitus’ own Peri Physeos as a work associated with this
genre, it is not strange that he would include politics as part of an exploration of the “nature” of
things.
A further implication of the connection made by Pre-Socratics like Heraclitus between the
political and the natural is what it says about later debates about the distinction between nomos and
physis. The 5th Century sophistic distinction between the terms marks a rupture with the earlier use
that connected the two. The lack of precedent for the events of the Peloponnesian War spurred
skepticism about that connection.42 This led to a questioning of human norms and conventions
represented by nomos as opposed to divine or natural reality represented by physis. This concern about
whether or not human politics and ethics were completely out of keeping with the divine/natural
was not as pressing for Heraclitus. He simply had a different understanding of the terms nomos and
physis.
B.

Do We Have Too Little Historical Context?

Another issue which potentially challenges this project concerns the quantity of evidence we
have for Heraclitus’ historical context. If Heraclitus were a figure of the 17th or 18th centuries C.E.
we would be spoiled for historical evidence. We would have contemporary histories, legal and other
official documents, books on contemporary thinking which may have influenced his own, and
probably letters by him or to him. But we have much less material of this kind for any Ionian Greek
40

Naddaf, 87–88.

41

Naddaf, 113.

42

Ryan K. Balot, Greek Political Thought (John Wiley & Sons, 2008), 99.

16

of the 6th to 5th century B.C.E. While some regions may have gone beyond mere scribal literacy, we
have no evidence of anything like mass literacy.43 Indeed the only ways to view written materials
were 1) public postings on stelae, etc., 2) obtaining a hand-copied version of a text, or 3) physically
going to the location where the text was stored. As a matter of fact, this last method of
“publication” is the one Heraclitus chose by giving his book as a dedication in the Artemesion.
1.

Raaflaub’s Challenge

Given these realities, little written historical evidence can be expected to survive today, and
even less that was written within Heraclitus’ lifetime. Accordingly, it is fair to ask if what little we
have is too little to contextualize Heraclitus’ thought at all. One of the few explicit critiques along
these lines is Kurt A. Raaflaub’s.44 After rejecting all the biographical details we find in Diogenes
Laertius, Plutarch, and Clement of Alexandria as useless or fictional45, he argues the following:
What does [the historical context] mean for our understanding of Heraclitus? Not much
because we do not know any details. For this very reason. even the reasonable assumption
that Heraclitus’s philosophy was at least partly rooted in his reaction to contemporary events
and experiences does not bring us any further. All we can say is that probably for most of his
life-time his polis was indeed governed by Persian-imposed tyranny and from soon after 494
by a more ‘isonomic’ system in which at least a sizable part of the citizen body had a say….
Given our condition of almost complete ignorance of Heraclitus's life and circumstances. the
only sound approach leads through his own statements – despite all uncertainties and
difﬁculties this entails.46
He goes on to conclude that from Heraclitus’ words alone we can detect a political component to
his thinking that includes “interesting and serious concerns for the community and the common
good.”47
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In other words, Raaflaub’s argument against the relevance of historical context in
interpreting Heraclitus is as follows. First, Raaflaub believes that biographical information about
Heraclitus is useless or fiction “most likely spun out of the philosophers own statements.”48 Even if
this were not so, he continues, we don’t have a detailed enough history of Ephesus or Ionia to help
us interpret him; we only know that it transitioned from client-state of Persia to isonomia. We do,
however, have his own statements in the fragments. He concludes by claiming that we can only look
to the fragments to understand Heraclitus.
Raaflaub’s argument unfairly represents our historical resources in two ways. First, he too
strongly discounts the usefulness of Diogenes Laertius’ biography of Heraclitus. Second, he seriously
underplays the importance of Ephesus’ transition from client-state to isonomia.
2.

The Problems of Ancient Biography

Concerning the first issue raised by Raaflaub, it is true that the credibility of ancient
biography is a debated matter. Unlike modern biography and history, the avowed purpose of most
of ancient examples of this genre was to provide edification or moral exempla first, information
about the past, second. Plutarch famously is more interested in the moral lessons that can be derived
from biographical anecdotes than he was with their veracity.49 Diogenes Laertius, on the other hand,
is adamant that he wants to provide an organized and coherent history of philosophy.50 While this
affords him a clean historical narrative, he runs the risk of forcing individual biographies into that
narrative. We can usually guess which philosophical views Diogenes (or his sources) disapproves of
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by his inclusion of scurrilous anecdotes about this or that philosopher – for example, Heraclitus’
supposed death by burying himself in cow manure.51
This problem is at the heart of Raaflaub’s assertion that biographical information about
Heraclitus is useless or fiction derived from sayings in Peri Physeos, itself; that Heraclitus’ “biography”
was “most likely spun out of the philosophers own statements.”52 His view is similar to Ava
Chitwood’s that “biographical tradition, favorable or hostile, arises from the subject’s philosophy,
but even more so from the biographers’ reaction to the subject’s philosophical work, read in a
personal manner as autobiography and not as philosophy.”53 In other words, since Diogenes
Laertius didn’t like something Heraclitus wrote, he crafted or curated anecdotes that cast the
philosopher in a bad light.
This reading finds support in the text of the biography itself where Diogenes uses a fragment
as evidence to support his biographical evaluation of Heraclitus. For example, he claims that
Heraclitus was “lofty-minded beyond all other men, and over-weening, as is clear from his book in
which he says: ‘Much learning does not teach understanding; else it would have taught Hesiod and
Pythagoras, or, again, Xenophanes and Hecataeus.’”54 While perhaps a bit overstated, Diogenes
interpretation of Heraclitus’ personality is not completely implausible.
However, Diogenes’ account is not without fault. He tends to present editorial remarks as
biographical facts. But does any of this mean that we cannot trust Diogenes’ account to have any
useful biographical facts? I would submit that we can still find some useful facts in Diogenes; that
asserting otherwise is a misunderstanding of the history of Greek biography and a conclusion that
goes beyond the evidence.
51
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3.

A Brief History of Ancient Greek Biography

We can roughly divide early biography written in Greek into three periods. For convenience,
I will refer to these periods as Ionian, Attic, and Hellenistic. The Ionian contained our first known
Greek biographies and autobiographies (500 – 480 B.C.E.).55 These biographies, much like the
nascent historiography of that period were straightforward accounts of figures of political
importance. Interest in biography seems concentrated in Ionia, rather than mainland Greece.56 This
may be due to the influence of the Persian interest in biographical accounts on the empire’s Greek
subjects. This idea is supported by the fact that “both Skylax and Xanthus, the first biographers in
the Greek language known to us, were Persian subjects.”57 As Momogliano writes, “Interest in kings
and tyrants is natural where kings and tyrants rule.”58 The private stories of kings and tyrants would
have acted as excellent propaganda as well. By contrast, interest in biography was very low in
Athens, since in the polis “private circumstances were made public and exploited by writers of
comedy and hostile orators or demagogues.”59
The Attic approach abruptly replaced these fifth-century biographical experiments in the
fourth century.60 The emergence of powerful military and political leaders, and the ever-changing
power dynamic between Athens and her neighbors focused attention on individual political leaders.61
This new prominence put pressure on writers to examine the lives of these figures in greater detail.
Often biographers could not find much detail in the sources available. The problem was stark.
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Readers wanted accounts of the “education, romantic entanglements, and characters of the subjects
read about. [But] [s]ince these features were less frequently supportable by documentation,
biographers naturally resorted to fiction.”62 Thus “[biography in the fourth century] came to occupy
an ambiguous position between fact and imagination.”63
This sort of biography was the norm until the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 B.C.E. Philip II of
Macedon’s decisive defeat of Athens and Thebes was a turning point in the history of Greece; it
ended any real Greek political autonomy for over a millennium. One change wrought by the coming
of Macedonian rule was an end to “experimentation on the borders between reality and fiction”64 in
biography. In its place, biography came under the sway of the Hellenistic “attitude of analysis and
stock-taking.”65 The champion of this approach to biography was the Pythagorean turned Peripatetic
Aristoxenus. According to Momigliano, the Hellenistic approach that mixed “erudition, scholarly
zeal, realism of details, and gossip”66 was his creation. In this era, “biography provided entertainment
for educated people who liked to know something about the lives of poets, philosophers, and
kings.”67 The Romans, as with so much else, took over this Hellenistic approach, and it spread with
their empire. It is this tradition that informed the work of Diogenes Laertius.
4.

Diogenes Laertius’ Credibility

We do not know his precise dates, but Diogenes Laertius lived some time during thirdcentury C.E.68 Much work on history of philosophy today depends on Diogenes’ Lives of the
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Philosophers to a greater or lesser degree.69 As a citizen of the Roman Empire he assumed a
thoroughly Hellenistic approach to biography. The “gossipy” part of this approach70 seems to be the
source of much of the criticism leveled at his work. It is true that he “spends considerable effort
relating the personal characteristics of philosophers, such as how they dressed, what they liked to
eat, how they exercised, their favorite pastimes, whether they drank alcohol, and what they said
about or did for friendship, marriage, and sex.”71 His work largely fits into what has been called the
“successions” genre, in which the focus is on the personal relationship between the individuals he
writes about rather than any doxographical72 connections.73
Since the prurient details seem philosophically irrelevant, it is easy to assume that these
details must be fictional. It is probable that this sort of analysis leads critics of Diogenes like
Raaflaub to conclude that all of Diogenes’ biographical details are suspect and not just the “gossipy”
ones. This conclusion, however, goes too far. It is anachronistic and goes beyond the evidence.
First, the perspective that personal details are irrelevant to understanding a philosopher is a
contemporary one that many ancient writers, including Diogenes, did not share. To authors like
Diogenes, these details were important to answering the question: “how should one live?”74 For
ancient readers the life and not just the arguments of philosophers were models to imitate and build upon.
This is comparable to the way that contemporary philosophers admire the life of Socrates. We
admire not just his skill at philosophical analysis, but also the saintly conviction he displays in the
Apology and Phaedo. Indeed, Socrates’ decision to submit to poisoning instead of fleeing into exile is a
69
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fascinating philosophical issue in its own right. Decisions about life and politics are ethically
important. There is little reason to think that this would be any different for the philosophers who
came before and after him.
Second, we have straightforward evidence that Diogenes was not especially mendacious. He
makes 1,186 references to 250 different authors and cites at least 365 different books as sources. 75
His differing presentation of his biographical subjects reveals that he seems to have stayed within
the limits of these sources. For all Post-Socratic schools, Diogenes presented a generalized
doxographical account of the school. Usually this account was included as part of the Life of the
school’s founder.76 Only in the Life of Pythagoras, does he deviate from this approach.77 This
suggests that either Diogenes had no sources about Pre-Socratic schools themselves, or that there
were none that matched Post-Socratic models.78 Further, since nothing was known of the life of the
philosopher Leucippus, Diogenes crafted a Life that was nothing but doxography.79 If he were as
unreliable as Raaflaub claims, he would have just invented biographical details for Leucippus.
Indeed, he could have generated one from the doxography itself, along the lines that Chitwood
suggests.
That Diogenes did not do this is at least evidence that he was interested in telling the most
truthful account that he could. I am not claiming that he does not embellish or editorialize. It is
impossible to prove he does not do the former and I gave an example above where I think he does
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the latter.80 But neither of these features is peculiar to Diogenes. They both stem from the
Hellenistic biographical tradition he was part of.
Careful reading can easily tell us when Diogenes is editorializing about a fragment, and when
he is relating a detail from his sources. I gave an example of the former above. For the latter,
consider Diogenes’ claim that Heraclitus turned down the kingship: “As a proof of his magnanimity
Antisthenes81 in his Successions of Philosophers cites the fact that [Heraclitus] renounced his claim to the
kingship in favour of his brother.”82 Notice that Diogenes cites a source for this claim, a practice not
all ancient authors could be relied upon to do with any regularity. It is thus unlikely that he derived
this biographical fact from Heraclitus’ philosophy. In addition, this fact is about political figures,
which we have seen was the preferred topic of archaic biographers. Hence it is probable this is an
actual anecdote about the archaic Ionian philosopher. There are numerous other examples in other
biographies in the Lives, where he does this. Diogenes likes to derive personal characteristics from his
interpretations of the writings of his subjects. This appears to be why he declares Plato to be jealous,
Antisthenes persuasive, Chrysippus arrogant, and Empedocles boastful.83
In other places Diogenes mixes editorialized biographical elements with those from his
sources. Thus, we find in the same paragraph a claim that Heraclitus was “nobody’s pupil” on the
basis of DK 101: “I searched for myself,” and that according to Sotion, Heraclitus was a student of
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Xenophanes.84 There are other examples where the reader can easily discern the editorial from the
sourced bits of the biography. If Diogenes intended to deceive his readers, he did a terrible job.
In short, we have no reason to be as dismissive of Diogenes as Raaflaub is inclined to be.
Diogenes is as careful as can be expected given the norms of ancient biography. Where those norms
differ from our own we may suspect he is speculating and draw conclusions more cautiously. Both
facts defang the criticism in Raaflaub’s first point. The information in Diogenes’ Life of Heraclitus is
not useless, and any “fiction” is separable from the facts. For example, the only place in Diogenes’
account where there is a serious conflict between the accounts he includes concerns Heraclitus’
death. On this matter he cites two sources giving different accounts of death by cow dung and two
sources claiming he died of an illness. The most likely explanation for these “death by dung”
accounts is that they are an extrapolation from one fragment, DK96: Corpses are more to be
thrown out than manure.
Further, several of the reported facts about Heraclitus’ biography point in the same general
direction, justifying a greater degree of confidence in them than might otherwise be justified. This is
clearly the case in Diogenes Laertius’ account. He recounts, for example, multiple sources claiming
Peri Physeos discussed politics. He also writes the several anecdotes suggesting Heraclitus’
“independence” like his rejection of the “kingship,” his not having a teacher, and his rejection of a
job with the Persian emperor.85 Thus I argue that there is room to assume that there are some facts
in Diogenes’ account that we can appeal to in order to understand Heraclitus better.
In the next section, I will endeavor to set down what I think those facts are.
Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 2:418. The issue of teacher/pupil influence on Heraclitus may have colored
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III.

Heraclitus: The Biographical Details in Historical Context
A.

The Biography

The following are what I judge to be the biographical facts about Heraclitus from Diogenes’
Life of Heraclitus and other sources.86 In other words, they are (1) not plainly “editorialized” from
fragments, and (2) either they are the type of fact that have a higher probability of preservation (i.e.
political events, birthplace, name of the work, etc.), or they seem to be rooted in something true
about him (e.g. he may never have written to the Persian king, but the story is consistent with other
anti-Persian stories about him). Heraclitus (Herakleitos), son of Bloson, was born in the Ionian city if
Ephesus (Ephesos) in the 530s B.C.E. His floruit date is given in Diogenes Laertius as the 69th
Olympiad (504-501 B.C.E.)87 and he is said to have lived for 60 years, giving us something like ca.
534 - 474 B.C.E. for his dates (with the floruit in the middle). He was probably some kind of
aristocrat, and his biographical details strongly suggest that his family claimed to be descendants of
the mythical founder of Ephesus, Androklos.88 If this is correct, then the “kingship” Diogenes
Laertius says he turned down in favor of his brother most likely was a priestly position analogous to
the archon basileis of Athens.89 Strabo claims that Androklids were called “basileis” and entitled to the
“privilege of front seats at the games and of wearing purple robes as insignia of royal descent, and
staff instead of sceptre, and of the superintendence of the sacrifices in honor of the Eleusinian
Demeter.”90 Heraclitus was allegedly asked to be a legislator by his fellow Ephesians, which he
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declined “because the state was already in the grip of a bad constitution [ponera politea].”91 He also is
said to have denied a job at the Persian court92 and to have persuaded the pro-Persian tyrant
Melankomas to abdicate.93 He placed his book, possibly called On Nature (Peri Physeos), as a
dedication in the Artemesion.94 The book was reportedly “divided into three discourses, one on the
universe [pantos], another on politics, and a third on theology.”95
B.

History of Ephesus

Of no less importance to his thinking are the details of the city in which he lived. Ephesus
was probably founded during the Dark Age (1100 -700 B.C.E.) or early Archaic Period (700 – 480
B.C.E.), supposedly by Athenian settlers. There is, however, no archaeological evidence to support
this ancient contention.96 At best, it may reflect the cultural and linguistic affinities between the two
poleis or an anachronistic reading of their political connections post-Persian Wars back into that much
earlier period. Ephesus may have counted the island of Samos as part of its territory for a time.97 A
pre-colonial settlement apparently existed and the colonists may have driven out (or perhaps more
likely integrated with) the local Leleges and Lydians.98 “Leleges” may merely be a Greek general term
for the pre-Greek inhabitants of Ionia and not a distinct people.99
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It is unclear how the city was governed, but it is probably safe to assume that it did not
diverge too far from the contemporary models.

Indeed, Ephesus probably had a Solonic

constitution from the sixth century until the end of the rule of the tyrant Melankomas in the
beginning of the fifth century.
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This constitution may have been put in place by Aristarchos of

Athens when the Ephesians called him to rule them.
From its very beginning, Ephesus was a settlement that was open to eastern influences. The
best example is “the cult and image of Artemis of Ephesus, a Greek goddess grafted onto an
Anatolian deity by the first Greek settlers.”101 The distinctive image of the goddess as “manybreasted” appears to be an early feature of the goddess at Ephesus, although the “breasts” may have
originally been “bulbs” similar to Carian depictions of Zeus.102 The feature probably dates back to
the Hittite tradition of depicting gods as wearing an animal-skin bag called a kursas, which was a
symbolic analogue to a cornucopia.103
In ca. 560 B.C.E. Croesus (Kroisos) of Lydia laid siege to the city.104 Desperate to win a losing
battle, the Ephesians, under the direction of the tyrant Pindar (Pindaros),105 dedicated their city to
Artemis “by tying a rope from the temple to the city wall.”106 Croesus reacted to this dedication by
granting Ephesus relative freedom among Lydia’s Hellenic subjects on the condition that Pindar
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(Croesus’ nephew107) was exiled.108 It was Croesus who helped rebuild the Artemision (which was
destroyed in a 7th century flood) by donating columns for the construction project.109 This may be
the beginning of the city’s close cultural connections with Lydia which is chiefly evident in the
architectural style of the Artemesion.110
After the conquest of the city, Pindar was replaced by the aisymnetes Pasicles.111 It is unclear
what the word “aisymnetes” meant at this time, as uses range from priestly office to something
analogous to the Athenian archon.112 This interpretation is reinforced by a fragment of Callimachus
which reads: “You were archon [aisymnao/eisymnao lit. “rule over”] of Ephesus, Pasicles, but from a
banquet.”113 Pasicles, in turn, was reportedly murdered by Melas, Pindar’s son.114
In 550 B.C.E. Cyrus became king of Persia.115 In 547/46 the Persians capture Sardis and
Croesus, ending the Lydian Empire.116 The Ionians appealed to Cyrus to maintain their autonomy
from Persia but were denied.117 Despite their attempts to fortify their cities, in 545 the Median
general of Persia Harpagos conquered all of Ionia.118 As part of this conquest, “[t]he Persians
replaced, rather than destroyed, the Ionians' Lydian and Egyptian markets for luxuries and
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mercenaries, and offered new opportunities to the Ionians by integrating them into their empire as
the naval arm of their advance into Europe and the Aegean archipelago.”119
Around this time, the Ephesians reportedly called the Athenian Aristarchos to serve as
aisymnetes for a term of five years.120 Aristarchos used his term to provide (or perhaps restore) a
Solonic constitution for the city.121 He was probably succeeded (ca. 541-537 B.C.E.) by the tyrants
Athenagoras and Comas, who are credited with exiling the poet Hipponax.122 It is probable that
these tyrants were Persian clients of native Ionian origin. If Ephesus followed the same pattern as
other cities, and we have no reason to think it did not, it is also probable that these clients were
allowed some independence and respect as tyrants or pretty kings (basileis) under the overlordship of
the Great King. 123
Accordingly, Heraclitus was most likely a young boy when, in 521 B.C.E. Darius became
king of Persia after a coup against Cambyses II, son of Cyrus. 124 For most of the philosopher’s life
until the Ionian Revolt, he would have been ruled by a succession of pro-Persian tyrants.125
Status among Ionian cities and among their self-styled basileis during this period was entirely
dependent on the Great King’s patronage.126 Each tyrant most likely competed to get more and
more privileges comparable to high-ranking Persians, most likely by extracting resources for the king
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from his immediate subjects.127 This Mede-izing probably bred resentment in the subject peoples of
Ionia. As Pericles B. Georges writes:
… Darius' clients broke the old rules of the game in the cities. Instead of securing popular
favor by benefactions and liturgies these tyrants were responsible for quite the opposite task
of collecting the dues of tribute and services which Darius had now established.128
In addition, these client tyrants could, in theory, remain in “power indefinitely by virtue of Persian
support alone.”129 These concerns, along with the personal grandeur in which they no doubt lived,
would have raised the hackles of other aristocrats in the poleis who did not enjoy this level of good
fortune. 130
The polis most “hand in glove” with the Persians was Ephesus’ greatest Ionian rival, Miletus
(Miletos).131 The Milesian tyrant Aristagoras was probably motivated by a desire to increase his status
with the Persian court by agreeing to lead the Naxian campaign.132 If successful, it would have aided
Darius in seizing control of the precious metal resources of Europe.133 When the Naxian campaign
proved to be an astounding military and financial failure for Aristagoras, his privileged position with
the Persians and within Miletus came under threat.134 Maintaining his position in the polis is probably
why Aristagoras underwent his astonishing conversion into a supporter of isonomia. 135
Aristagoras’ actions in 499 B.C.E., coupled with the already simmering economic resentment
in the poleis, led to the Ionian Revolt against the Persian Empire. It is unclear who was tyrant in
Ephesus at this time, but he no doubt followed Aristagoras’ example because in 498 the Ephesians
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aided the other Ionians in their siege of Sardis.136 Later that year, the joint Ionian forces were
defeated by the Persians at Ephesus.137 By 493 Mardonius (Darius’s son-in-law) had crushed the
revolt outright.138 The following year, as part of a region-wide Persian policy, the constitution of
Ephesus was changed into a democratic one.139 Gehrke speculates that it was in connection with
these constitutional reforms that Hermodorus (Hermodoros) (mentioned in DK121) was banished.
Presumably, the Ephesians asked Hermodorus to provide the polis with a new constitution, but he
fell short of expectations in some way.140
During the Battle of Mycale in 479 B.C.E., the Ionians in the Persian fleet followed the
Samian lead in switching sides to the Greeks.141 The Milesians guarding the passes did the same.142
This effectively amounted to a second Ionian revolt against the Persians. Following the Persian
defeat, the Ionians gained recognition as independent allies of the Hellenes.143 Given his age,
Heraclitus probably died within the next decade after Mycalae. The city joined the Delian League in
454/3.144 As there is no evidence that Ephesus changed its constitution again, it probably remained a
democracy at least as late as 415/414 when it left the Delian league and revolted against Athens.145
On the international stage, Ephesus had a reputation of extreme flexibility and neutrality.146
The relative wealth of the city in the region may have encouraged this policy as the Artemesion may
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have been, in effect, the most important regional “bank.”147 In turn, this relative international
stability may have led to relative intranational stability as (excepting the period that roughly coincides
with Heraclitus’s life) very few constitutional changes are attested in Ephesian history during
antiquity.148
IV.

A Brief Summary of My Argument
A.

An Application of My View

It is my view that we can use the foregoing historical context149 to help interpret Heraclitus’
difficult writing. For example, we know that Heraclitus seems to have been critical of his fellow
citizens since he twice criticizes them in the fragments. First there is the fragment concerning
Hermodorus150, DK121: All the adult Ephesians ought to hang themselves and to leave the
city to beardless boys: for they exiled Hermodorus, the one man of them who mas most
beneficial, saying, "Let there not be one man among who is the most beneficial -otherwise, may he be elsewhere among others." Second there is DK125a: "May your wealth
never abandon you," he said, "men of Ephesus, so that your wickedness can be proven." In
combination they tell us that Heracltius thought the Ephesians love wealth above ethical behavior
(DK125a) and do not know what or who serves the interests of the polis best. But this only leaves us
with more questions. That is to say, the fragments do not tell us what Hermodorus was actually
exiled for or what “wickedness” the Ephesians were guilty of.
Here is where history can provide some possible answers. Diogenes tells us that Heraclitus
refused to become a legislator because Ephesus was already in the grip of a “bad constitution.” 151
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The Greek for “bad constitution” here is ponera politea. Poneros can mean everything from painful and
grievous to worthless and knavish. Politea can mean “constitution” (as the translator here has
chosen), but it could also refer to the citizens of a polis themselves. Hence we can render the bit
from Diogenes as: Heraclitus refused to become a legislator because Ephesus was in the grip of a
“wicked citizenry”. This neatly fits with DK121 and 125a because they both represent critiques of
the Ephesian citizenry as bad in some way; DK125a in fact uses the word ponereumenoi for
“wickedness” and thus the same word is used in both the biographical anecdote and in the fragment.
This is one small way in which using history can help us understand Heraclitus.
History, however, has more help with these two fragments. Recall that in the last paragraph
of the previous section we learned that Ephesus had an extremely flexible foreign policy which saw
it side with whomever was the regional power at the time. This led to its relative stability and
probably its great wealth. Recall also that Heraclitus seems to proclaim the centrality of conflict in
several fragments. There seems to be a mismatch between Heraclitus views about conflict and the
history of Ephesus. This mismatch makes more sense when we include DK121 and DK125a back
into the picture. Both fragments (and the Diogenes anecdote) reveal that Heraclitus was critical of
the Ephesian citizenry as wicked and wealthy. With the benefit of historical context, we can now
venture as to why he had this critique. Heraclitus saw the Ephesian aversion to conflict as a kind of
moral failing.152
B.

Summary of the Essay

This is a sample of the interpretive potential of the approach I have argued for in this
chapter. I wish to argue that if we contextualize Heraclitus historically, as I have done above, we can
open up hitherto neglected areas of his thought. I believe that the influence that contemporary

In Heraclitus we thus have a thinker who, like the later Socrates, stood apart from contemporary opinion in favor of a
philosophical position.
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religion and politics had on his thinking can explain and make disparate themes in the fragments not
only explicable, but more sophisticated than previously recognized.
Up till now approaches to Heraclitus on religion have focused on his attitudes toward
religion rather than its influence on him. My approach seeks to emphasize this aspect of his
relationship to the religion of his time to further understand his ideas. To that end, I think we can
find several interesting connections. We can detect in his ideas borrowings from the cults of
Demeter/Kore at Eleusis and Apollo at Delphi. These influences help explain key Heraclitean terms
like xynos; they also explain why he felt the need to write in such a cryptic often ambiguous style. For
example, his cryptic sayings about life and death have a distinctly Eleusinian cast to them. In the
Mysteries mortals and immortals were brought closer, the line between them was made ambiguous;
this is something that not only Heraclitus, but later Plato, would take note of. Further, the Mysteries
were a communal experience that transcended the usual social divisions in the Greek world. We see
echoes of this in the Heraclitean idea of the xynos (i.e. “shared” or “common”).
He could not easily communicate the fruitful ambiguities of the Mysteries in words. First,
because the rituals were secret, and second because words are too easily misunderstood or distorted.
Accordingly, Heraclitus turned to the oracular ambiguity exemplified by the Oracle at Delphi for a
writing model. Just as that Oracle used ambiguous poetry to give a focus to communal discussion
and decision-making, Heraclitus seems to have hoped his own poetry would spark similar behavior
in his readers.
We can see this emphasis on the common/communal extended into his political thinking as
well. Here the influence of contemporary developments in law and politics were key. Inspired by the
complicated politics of his time, the development of the polis as an institution, and drawing on
political and religious metaphors he had access to as a member of a priestly family, Heraclitus
concluded that the common thread in human life was the same as can be observed in nature:
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conflict, where that means both things in opposition to one another, but also to indicate the
interdependence of those opposed things as in DK51: They do not comprehend how, diverging,
it accords with itself: a backward-turning fitting-together (harmonia), as of a bow and a lyre. It
is hardly a coincidence that the bow and the lyre were associated with the god Apollo.
During his lifetime, Heraclitus experienced the rule by pro-Persian tyrants, a revolt against
the Persian Empire, and a change to the Ephesian constitution which influenced him to believe that
politics is conflictual. This viewpoint put him at odds with the less developed political awareness
(awareness of the uniqueness of the polis and its nomos, and the need to defend it) of his fellow
Ephesians. It is probable Heraclitus was at odds with his fellow Ephesians for their Mede-izing
(Pro-Persian) tendencies. I have already made an analysis along these lines above.153 His views on
ethics and politics (particularly about the common and the role of law) or reactions to them would
go on to influence thinkers from Democritus to the Stoics.
In the next chapter I will examine different interpretations of Heraclitus on religion and I
will argue that they focus too much on his attitudes toward religion and not enough on what religion
could have inspired in his thought.
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CHAPTER 2: INTERPRETING HERACLITUS ON RELIGION
One of the most interesting and controversial questions concerning Heraclitus’ philosophy is
what his views are on religion. Closely related is the question of what influence religion may have
had on his other philosophical ideas. To paraphrase Mantas Adomenas, when we look at the ideas of
Pre-Socratic thinkers we are looking at philosophy in its infancy and how it related to the important
cultural traditions of that time.154 If we want to understand how philosophy developed we must
understand how it evolved out of a critique of and an attempt to understand these traditions. One
question concerns the uniformity of these critiques. Did all early philosophers share the same goals
and methods? As Adomenas explains
Were all the early philosophic attempts characterised by emancipation from traditional piety,
as the conventional opinion of scholars would have us believe? Or was there a more
complex pattern in the relationship to traditional religion, represented by one of the most
prominent proponents of the enterprise that had yet to define itself as ‘philosophy’?155
In this Chapter I discuss both questions.
There are (roughly) three main lines of interpretation that previous commentators have
adopted toward Heraclitus’ views on religion.156 First, I will briefly examine the three interpretations
and then I will present my own alternative approach. As I will explain, my own view is that, far from
seeking to “emancipate” his contemporaries from traditional religion, Heraclitus sought to apply the
innovative ideas he found in that religion. His interpretation of popular Greek religion was a source of
many of Heraclitus’ philosophical ideas and methods.
I.

Three Interpretations of Heraclitus on Religion
The first interpretation imagines Heraclitus as analogous to Enlightenment atheists like

Voltaire. Thinkers, like Kahn, who support this view place emphasis on fragments like DK14, DK15
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& DK5 (quoted below on pp 40 and 41), which seem to challenge or question certain existing
religious practices. Kahn’s reasoning seems to be that the apparent critique of mystical practices
(especially those associated with Dionysos) amounts to a critique of all Greek religion. In other
words, Heraclitus was a religious skeptic. Kahn states his view most forcefully in his commentary on
DK14:
Heraclitus is not an aristocrat or conservative in religious matters. He is a radical, an
uncompromising rationalist, whose negative critique of the tradition is more extreme than
that of Plato a century later. Plato breaks only with current beliefs about the gods; in matters
of cult he follows the principle that custom is king. Not so Heraclitus. Despite his great
respect for nomos as the legal order and moral cement of the community, in matters of piety
and psychic destiny he denounces what is customary among men (ta no mizomena) as a tissue
of folly and falsehood.157
Heraclitus, Kahn believes, was an early iconoclast.
The second interpretation is Glenn Most’s. Most believes that Heraclitus is a kind of reinterpreter of Greek religion; his Heraclitus is a kind of early Philo of Alexandria. As Most puts it,
“he seems in general to be applying his philosophical reason to the phenomenon of Greek religion
with a fundamentally conservative intent, rejecting what he must, saving what he can by
reinterpreting it.”158 On Most’s view Heraclitus is not concerned with tearing down all of traditional
Greek religion, instead “[h]e prefers to focus on the cults of the city and on established ritual and
mystery practices, isolating elements that he takes to correspond to his own views and hinting at
why and how they do so.”159 In other words a comment like (DK5) They are purified in vain,
because they are polluted (mianomenoi) by blood, just as if someone who had stepped into
mud cleaned himself with mud is not meant to damn the Dionysiac cult itself, but to make the
reader think critically about the sensibleness of that “purification” practice.
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Whereas Most sees Heraclitus as a kind of philosophical interpreter of religion, a third
interpretation presents Heraclitus as a thinker using philosophy to reform traditional Greek religion or
at least how his contemporaries thought about it. The best example of this view is Mantas
Adomenas’. Adomenas believes that Heraclitus’ goal was not to tear down traditional institutions
and beliefs, but to make his audience see that they were viewing them incorrectly.

He sees

Heraclitus as “an interpreter, who tries to discern the pattern inherent in the existing practices, and
exploit it in the construction of his own philosophical theology.”160 For Adomenas, Heraclitus is
mining religion for examples that illustrate points about the logos that the philosophically unlettered
would not discern otherwise.
In what follows I am going to provide reasons why we should reject Kahn’s and Most’s
interpretations of Heraclitus, while accepting the general thrust of Adomenas’ approach as part (but
only a part) of an approach that I will defend.
II.

Kahn’s View: Was Heraclitus a Religious Skeptic?
The view that Heraclitus was a religious skeptic or Enlightenment-style atheist centers on

three fragments: DK5, DK14, & DK15:
DK14: To whom does Heraclitus of Ephesus address his prophesies? To “nightwanderers, Magi, Bacchants, Maenads, and initiates (mustai).” It is to these that he
prophesies "the fire" [cf. D84]. For "they are initiated (mueisthai) impiously into the
mysteries (musteria) that are recognized among men."
DK5: They are purified in vain, because they are polluted (mainomenoi) by blood, just
as if someone who had stepped into mud cleaned himself with mud: if any [scil. other]
human noticed him doing this, he would think that he was mad (mainesthai). And they
pray to these statues, just as if someone were to converse with houses, not knowing
who the gods and heroes are.
DK15: If it were not for Dionysus that they performed the procession and said the
hymn to the shameful parts (aidoia), most shamefully (anaidestata) would they be acting;
but Hades is the same as Dionysus, for whom they go mad (mainesthai) and celebrate
maenadic rites.
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For Kahn, these fragments reveal a “radical, an uncompromising rationalist.”161 Kahn’s Heraclitus
was not content rejecting the vague theology of the poets. On this view, the Ephesian also rejected
the rites and cults intertwined with the polis that, also according to Kahn, Plato was content to leave
be.
This interpretation is problematic. First, it sits poorly with Heraclitus’ own invocation of
religious language in a positive light both in these three fragments themselves as well as others. Let
us look at these three fragments in greater detail. DK14 says that “they” (the groups listed earlier in
the fragment) are initiated “impiously into the mysteries that are recognized among men.” The
mysteries themselves are not “impious”; the initiation is. Thus, it is far from obvious that he is
criticizing the mysteries themselves.
Further, to recognize an impious action is to recognize that there is a pious way to do that
same thing. If I criticize how someone throws a baseball, I imply that I think there is a right way to
throw a baseball. Thus, Heraclitus’ invocation of the idea of impiety suggests that he is not rejecting
religious ideas entirely. He clearly believes in some notion of the divine; impiety is a violation against
the divine and thus the charge itself assumes the existence of the divine.
A supporter of Kahn’s position might argue that Heraclitus is merely using religious
language to subvert it. He could be using it in a sarcastic or ironic way. But this position fails to
account for Heraclitus’ declaring that those who are initiated impiously deserve “the fire.” That
statement implies some sort of evaluation of the group. Recall that in DK66 Heraclitus writes:
When the fire has come upon all things, it will judge them and seize hold of them. Fire in
that fragment is a metaphor for justice and punishment. Hence Heraclitus is probably condemning
this group and not using religious language ironically.
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Consequently, DK14 appears to be a comment from within the Greek religious tradition. It is
does not say that this tradition is false or problematic. Rather, Heraclitus is attempting to cast a
critical eye on certain behaviors that he believes are unworthy of that tradition.
We can make a similar analysis of DK5 and DK15. In DK5 an unspecified “they” are
“purified in vain” because they are “polluted by blood.” Here again Heraclitus is assuming a position
from within the Greek religious tradition to criticize certain practitioners of it. As I will discuss
below, Heraclitus was associated with the cult of Demeter at Eleusis. One of the few things that
disqualified one from becoming an initiate of her Mysteries was the ritual pollution suffered by
anyone who had committed murder.162 It is reasonable to conclude that Heraclitus thought it was
literal madness for someone to think they can be “purified” by blood. Impurity cannot make one
pure.
Purification by blood is just as mad in his mind as praying to statue as if “as if someone
were to converse with houses.” The statues represent gods and heroes, but the statues are not the
gods and heroes themselves. To think otherwise is madness akin to believing a baby doll is a living
child or talking to a house instead of the people who live within it.
It would be too easy to take this latter point too far and conclude that Heraclitus, like some
modern Christian critic, is declaring Greek religion to be statue worship. Indeed, if DK15 were the
only religion fragment we might be justified in concluding this. But this is a mistake. Consider the
following fragments:
DK24: Gods and humans honor those men whom Ares has slain.
DK32: One thing, what is wise: it does not want and does want to be called only by
the name of Zeus.
DK53: War is the father of all and the king of all, and has revealed that the ones are
gods and the others humans, and has made the ones slaves and the others free.
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DK62: Immortals mortals, mortals immortals, living the death of these, dying the life
of those.
DK79: A grown man is called puerile by a divinity, just as a child is by a grown man.
DK83: The wisest human being will seem to be a monkey compared to a god in
wisdom, beauty, and everything else.
DK100: … the sun, which is the overseer and observer of these things [i.e. limits and
periods], becomes the collaborator of the god who leads and is first, by limiting,
judging, revealing, and illuminating the changes and seasons that bring all things,
according to Heraclitus.
DK93: The lord whose oracle is the one in Delphi neither speaks nor hides but gives
signs.
DK94: The sun will not overstep measures, otherwise, the Erinyes, Justice's helpers,
will find it out.
All these fragments use language concerning the gods or the divine. While some might be using
“religious colloquialisms” – much like some people still say “A.D” even though they are not
believing Christians – many are references to individual gods. DK93 and DK94 unquestionably refer
to Apollo and the Furies, respectively and DK32 refers to Zeus by name.
More importantly, none of these fragments suggests a skeptical attitude toward (or rejection
of) the gods mentioned. Rather, they use the gods as comparatives to humans (DK53, DK62,
DK79, and DK83), as enforcers of norms or order (DK24, DK100, DK94), or as mysterious
sources of wisdom (DK32, DK93). Much like DK5, DK14, and DK15 they suggest an engaged
critical attitude, rather than an “uncompromising rationalist.”
Apart from the consistency problems Kahn’s interpretation causes, as Most has pointed out,
it relies on a questionable generalization “from the individual ritual practices that Heraclitus
discusses so as to arrive at a category of Greek religion as a whole.”163 There is simply no reason to
motivate this move apart from a desire to see Heraclitus as a kind of Pre-Socratic Voltaire.164 It may,
in fact, reflect too strong a reliance on the Christian sources of the fragments, like Clement of
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Alexandria. Clement selects quotations from Heraclitus to portray Greek religious practices as silly
or corrupt. For example, here is DK14 in context:
These are the secret mysteries of the Athenians; these Orpheus records. I shall produce the
very words of Orpheus, that you may have the great authority on the mysteries himself, as
evidence for this piece of turpitude:
"Having thus spoken, she drew aside her garments,
And showed all that shape of the body which it is improper to name, the growth of
puberty;
And with her own hand Baubo stripped herself under the breasts.
Blandly then the goddess laughed and laughed in her mind,
And received the glancing cup in which was the draught."
And the following is the token of the Eleusinian mysteries: I have fasted, I have drunk the cup; I
have received from the box; having done, I put it into the basket, and out of the basket into the chest. Fine
sights truly, and becoming a goddess; mysteries worthy of the night, and flame, and the
magnanimous or rather silly people of the Erechthidæ, and the other Greeks besides, "whom
a fate they hope not for awaits after death." To whom does Heraclitus of Ephesus address
his prophesies? To "night-wanderers, Magi, Bacchants, Maenads, and initiates
(mustai)." It is to these that he prophesies "the fire." For "they are initiated (mueisthai)
impiously into the mysteries (musteria) that are recognized among men." [translation
altered for consistency]165
After declaring various Greek mystery traditions to be ludicrous and profane, Clement selects DK14
as authority that even a pagan Greek thought these practices were problematic. He assumes that
Heraclitus’ critique is of a piece with his own.
Kahn appears to take up Clement’s approach even if he does not have Clement’s motivation.
He concludes that “Heraclitus’ polemic is not directed against vulgar superstition, the cult of the
uneducated masses, as some commentators suppose. The religion under attack is that of Pindar and
Sophocles.”166 This is an understandable, if misguided, conclusion. In the fragments mentioned, and
in a small number of other fragments, Heraclitus makes statements that taken literally and devoid of
context could have shocked the religious sensibilities of his readers. Kahn takes the shocking nature
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of these fragments as evidence that Heraclitus wanted to do away with the entire edifice of Greek
religion.
For example, consider DK96: Corpses are more to be thrown out than manure.167
Ancient Greeks, like many cultures, had elaborate rituals and rules concerning the handling of
human corpses. Thus, one way to interpret this fragment is as a direct attack on Greek funerary rites.
This appears to be how Kahn takes it when he writes: “No utterance of Heraclitus is better
calculated to offend the normal religious sensitivities of an ancient Greek than this contempt for the
cult of the dead, as every reader of the Antigone will recognize. The shock effect of this aphorism
made it one of the best known throughout antiquity.”168 While this is not the only possible
interpretation of this fragment, it is the most popular. Kahn and others surmise that since Heraclitus
appears to believe (from other fragments) that the psyche is the core element of the person, that the
body is as useless as literal waste after death.169 This is a plausible connection, but not the best
interpretation available.
My alternative is that Heraclitus is trying to draw attention to the apparent conflict between
funerary rites and the decay of human remains. Adomenas echoes my views when he argues that
the fragment concerns the apparent conflict between putrefaction and veneration of the corpse. The
Greeks lived in a Mediterranean climate, and a corpse would not have survived a showing for long
without decay setting in. Adomenas thinks it is possible that the fragment may have been longer and
represented another example of the unity of opposites: “The logical emphasis of the fragment may
have been placed on the contradiction between this and traditional funeral practices. The surviving
words may have constituted a first part of the fragment that would have run something like the
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following: ‘Corpses are more to be thrown away than dung, and yet they are afforded various ritual
honours / almost god-like veneration / sumptuous funerals vel sim.’”170
Another variation on this theme suggested by Adomenas is that Heraclitus may be calling
attention to the paradoxical treatment of corpses within the religious tradition itself. Even though
the tradition honors and venerates dead bodies, that same tradition declares that one is “polluted” by
touching them.171 Thus the tradition itself recognizes a kind of unity of opposites when it comes to
corpses, which are treated as both sacred and polluted. After the post-Platonic devaluation of the
body that became common in Western thought “it would not be surprising if the same sentiment
were read into Heraclitus’ fragment, simultaneously failing to notice its paradoxical content, and only
its memorable opening was transmitted through quotations.”172
Kahn, however, tacitly rejects this interpretation of DK96. For Kahn, this fragment can only
mean a devaluation of the body that was shocking to the Greek religious tradition. Even assuming
Kahn is correct, however, it underdetermines the conclusions he draws from it. In his commentary
to DK14 he uses DK96 as evidence for his conclusion that Heraclitus launched an all-out attack on
Greek religion.173 As we have seen above it is questionable that DK114 itself suggests such an attack
since in other places Heraclitus seems to appeal to aspects of that religious tradition. But it is even
more questionable to connect the two fragments as Kahn does. At best Kahn’s interpretation of
DK96 suggest that Heraclitus had some heterodox ideas about corpses. If Kahn is right about
DK14 as well, Heraclitus may also have had heterodox ideas about mystery religions. But there is a
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difference between having heterodox ideas about a subject and rejecting that subject wholesale.
Hesiod’s view of the gods differed from Sophocles, Sophocles’ views differ from Euripides’, etc.
Some of these differences were slight, e.g. between Hesiod and Sophocles. Some of these
differences were great as between Sophocles and Euripides.174 Yet it would be facile to suggest that
these differences amounted to a rejection of the whole of traditional Greek religion.
Heterodoxy need not count as heresy. This is particularly true in a religious culture like that
of the Greeks which had no centralized religious authority and no scriptural canon. True, the Greeks
recognized crimes against religion. We need only think of one of the charges against Socrates. If
Heraclitus was so much more heterodox than Plato, as Kahn claims, then why are there no
anecdotes about his facing charges like Socrates? Surely such a radical view of religion would have
made some ripple, at least, in the biographical tradition. Perhaps Ephesus was more permissive than
Athens. Certainly, there is a case for this. Athens at the time of Socrates’ trial was in a state of
existential crisis. It had gone from hegemony to massive population decline, crushing naval losses,
and civil unrest. Socrates was sympathetic to oligarchy and was the teacher of Critias (leader of the
Thirty Tyrants) and the untrustworthy Alcibiades. Athens was in no mood to have its values
questioned by such a character.
Comparatively, Heraclitus’ Ephesus was only briefly under its own rule during the Ionian
Revolt. Its Persian overlords had little interest in interfering in Greek or any other non-Persian
religious affairs. One could argue that this was a much more permissive environment for religious
heterodoxy than fourth century B.C.E. Athens. Heraclitus provides evidence that Ephesus was not
entirely tolerant, however. For evidence, we need only look at another Heraclitean fragment
(DK121):

Euripides’ depiction of the gods is famously heterodox. He depicts them less as ordered arbiters of justice and more
as brute forces of nature that man cannot comprehend.
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All the adult Ephesians ought to hang themselves and to leave the city to beardless
boys: for they exiled Hermodorus, the one man of them who mas most beneficial,
saying, "Let there not be one man among us who is the most beneficial -- otherwise,
may he be elsewhere among others."
History does not record the reason for Hermodorus’ exile, but there is a (probably spurious)
tradition that Hermodorus went to Rome to help the decemvirs compose the famous Twelve
Tables.175 We can extrapolate that Hermodorus was some sort of legal reformer who was exiled
because of his heterodox legal views. It is thus these views which Heraclitus thinks would have been
beneficial to the city. Contextualized, Hermodorus thus resembles Socrates. Indeed, the tone of this
fragment is very much like the tone of the Apology. Socrates tells the jurors that his inquiries are
beneficial to the well-being of Athens. Despite this, he is punished.
Similarly, if Heraclitus’ heresy or impiety was so great, he should have at least met the fate of
Hermodorus. Heraclitus was from a clerical family. His words concerning the gods would have
carried great weight. His religious writings would likely have drawn attention if they had been radical.
After all, he did not hide Peri Physeos. He dedicated it to one of the most famous temples in the
world. In a pre-printing world this was basically publication. Thus, I do not think it is persuasive to
argue that we have overlooked a “radical” Heraclitus because of Ephesian permissiveness.
In summary, there simply is no compelling argument that Heraclitus was a radical religious
skeptic. First, this interpretation seems to contradict several other fragments where Heraclitus is not
so critical. Second, this interpretation appears to owe more to a reliance on the bias of our early
Christian source of some of the fragments, Clement of Alexandria, and less on historical context.
Third, the fragments to which Kahn appeals underdetermine his conclusions. Finally, as I will argue
in the next chapter, contemporary religious ideas had a significant positive role in shaping Heraclitus’
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philosophy which suggests that he approved of at least some elements of the Greek religious
tradition.
III.

Most’s View: Heraclitus as Philo of Alexandria
Where Kahn saw Heraclitus as a sort of religious skeptic, purging Greek religion of its

irrational features, Glenn Most has a different view. Heraclitus, he argues neither offers a systematic
theology of abstract gods, nor presents a polemic against existing theological ideas. Instead, his
approach is one of “selection and accommodation.”176 Instead of setting himself up as an opponent
of Greek religion, Heraclitus
… seems to want to make us think critically about religion (and since he is Greek, it is about
Greek religion that he wants to make us think critically), pointing out structures and
paradoxes inherent in its religious practice and inviting us to reflect on them by attempting
to develop conceptions of the gods, and of cults in their honor, that would be worthy of
their divinity and of our belief in them.177
Thus, wherever possible he links the gods with traits that he considers laudable (i.e. justice, wisdom)
and highlights problems with contemporary practices and beliefs where he thinks they are missing
the mark.
Most’s argument is brief, and his rejection of alternative views is cursory at best, but his
argument looks something like the following. Unlike Xenophanes and Parmenides, who are
concerned with divinity in general, Heraclitus seems to focus on specific religious practices. 178
Xenophanes was interested in the gods of the poets like Homer and Hesiod who are, in his view,
too anthropomorphic and too immoral.179 By contrast, Most argues, “[t]he gods that interest
[Heraclitus] are not those of the poets but those of the city and the mysteries, and it is these that he
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tries to set into relation with his philosophical views.”180 Where Heraclitus does concern himself
with the nature of the gods, he is “performing a kind of philosophical allegoresis, translating
characteristics into concepts within the terms of his philosophical system – and thus, as it were,
saving (at least some of) the appearances of Greek religion.”181 Thus, Most concludes that Heraclitus
is not a skeptic but “seems in general to be applying his philosophical reason to the phenomenon of
Greek religion with a fundamentally conservative intent, rejecting what he must, saving what he can
by reinterpreting it.”182 In short, Heraclitus’ concern was not with theology, but religion.183
Although he does not mention him by name, Most’s model of Heraclitus is strikingly like
Philo of Alexandria.184 Like Philo, Most’s Heraclitus is interested in “saving the appearances” of
Greek religion through reinterpretation of their meanings. Peri Physeos itself would, of course,
provide these meanings.

In other words, by giving Greek religion meanings consistent with

Heraclitus’ own philosophy, he hopes to save it from itself. It is hard to see how this does not make
Heraclitus a kind of “reformer” and Most does not clearly explain why his view is categorically
different from Adomenas’185 even though he is critical of Adomenas’ views and is responding to
them in part. But even if we take Most at his word, his approach leaves much to be desired.
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Despite their faults, Adomenas’186 views, although expressed earlier than Most’s, present a
credible alternative: that Heraclitus was using religious examples to support his philosophical views.
Only one fragment, DK32, provides any kind of support for Most’s approach: One thing, what is
wise: it does not want and does want to be called only by the name of Zeus. Most notes that it
the subject of the sentence is to sophon (“what is wise”) and not Zeus. He suggests that although
fragment assumes the existence of Zeus “at the same time he is being depersonalized, generalized,
identified with an abstract category of which he is the supreme representative.”187 Thus, argues Most,
humanity is only partially correct about Zeus. They are right to call him Zeus, but this is a partial
truth. The “wise” is greater than just the entity picked out by the name “Zeus.”
Even if Most is correct about this fragment, it is plainly compatible with Adomenas’ views.
In Adomenas’ essay he writes, citing DK32 inter alia, that “[o]ne must be aware, however, that for
Heraclitus the ultimate principle of reality transcends deities involved in the ritual and cult of the
traditional religion.”188 While the ultimate truth transcends the traditional usage of the gods of cult
and tradition “‘[m]ortals’ and ‘immortals’ (fr. 62), ‘men’ and ‘gods’ become pairs of opposites in the
context of overall unifying structure that lies beyond the division into ‘human’ and ‘divine.’” 189
Hence Adomenas sees DK32 as consistent with his views.
Indeed, Most’s approach to this fragment fits neatly into my framework in this essay, which
on this point doesn’t stray far from Adomenas’. If I am correct that Heraclitus’ historical context
(including popular religion) influenced his philosophical method and views, a fragment like DK32 is
only to be expected. This is especially true of the influence that mystery religion had on Heraclitus
which I shall discuss in the next chapter. On my view, in DK32, Heraclitus is announcing that there
186
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is an exoteric and esoteric truth about Zeus. The “exoteric” truth is that he is the Zeus of myth,
powerful and promiscuous. The “esoteric” truth, analogous to the experience of someone fully
initiated in the Mysteries, is that Zeus is also “what is wise.” Calling that entity “Zeus” is not wrong;
it is merely the partial knowledge of the un-initiated.
A second problem with Most’s approach is that contrary to his claim that Heraclitus is
“rejecting what he must” it is not clear that Heraclitus is truly “rejecting” anything in popular
religion. I have already discussed at length why it is problematic to conclude from DK5, DK14, and
DK15, that Heraclitus is “rejecting” mystery religion. Indeed, his overwhelming approach appears to
be a “rejection” of thinkers and practitioners rather than practices themselves. Recall individual
thinkers like Pythagoras, Hesiod and Xenophanes that he singles out for scorn. Also recall groups he
seems to dislike, like his fellow Ephesians, people who mindlessly follow the poets, or people who
profess to have their own private (as opposed to common) understanding. His worry is not that
there is no subject to understand, but merely some people are terrible at understanding it.
Finally, I think Most’s approach misses what is interesting about sorting out Heraclitus’
relationship to popular religion. Adomenas puts the matter well:
Why should the way Heraclitus related to the practices and beliefs current in the popular
religion of his time be so important? At stake is, I propose, the relationship between
philosophy in statu nascendi and one of the more important aspects of the Greek cultural
tradition. Were all the early philosophic attempts characterised by emancipation from
traditional piety, as the conventional opinion of scholars would have us believe? Or was
there a more complex pattern in the relationship to traditional religion, represented by one
of the most prominent proponents of the enterprise that had yet to define itself as
‘philosophy’?190
Most’s view is trapped by the frame created by previous scholars of an antagonism between religion
and philosophy, where philosophy plays the role of emancipator. Although he claims that Heraclitus
acts with a “conservative” intent, he still assumes that Heraclitus is trying to make popular religion

190

Adomenas, 88.

51

conform wherever possible to his philosophy. This assumption reveals the shadow cast by Socrates’
trial for blasphemy and treason that occurred long after Heraclitus lived. We cannot assume that
this antagonism between religion and philosophy would have existed for Heraclitus too.
To summarize, I do not agree with Most that Heraclitus’ intent was to make Greek religion
conform to his philosophy. Heraclitus was not simply trying to save the acceptable bits of Greek
religion through “quasi-allegoresis.”191 Although in some ways this view is less radical than Kahn’s
suggestion that Heraclitus is rejecting conventional Greek religion altogether it simply goes far
beyond and even contradicts our evidence.
IV.

Adomenas’ View: Was Heraclitus a Religious Reformer?
A third view of Heraclitus is that he was a religious reformer. The exemplar of this view is

Mantas Adomenas. In his article “Heraclitus on Religion” he challenges the prevailing view of
Heraclitus as a skeptic of traditional religion who proposes a rationalist theology to replace it.
Adomenas credits the genesis of this view to the assumption that Heraclitus was a successor to the
ideas of Xenophanes. An assumption that he rejects in favor of a more complicated view of
Heraclitus that sees him as a sort of religious reformer instead of a rationalist theologian.
After dispensing with the idea that Heraclitus was a follower or student of Xenophanes192,
Admoenas examines the controversial fragments (DK14 & DK15 especially) to see what better
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sense he can make of them. Primarily he thinks that Heraclitus is selecting religious practices that
exemplify the unity of opposites. To that end, Adomenas first examines the controversial DK14 and
DK15.
Adomenas compares the language of impiety in DK14 (i.e. they are initiated impiously
into the mysteries that are recognized among men) to the pagan apologetics of Iambilichus in
the Mysteries of the Egyptians.193 Iambilichus explains that the phalli used in obscene rights should be
seen as allegories for the process of generation. Further, he argues that obscene rituals can be
cathartic for “just as the attempt to constrain passions intensifies them, so, to an equal degree, short
and limited indulgence appeases, purifies the passions and reduces their strength.”194 It is after this
passage that he cites Heraclitus DK68: “Heraclitus calls them [i.e. obscene rituals and hymns]
cures.” If we combine this reference with D58 (Doctors, Heraclitus says, cutting, cauterizing,
badly mistreating their patients in every way, complain that they do not receive an adequate
payment from their patients-- and are producing the same effects, benefits and diseases)
Adomenas argues, we can recontextualize DK14. Just as doctors paradoxically inflict the pain of
surgery to remove the pain of disease, obscene rituals which appear impious paradoxically “cure”
something wrong with the ritual practitioner.195 Adomenas is arguing that DK14, like DK58, is an
example where Heraclitus is highlighting the “unity of opposites.”
Following this line of reasoning, Adomenas cleverly interprets DK15 (If it were not for
Dionysus that they performed the procession and said the hymn to the shameful parts…) as
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another example of Heraclitus’ doctrine. He argues that the identification of Hades and Dionysos in
the latter half of the fragment is grounded in Greek representations of the latter god. Dionysos the
god of wine and vitality is also linked with death.196 His birth occurs after the death of his mortal
mother Semele who was turned to ash when she saw Zeus in all his glory. Another version has him
as Zagreus, the son of Zeus and Persephone who was torn apart by Titans at the instigation of Hera.
Finally, Dionysos’ own mystery cult was associated with secrets of the afterlife. Thus, the
identification of Dionysos (life) and Hades (death) would be another example of the unity of
opposites found in the world.
On a casual reading of DK15, Heraclitus is criticizing the Dionysiac procession and hymn as
shameful things that society gives a pass because they are religious rituals. On Adomenas’ view, there
is no criticism at all. Instead, Heraclitus is telling us that the ritual itself is an example of the unity of
opposites, and that is what makes it sacred. So the fragment is a kind of doubling of the unity of
opposites. First Hades (death) and Dionysos (life) are two sides of the same coin. Second the
“shameful” acts are also sacred. The unity of the first pair of opposites explains the unity of the
second pair.
Adomenas applies his interpretive framework to other fragments on religion. DK5: They
are purified in vain, because they are polluted (mianomenoi) by blood, just as if someone who
had stepped into mud cleaned himself with mud… The ritual in question is probably the
“Apollonian ritual of purification from murder – a piglet was killed over the murderer’s head, so that
the blood would drip onto his head and hands.”197 The idea behind the ritual appears to be
something like sympathetic magic.198 Since the person was polluted by human blood, they must
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symbolically experience that pollution again to remove the miasma. This fragment is thus another
example of the unity of opposites because it shows that blood is paradoxically both polluting and
purifying.199
Adomenas continues in this vein toward his conclusion. Obviously, he disagrees with Kahn
and others that Heraclitus was a kind of skeptic or critic of religion. Instead, Adomenas concludes
that Heraclitus saw in religion a fertile ground for examples of his doctrine of the unity of opposites.
In other words, Adomenas’ Heraclitus ventures to give a somewhat systematic account of religion to
use that account as further justification for his philosophical views. That is to say, “Heraclitus treats
religious practices in a way similar to his treatment of ethics and politics, which he also tries to
incorporate into his highly integrated vision of reality, whereby a universal principle (identical with
the content of the logos that Heraclitus announces) governs both the cosmos and human society.”200
To summarize, there is much to be said in favor of Adomenas’ views on the issue. Admomes
(although he rejects the label) presents Heraclitus as a kind of reformer who wants to use his
philosophy to change common views of religion and use religion as a source of examples in his
philosophy. In the main, I think Adomenas is broadly correct. As I argued in Section I, the idea that
Heraclitus was a religious skeptic is unsustainable. Further, Adomenas is in safe territory extending
the unity of opposites doctrine to cover the controversial religious fragments. If anything can be said
to be a main theme in Heraclitus, it is the unity of opposites. My only concern is that since we do
not have his complete work, we do not know if the unity of opposite theme ran throughout the
complete work or if it was confined to the fragments that have survived.. Thus, while Adomenas’
interpretation is supported by an approach that favors a presupposition of “thematic unity” to De
conceive as a kind of invisible ether.” James George Frazer, The Golden Bough: A Study of Magic and Religion, 2003,
http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/3623?msg=welcome_stranger#chapter3.
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and the foulest: for fish it is drinkable and life-giving, but for humans undrinkable and deadly.
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Physeos, other equally plausible presuppositions undermine that support. Most importantly, however,
in focusing on how Heraclitus used religion to illustrate his philosophical ideas, I believe that
Adomenas misses how religion influenced what those ideas were in the first place. I shall discuss this
latter issue in greater detail in the next chapter.
V.

My View
My own approach makes the reasonable assumption that Heraclitus would have been

influenced by his historical milieu and expands from there. We know that Heraclitus was a member
of a priestly caste in Ephesus that was connected to the Eleusinian Mysteries. While it is possible
that someone with this background would have rejected all inherited tradition, it is not likely, and
drawing that conclusion would require meeting a relatively high burden of proof that is not met in
this case. The only “evidence” that we have that he rejected it relies on a controversial reading of
three fragments (DK5, DK14, & DK15). On the other hand, the evidence that this tradition positively
influenced him is scattered throughout the fragments.201 It is thus much more probable that Heraclitus
was inspired by that tradition, rather than actively seeking to undermine it. 202

201
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For example, by providing some historical context we can generate a plausible alternative to
Most’s view of DK5, DK14, and DK15 that makes them more harmonious with the conventional
religious assumptions found in the other fragments. DK5, DK14, & DK15 share a common theme
of impurity and madness in religious practices. Like most mysteries, those of Eleusinian Demeter
require that the initiate be pure in some way. Unlike these other practices, Demeter’s worship was
bloodless. Both the sacrifices to the goddess and the mystai themselves were consider impure if they
were bloody in some way. For example, the mystai were required to declare that they did not have
“impure hands” (i.e. that they had not committed murder). But they were also prohibited from
eating foods associated with blood and death. Pomegranates, associated with blood and death
because of their red juice and their role in the myth of Demeter and Persephone, were explicitly
forbidden.203 Dionysus’ own mysteries and the religious practices of the Magi204 were both bloodier.
It is thus plausible that the fragments in question were written from the perspective of an initiate
into Demeter’s mysteries.
From the perspective of one of Demeter’s initiated, the focus on blood and madness is these
other practices is impious and contradictory. Thus, in DK5 is literally madness (mainesthai) to think
that by being “polluted (mainomenoi) by blood” used in religious rituals that one can become
purified. It is just as mad as praying to a statue as if it were the home of a god, instead of a mere
representation of a god.
DK15 is more puzzling (If it were not for Dionysus that they performed the procession
and said the hymn to the shameful parts (aidoia), most shamefully (anaidestata) would they be
acting; but Hades is the same as Dionysus, for whom they go mad (mainesthai) and celebrate
maenadic rites). There is a clear pun between “shameful parts” (aidoia), shameful acts (anaidestata),

203

Foley, The Homeric Hymn to Demeter, 56–57.

204

Markham J. Geller, Ancient Babylonian Medicine: Theory and Practice (John Wiley & Sons, 2015), 128.

57

and Hades (Aides)205 but apart from this wordplay Heraclitus’ intent is murky. Does he mean to
criticize the procession and hymn (Kahn) or point out the unity of opposites inherent in them
(Adomenas)? Most suggests that Heraclitus is making “a connection in re: if the Dionysus of the
mysteries has power in the Underworld, then must he not be ruler there, and in this sense correlated
with Hades or ultimately even identical with him?”206
This is a plausible interpretation, but if I am correct about the Eleusinian bent of these
fragments, we can take this further. The chief antagonist of the Demeter myth is Hades. It is Hades,
lord of death, who causes the goddess’ bereavement; it is thus over Hades that Demeter is ultimately
(partially) victorious over at the end of the Homeric Hymn. Indeed, in the Homeric Hymn Persephone
was said to have been captured by Hades at a plain called Nysa.207 We do not know where this Nysa
was supposed to be, but it is also the name given to the place Dionysos was born in his own Homeric
Hymn.208 This coincidence between the birthplace of Dionysos, and the spot where Persephone was
abducted, surely caught the attention of the pattern-loving Heraclitus. Indeed, Dionysos himself was
connected to the Mysteries at Eleusis where he is identified with Iakkhos, the torchbearer daimon
that lead the procession of the initiates.209
Accordingly, Heraclitus’ comment means that the initiates into the Dionysian mysteries are,
unbeknownst to them, worshipping a god of death. By calling the object of their worship
“Dionysus” society gives them a pass for this “shameful” behavior. Their god is not truly as they
think he is. This is like the maneuver that he makes in DK32: One thing, what is wise: it does not
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want and does want to be called only by the name of Zeus.210 Here again Heraclitus seems to be
trying to point to what he believes is the true nature of the gods. Most points out the most salient
implicit feature of this fragment: “Zeus is here being revered not, as usual in Greek culture, for his
power, but for his wisdom.”211 This suggests the first part of the clause after the colon (i.e. “it does
not want … to be called only by the name of Zeus”). It does not want to be called only by the
name of Zeus because “Zeus” is typically associated with power and not wisdom. The second half
of that clause (i.e. does want to be called … by the name of Zeus) suggest that the name “Zeus”
is at least a partially correct identifier of the god in question. Most writes, and this is one point on
which I agree with him, that Heraclitus seems to be saying that “the understanding of this divinity
established in Greek religion is only partially correct. Humans understand their god in part indeed,
but only in part: its own understanding and self- understanding is more encompassing.”212
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we can conclude the following about the alternative interpretations.
First, Heraclitus was not a rationalist skeptic who rejected Greek religion wholesale. The conclusion
that he was some sort of skeptic was based on his a scant few fragments and a spurious association
with Xenophanes. Second, Most’s view which casts Heraclitus in the role of an early Philo of
Alexandria is limited by an uncomplicated view of the relationship between religion and philosophy.
He tacitly accepts the anachronistic frame that philosophy was “outside” of religious thought and
that popular religion could be made to conform with it. Third, while the ideas that Heraclitus was a
reformer who sought to bring popular religion in line with his doctrine of the unity of opposites is
plausible and has some truth to it, it is only a partial account. This view neglects what I see as the

As with other Heraclitean fragments DK32 is ambiguous. It is also possible that the only applies to the first part of the
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plain influence of popular religion on that very philosophy. Hence, it errs in making the relationship
between philosophy and religion in that early period overly simple. It assumes that the philosophical
ideas came first, and then he turned to religion to support them.
Instead, it makes more sense to see Heraclitus as critically examining popular religion from
inside the tradition rather than outside of it. The fragments that, out of context, appear to be
takedowns of religious practices are more likely cautions to his readers to think critically about
prevailing religious ideas; particularly those concerning practices connected to the life of the polis like
the Mysteries. Indeed, I believe that his inspiration for this sort of critical engagement from within a
tradition was inspired by and modelled on religious practices surrounding the worship of Demeter
and Apollo. Examining this inspiration is the goal of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3: FROM MYTHOS TO LOGOS: GREEK RELIGION IN THE
FORMATION OF HERACLITUS’ PHILOSOPHY
In the last chapter, I discussed various interpretations of Heraclitus’ relationship to religion
and how they affect our understanding of the fragments. I also presented my own view, which posits
that Heraclitus was not merely using religious examples as a target for critique or reform, or as a
resource to teach his philosophy, but as a source of and inspiration for many of his ideas. To see this
point, we must understand the religious background of the world Heraclitus lived in.
Accordingly, to understand this background, I will spend section I of this chapter briefly
examining the Mysteries. That done, in the remaining subsections I will examine how the Mysteries
interacted with the ideas of Plato and Heraclitus and I will examine Heraclitus further to draw out
how some of his philosophical ideas are connected to the Mysteries. The discussion of Plato serves
two purposes. First, it is relatively uncontroversial that Plato was influenced by the Mysteries and
thus he provides a good model for understanding how this aspect of Greek religion interacted with
philosophy. Second, I believe that Plato was influenced by Heraclitus and that some of this influence
is detectable in the way that Plato uses the Mysteries as a philosophical resource for his own ideas.
Finally, in section II I will discuss the influence and connections between Heraclitus’ ideas and the
Oracle of Apollo at Delphi.
I.

The Eleusinian Mysteries and Philosophy
In this section I will examine the influence that I believe Demeter’s mysteries had on

Heraclitus’ philosophical ideas and methods. First, I will provide the necessary historical context.
What were the Eleusinian Mysteries? What practices were associated with them? How did these
practices affect the initiated?

Second, I will use this context to tease out how the Mysteries may

have shaped what some philosophers wrote. This will begin with an examination of the use of ideas
from the Mysteries found in Plato’s Phaedrus and Symposium. Having established this, I will examine
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how the idea of a transformative, collective experience changing an initiate’s perception of the world
is crucial to understanding a thread that runs through many of Heraclitus’ fragments.
To see why we should look to the Mysteries for help understanding Heraclitus, we need only
the prod of our ancient sources. Toward the end of his Life of Heraclitus, Diogenes Laertius recounts
an epigram concerning the difficulty of understanding Heraclitus. One of these epigrams runs as
follows:
Do not be in too great a hurry to get to the end of Heraclitus the Ephesian’s book: the path
is hard to travel. Gloom (skotos) is there and darkness devoid of light. But if an initiate
(mystes) be your guide, the path shines brighter than sunlight.213
This epigram makes a plain comparison between the reader seeking to understand Heraclitus’ book
and the religious supplicant seeking to understand a religious mystery. Put even more simply, the
epigram argues that the book is only obscure (skotos) to the uninitiated.
But what did it mean to be “initiated” and “uninitiated” in the world that Heraclitus lived?
What was a religious mystery and how did it differ from or connect with myth? We must answer
these questions to understand how insightful this epigram is. But to answer this question we must
lay out what we know about mystery religion in general and the Eleusinian Mysteries that Heraclitus
was associated with. As a member of a family entitled to call themselves basileis of Ephesus,
Heraclitus’ family played a similar role to the priestly families of Athens associated with Demeter’s
Mysteries.
A.

A Brief Examination of the Eleusinian Mysteries

Until Christianity came to dominate Europe, the ancient world was awash in religious
devotees to various “mysteries.” Mysteries (mystēria) were “rituals of a secret nature … which invited
the members of a certain group, often very widely defined, to participate and thus be ‘initiated’
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(myeisthai, teleisthai).”214 The purpose of these secret rituals varied, but all offered benefits to the
initiated in this life or after death and a powerful religious experience that may have allowed “the
initiate the sense of a closer relationship with the divine and a new understanding of familiar myths
and rituals.”215 Mystery cults were a supplement to, not a replacement of Greek religious practices,
and typically were integrated with the web of politics and religion that pervaded the polis.216
Dating back to the seventh century B.C.E. and dedicated to the goddesses Demeter and
Persephone/Kore, the Eleusinian Mysteries were the oldest and most respected in the ancient
Mediterranean world.217 They were also the most inclusive of the mysteries since “[a]t least by the
classical period (480 - 323 B.C.E.), the Mysteries were open to all persons who spoke Greek and had
not committed murder: male or female, slave or free, Greek or Greek-speaking foreigner.”218 As
discussed in the previous chapter, it is probable that Heraclitus’ family were hereditary priests of
Demeter.
The Eleusinian Mysteries had two stages of initiation: “The ﬁrst stage of initiation was called
myêsis; a mystês (pl. mystai) is one who closes his eyes and/or keeps his mouth shut.” 219 This likely
referred both to the ignorance of initiands (those being initiated for the first time), and the duty to
keep the details of the ritual secret from others. The second and “ﬁnal stage is described as epopteia;
the epoptês is one who sees.220 These epooptai “were those who had already been initiated in past years
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and returned to witness the rites again.”221 The initiands … were individually sponsored and directed
by initiates called mystagogoi, or leaders of the mystai.”222
The

first

day

of

the

Greater

Mysteries

was

the

fifteenth

of

Boedrimion

(September/October). On that day, “the mystai, or initiands, gathered at the Stoa Poikilê in the
Agora” where they were reminded that “those impure in hands or incomprehensible in speech” (that
is, murderers or barbarians who did not speak Greek) should not participate.”223 After purifying
themselves in the sea, sacrificing a piglet to the goddess, they joined the procession to Eleusis. In the
procession, priestesses carried the boxes (kistai) containing the sacred objects (hiera). The procession
proceeded over a bridge that spanned the boundary between Athens and Eleusis whereupon
“masked participants made obscene gestures and jokes as the mystai passed by. The final stages of
the walk would have been completed after dark and by torch-light.”224
The next day the mystai were led to the Telesterion, the hall where the Mysteries took place.
This building deviated from standard Greek temples and could accommodate several thousand
people at a time.225 The ceremony “took place in darkness until a great light shone when the
Anaktoron [an inner chamber of the Telesterion] was opened and the hierophant [lit. “revealer of
sacred things”] appeared.”226 At some point there was a “sacred encounter” between the priestess
and the hierophant, and the latter would reveal the hiera to the mystai.227 We do not know what the
mystai saw or any details of the initiation, but the Christian writer Clement of Alexandria reports that
the password (synthema) that proved one was an initiate was as follows: “I fasted, I drank the kykeôn
221
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(a drink of barley, water, and herbs), I have taken from the chest (kistê), I worked, and deposited in
the basket (kalathos) and from the basket into the chest”228
Numerous ancient reports claim that the experience was transformative in some way. An
ancient rhetorician offers a description of the experience “I came out of the mystery hall feeling like
a stranger to myself.’ (Sopatros Rhetores Graeci VIII: 114—15)”229 According to Plutarch, the epoptes
is “set free and loose from all bondage, walks about, crowned with a wreath, celebrating the festival
together with the other sacred and pure people, and he looks down on the uninitiated, unpurified
crowd in this world in mud and fog beneath his feet.”230 Aristotle, in his inimitable way,
“emphasized that the initiate does not learn (mathein) something but is made to experience (pathein)
the Mysteries and change his or her state of mind (fr. 15 = Synesius Dion 10 p.48a).”231
The Mysteries traced their origin to the myth recounted in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter (ca.
675 – 625 B.C.E.)232. This myth describes the abduction of Demeter’s daughter Persephone by
Hades (lord of the underworld) and Demeter’s subsequent journey to the Attic city of Eleusis. In
her grief, she searches the world for her daughter. Disguised as an old woman Doso (“I give”), she
comes to Eleusis where she meets the daughters of King Keleos and Queen Metaneira. Kallidikê
(“beautiful justice”) tells Doso that she may come be the caretaker for their only brother
Demophoön.233 Doso attempts to make the infant an immortal by a secret ritual that involves
placing him in a fire. Metaneira discovers this ritual, and misunderstanding its purpose, interrupts it.
Following the revelation that Doso is the goddess Demeter, the Eleusinians build her a temple,
within which she hides herself from the world. As a result, agriculture all over the world begins to
228
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suffer. Without agriculture, mortals begin to die and have nothing to sacrifice to the gods. Zeus
relents and sends Hermes to bring Persephone back to her mother. Unfortunately, Persephone had
eaten a pomegranate seed given to her by Hades, ensuring she would have to return to the land of
the dead for one-third of the year. In response, Demeter restored fertility to the land and gave the
Mysteries to mankind:
She went to the kings [basileusi] who administer law,
Tiptolemos and Keleos, leader of the people, and revealed
the conduct of her rites and taught her Mysteries to all of them,
holy rites that are not to be transgressed, nor pried into,
nor divulged. For a great awe of the gods stops the voice.
Blessed is the mortal on earth who has seen these rites,
But the uninitiate [ateles] who has no share in them never
Has the same lot once dead in the dreary darkness.234
The Hymn, like the Mysteries themselves, is overtly Panhellenic in a way that most archaic Greek
poetry was not.235 Versions of the myth outside the Hymn, are more Athenocentric. In these
versions, the goddess teaches not only the mysteries, but agriculture itself, to the Attic people.236 It
was this (probably later) version of the myth that Isocrates refers to in Panegyricus 28 when he claims
that Demeter
…gave two gifts to Athens that are, in fact, our two most important possessions: the fruits
of the earth that have allowed us to live civilized lives and the celebration of the mystery rites
that grant to those who share in them glad hopes about the end of their life and about
eternity.237
Indeed, the popularity of this, the most egalitarian238 of Greek religious rites, justifies the orator’s
grandiloquence. If you lived in the Grecophone world from the Eight Century B.C.E. to the Fourth
Century C.E. you knew of the Mysteries. Accordingly, as I have argued Heraclitus certainly knew of
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them.239 Indeed, as I discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, Heraclitus’ family’s status was based
partly on its claimed links to the Mysteries and Athens’ mythical background. As a Greek and as a
member of a family entitled to call themselves basileis (lit. “king” but could also denote priests like
the archon basilieus of Athens)240, Heraclitus could not have avoided the influence of the Mysteries.
B.

Mortality and Immortality in the work of Plato and Heraclitus

Before we examine Heraclitus himself, let us look at Plato and his use of the Mysteries in his
own work. As I said in the introduction an examination of the interaction between Plato’s ideas and
the Mysteries is useful for two reasons. First, since the connection between Plato and the Mysteries
it is fairly well-established, he provides an excellent model for examining their influence of
philosophy. Second, and more importantly, I believe that Heraclitus influenced Plato and that some
of that influence may be in the way Plato used the Mysteries as a philosophical resource. The
clearest piece of evidence that Plato was influenced by Heraclitus is Plato’s use of the idea of the
unity of opposites in Erixymachus’ and Diotima’s speeches. The latter speech not only uses this
Heraclitean idea but also provides a connection to the Mysteries.
Plato makes interesting use of the Mysteries in two of his works. First, there is the relatively
brief but interesting metaphorical use in the Phaedrus and second, there is the more extensive use of
the Mysteries as a model in the Symposium. First, let us look at the Phaedrus.

1.

Phaedrus
During Socrates’ second speech in the Phaedrus, he begins discussing the “madness” of the

lover “who when he sees beauty on earth, remembering the true beauty, feels his wings growing and

Indeed, he makes explicit reference to mysteries in DK14: “To whom does Heraclitus of Ephesus address his
prophesies? To night-wanderers, Magi, Bacchants, Maenads, and initiates (mustai). It is to these that he prophesies
the fire [cf. D84]. For they are initiated (mueisthai) impiously into the mysteries (musteria) that are recognized
among men.”
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longs to stretch them for an upward flight.”241 Although he cannot fly there, the experience teaches
him to neglect things of this world and recall the “things that are” (ta onta).242 Recollection of these
“thing that are” is described in terms that explicitly evoke the experience of the Mysteries. The
recollector is
…stricken with amazement and can no longer control themselves … because they cannot
clearly perceive. … But at that former time they saw beauty shining in brightness, when, with
a blessed company …they saw the blessed sight and vision and were initiated [teleton] into
that which is rightly called the most blessed of mysteries, which we celebrated in a state of
perfection … not entombed in this which we carry about us and call the body.243
Philosophical insight is thus analogous to the experience of an initiate to the Mysteries. Like the
initiates gathered in the dark Telesterion, the recollector “in blessed company” is shown something
that transcends his or her everyday existence. The initiate is let into the company of those who know
the esoteric truth about Demeter beyond the exoteric truth in myth. The recollector remembers the
reality beyond the appearances of the changing world.
As discussed above, the ancients widely recognized the experience of the Mysteries as
transformative. By comparing philosophical insight to mystical experience, Plato accomplishes two
goals. First, as he frequently does, Plato is using the analogy to something understood by his
audience to introduce a philosophical idea that was unfamiliar to them. Recalling what the true
“things that are” would be as alien to his audience as it is to us, describing how the Mysteries
worked on people would not have been. Second, he is putting the idea of philosophical insight in the
best light possible. We know from our ancient sources that the Mysteries were highly revered.
Indeed, in Athens there were laws about giving the Mysteries the proper respect. One of the charges
leveled against Alcibiades during the Peloponnesian War was profaning the Mysteries. Athens took

Plato, Plato: Euthyphro. Apology. Crito. Phaedo. Phaedrus, trans. Harold North Fowler, Reprint of 1904 edition edition
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999), 483 (Phaedrus 249d).
241

242

Plato, 483 (Phaedrus 249e).

243

Plato, 484–85 (Phaedrus 250ac).

68

this charge so seriously that he was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death in absentia for it! By
comparing philosophical insight to mystical experience, Plato was quite boldly asserting the bona
fides of the former. He would take this analogy even further in the Symposium.244

2.

Symposium
In the Symposium, Plato has Socrates present a “discourse on Love [Eros]” that he says was

given to him by a woman named Diotima of Mantinea. (201d)245. Socrates claims that before
speaking with Diotima, he held a view much like Agathon’s that Love is a god and lacks nothing in
either beauty or virtue, and hence he has the power to create those things in others.246 Diotima
argues such a being could not desire the good and beautiful because it already possesses both; desire
requires a lack. Instead, she convinces Socrates that Love is not a great god but “a great spirit
[daimon].… [since] spirits are intermediate between god and mortal.”247 Indeed, she claims that the
function of daimones is to be intermediaries between the immortal gods and mortal humans
concerning things like divination, sacrifices, and magic.248 If you seek wisdom, you must be one of
“those who are in between” like Love.249 She cleverly concludes that “Love must be a philosopher
[i.e. a “lover of wisdom], and a philosopher is in a middle state between a wise man and an ignorant
one.”250
Socrates wonders what role Love plays in human life? Diotima then changes the question to
what the lover of good things gains by possessing them. Socrates replies that that the object of the
Josh Wilburn has pointed out to me that “Plato might, like Heraclitus, also be appealing to the Mysteries because of
the ineffability of the Forms: one has to have experienced them firsthand to understand them; one cannot describe them
in any especially informative way.” I think Josh must be correct here since both thinkers struggle with the inadequacy of
language to communicate the experience of an ineffable truth.
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lover is the possession of good things in order to be happy. She eventually convinces Socrates that
“‘Love is the desire to possess the good always.”251
Diotima explains that we know something is love when “[i]t is giving birth in the beautiful,
in respect of body and of soul.”252 Her clarification is even less straightforward as she claims that all
of us are “pregnant” in body and soul and thus desire to give birth and pregnancy and procreation
“is an aspect of immortality in the otherwise mortal creature, and it cannot take place in what is
discordant.”253
This desire to procreate manifests itself differently in different people, Diotima explains. If
we are “pregnant in the body” we have sex and produce offspring with a member of the opposite
sex.254 In this way, we ensure a kind of immortality for ourselves through our children. If, however,
we are “pregnant in the soul” we procreate by bringing wisdom into the world. If we are a poet, this
expresses itself as personal excellence or virtue (arete). If we are politicians or lawgivers, wisdom
expresses itself in the good laws and institutions we leave behind.255
It is at this climactic point that Diotima appeals to language that overtly evokes the
Eleusinian Mysteries:
These are aspects of the mystery of love [erotika] that perhaps you too, Socrates, might be
initiated [muetheis] into. But for the ﬁnal initiation and revelation [teleia kai epoptika], to which
all this has been merely preliminary for someone on the right track, I am not sure if you have
the capability. However I will do my utmost to explain to you, and you must try to follow if
you can.256
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Thus, she casts her entire account of Love (so far) as analogous to the Lower or Lesser Mysteries;
rites of preparation and purification that preceded the Greater Mysteries that took place in the
Telesterion.257 The Greater Mysteries (epoptika) are outlined in the famous “ascent of desire” passage
of the Symposium (210a-212b). In this passage Diotima “describes a series of attractions to a
hierarchy of beautiful objects … culminating in the contemplation of an abstract and perfect Idea of
Beauty.”258 Only then will the philosopher give birth to true virtue “because it is not an image that he
is grasping but the truth.”259 The philosopher will thus earn the love of the gods and become
immortal.260
As Nancy Evans has argued, Diotima (lit. “Zeus-honored”), acts as mystagogos for Socrates’
initiation into philosophy in much the same way as Demeter herself acts in her own rites; she is “one
who initiates individuals into her Mysteries and who mediates to humans information about the
divine.”261 Just as in her Eleusinian rites the goddess brings mortal and immortal together through
her mediation, so Diotima brings Socrates and his listeners closer to knowledge of the divine.

3.

A Heraclitean Influence in Symposium?
A more implicit feature of Symposium is its Heraclitean concern with opposites. Indeed, the

theme of opposites is evoked in Aristophanes’ myth262, and Heraclitus himself (a version of DK 51)
is invoked in Erixymachus’ speech
Now, it is obvious to anyone who gives even the slightest thought to the matter that the
same reconciliation of opposites applies in music. This perhaps is what Heraclitus meant,
although his actual wording is not accurate; for he says of “the One” that “it is in agreement
while being in disagreement with itself, like the harmony of the taut bow or the lyre”.
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However, to speak of a harmony as being in disagreement with itself, or as existing when it is
composed of elements still in disagreement, is quite absurd.263
Puzzled by this, Erixymachus concludes that Heraclitus must mean that opposites are brought into
agreement with one another, like high and low notes in a scale.
This is similar in sentiment to DK8, where Aristotle claims that: Heraclitus [scil. Says] that
what is opposed converges, and that the most beautiful harmony (harmonia) comes out of
what diverges, and that all things come about by strife. This fragment along with DK51 (They
do not comprehend how, diverging, it accords with itself: a backward-turning fittingtogether (harmonia), as of a bow and a lyre) suggests another religious inspiration for Heraclitus,
the cult of Apollo at Delphi. Apollo was, among other things, the god of music, truth, prophecy, and
healing.
Erixymachus finally applies these musical ideas to the discussion of love, concluding that in
harmony and rhythm music “creates agreement” between elements that are in disagreement “by
implanting mutual love and unanimity between the different elements” just like medicine does.264
Love is thus the force that helps create harmony and rhythm; it helps to bring together things that
oppose one another.
Diotima’s speech can be seen implicitly as her reaction to this Heraclitean puzzle as well. Her
solution is Love himself. As the middle term between opposites, he mediates between them. Indeed,
her own myth of Love’s parentage is her chief pedagogical tool to explain this to Socrates. Love is
born of two opposites: “Love is the child of the mortal woman Penia and the god Poros
(personifications for want or lack, penia, and resource, poros, who is the divine son of the goddess
Metis, or cunning).”265 Love itself is the unification of opposites! It is the middle term that unifies
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them. This, she argues, is the same position held by the philosopher, born by the opposites of
ignorance and wisdom, he is their middle term; he is their mediator.
In other words, Diotima expands on Erixymachus’ more simplistic analysis of Heraclitus to
create something of greater philosophical importance. She (and Erixymachus) seems to hit very
close to what Heraclitus himself seems to be saying in one of his criticisms of Homer:
Heraclitus criticizes the poet [i.e. Homer] who wrote, "If only strife would vanish from gods
and men! (Il. 17.107): for there would not be any harmony (harmonia) if there were not
high-pitched and low-pitched, nor would there be any animals without female and
male, which are opposites.266
Unifying opposites is creative. From opposites are born new things that each alone could not
engender. As discussed above, the apparent meaning of the various kinds of “pregnancy” discussed
by Diotima in the dialogue is concerned with the way in which mortals can achieve some sort of
immortality. In other words, it is concerned with how the opposites mortal and immortal can be
brought together in some way. The best solution to this problem, she says, is the philosopher. His
“offspring” are the most immortal. If he can give birth to true virtue by contemplating the beautiful
itself, “it is possible for him to be loved by the gods and to become, if any human can, immortal
himself.”267

4.

The Mysteries and Bringing Together the Mortal and Immortal
In the Mysteries, the paramount pairing of opposites was mortal/immortal (i.e.

humans/gods). One of the most characteristic traits of Greek religion was its extreme emphasis on
the different ontological status of humans and gods. For example, humans could never experience
pure good fortune, thus we have Achilles’ consolation of Priam in Iliad 24.529-533 where Zeus
either “gives a mixed lot [of gifts and ills or] … only of the baneful” but never pure good fortune. 268
266

DK A22.

267

Sheffield, Plato: Symposium, 50 (212a).

268

Homer, The Iliad: Books 13-24, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Loeb, 1999), 603.

73

We see it also in the Croesus Logos of Herodotus (I.32) in which Solon tells the Lydian king that
“there are many to whom heaven has given a vision of blessedness, and yet afterward brought them
to ruin.”269 Yet the most important difference between humans and gods is that the former die,
while the latter do not. Indeed, a common word for humans in the Greek of both Homer and Plato
is thnetoi which meant “those subject to death.” The gods on the other hand, were frequently called
athanatoi (lit. “deathless”).
It naturally followed that gods not only never experienced death themselves, but rarely the
loss of anyone they cared about. This is why Achilles’ mother Thetis is a sympathetic figure. She was
forced to marry a mortal and bear a son who would be subject to death. She was an immortal forced
to experience a part of mortal life. Similarly, in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter, the goddess is forced to
experience the loss of her daughter to the deity that personifies death, Hades. The goddess’ reunion
with her daughter for two-thirds of the year is, in effect, a partial conquest of death, the blessings of
which she shares with the initiates to her Mysteries. This partial conquest of death, this ascent to a
portion of what immortality has to offer, is analogous to what Diotima in the Symposium claims for
the philosopher who has “given birth to virtue.” For the philosopher who has ascended it is
“possible for him to be loved by the gods and to become, if any human [anthropon] can, immortal
[athanato] himself.”270
Indeed, the myth underlying the Mysteries has other important similarities to the story of
Achilles in the Iliad:
The wrath (mênis) and grief (achos) of both hero [Achilles] and goddess [Demeter] derive
initially from the abduction of a woman (Briseis, Persephone) who becomes the wife or
spear bride of the abductor (Agamemnon, Hades). The withdrawal of hero and goddess then
results in immense losses for the Greeks or a destructive famine on earth, in Demeter’s case
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there are two withdrawals, one from heaven to Eleusis, the second to her temple at Eleusis.
271

In Achilles’ case, his return to battle resolves his wrath and grief, granting him immortal fame, but a
shortened life. His fate is analogous to that of great poets and lawgivers, in Diotima’s discussion of
the “lesser mysteries” of Love.272 Demeter’s wrath and grief is resolved when her daughter is
returned to her for most of the year, and the blessings of immortality are granted to all her initiates.
They are much like the initiates into the “higher mysteries” of Love, who achieve something as close
to the life of gods as is possible for mortals.
In both cases, it is the unification of opposites (i.e. immortal/mortal) which leads to the
birth of something beautiful. As Foley puts it:
By bringing divinity closer to mortal suffering and mortals closer to divine power, the story
pattern of wrath, withdrawal, and return as it is enacted in both the Iliad and the Hymn mixes
worlds that the entire Greek cosmos is designed to keep apart. When the world is
reconstructed at the return, it can never be quite the same.273
I submit it is this that Heraclitus is referring to when he writes in DK62: Immortals mortals,
mortals immortals, living the death of these, dying the life of those (or Kahn: “Immortals are
mortal, mortals immortal, living the others’ death, dead in the others’ life.”). For immortals,
experiencing something typical of mortal life—for example the loss of a loved one, is the only way
they can truly experience death. For mortals, by contrast, dying and loss is a part of living. Yet their
encounter with immortals brings them closer to the immortal state. For heroes like Achilles, this is
immortal fame, for others the more tangible gift of a pleasant afterlife.
This latter scenario, a pleasant afterlife, is probably what the Mysteries offered initiates.
Demeter and her daughter are paradigmatic cases of immortals that tasted the life of a mortal; they
experienced separation by death. Because of that experience, we have Demeter’s Mysteries which
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bring mortals closer to the life of the immortals. The best way to understand DK62 is as an
expression of this intriguing collision between categories of life which are traditionally thought of as
separate in early Greek thought.
My view of DK62 is not the only one available. Kahn thinks this fragment is asserting the
“heretical” idea that: “Mortals live the death of immortals” and “Immortals are dead in the life of
mortals.”274 He also argues that Heraclitus uses “death” to signify a change of state, as one
interpretation of its use in DK88 (There is the same within, what is living and what is dead,
what is awake and what is sleeping, and what is young and what is old; for these, changing,
are those, and those, changing in turn, are these) and perhaps DK36 (For souls it is death to
become water, for water it is death to become earth; but out of earth, water comes to be, and
out of water, soul) might suggest. As Kahn puts it “Human death — the death of each of us, and
of those dear to us — will have to be understood as a phenomenon of precisely the same sort, a
change of state within the total life cycle of nature.”275
While plausible, Kahn’s view strikes me as unnecessary. There was plenty of paradox in
Greek religion. The inclusion of paradox is not necessarily an indication that Heraclitus is expressing
something “heretical.” We can easily find some of this weirdness in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter as
well as the other Homeric Hymns. For example, consider the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite which recounts
the tale of Tithonos. Tithonos was made immortal by Aphrodite, but not ageless, thus he withered
away into nothing more than an immortal complaining voice. This mortal immortality was a kind of
“living death.” Still another example is the fate of Dionysos’ mortal mother Semele. She hubristically
wishes to see Zeus in his full glory and is burnt to ash as a result. Zeus’ “life” was her death.
Heracles, as a demigod half immortal and half mortal is himself a collision of the two categories. It
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would take his death as a mortal for him to become an immortal. In all these cases we have the
transformative collision of the immortal and the mortal. The ambiguities and parallelism in DK62
mirror the weirdness of the collision of mortal and immortal. Human life is like “death” to
immortals, dying is the “immortality” of mortals. Accordingly, it is unnecessary for Kahn to reach
for a figurative interpretation of the fragment that involves “cycles of nature.”
To reiterate, DK62 (Immortals mortals, mortals immortals, living the death of these,
dying the life of those) is an intriguing example of the unity of opposites we might call a
“unification of opposites.” The fragment is an example of Heraclitus taking a familiar trope from
Greek religion, the difference between mortals and immortals, to show both the dependence of the
categories on one another276 and that new categories (e.g. an immortal experiencing loss, immortality
for mortals after death) are created by their collision.
C.

The Eleusinian Influence on Philosophy: Heraclitus

In the previous sections we examined how the Eleusinian Mysteries were an influence on
Plato’s ideas about Love and the Forms in Symposium and how the Heraclitean themes and
Eleusinian themes in that dialogue overlap. Next, we examined a key theme common to the
Mysteries, to Symposium, and to Heraclitus: the relationship between mortals and the gods. For
Plato, we draw close to the gods in perceiving the forms. This is like the way in the Mysteries we
draw close to the gods by undergoing initiation. Finally, we saw how for Heraclitus, the relationship
between mortals and immortals is an important instance of the unity of opposites. In this section, I
want to further develop the connection between the Mysteries and Heraclitus ideas. First, I want to
examine how the unity of opposites, inspired by the Mysteries applies to Heraclitus thinking about
death. Second, I will show how the experience of the initiate explains what Kahn calls Heraclitus’

That is to say that “immortals” (i.e. undying things) as category makes no sense unless there is a category of “mortals”
(i.e. dying things).
276

77

“epistemic isolation.” Third, I will argue that the communality of the experience of initiates into the
Mysteries is a key inspiration for Heraclitus’ insistence that the logos is something common, not
private.

1.

Mortality & Immortality in the Fragments
First, let us consider the connection between the unity of opposites and Heraclitus’ ideas

about death. Without this unification of opposites, Heraclitus declares that we experience something
analogous to Diotima’s “lesser mysteries. DK21- Death is whatever we see when awakened;
whatever we see when sleeping is slumber. As mortal beings who are uninitiated, our everyday
waking experience is that death is everywhere. Our friends, family, and enemies all die, and we can
only hope to join them. When we sleep, we retreat into a world of just sleep. This is similar to the
testimonium in DK89 which claims “Heraclitus says that those who are awake have a world that is
one and in common, but that each of those who are asleep turns aside into his own particular
world.” One meaning of this fragment is that death is the common problem of all mortals.
Naturally, we wish to remedy this problem by ensuring some measure of immortality, even if
this immortality, paradoxically, comes only after we die. One prospect is immortality through our
children like those Diotima described as “pregnant in the body.” This approach is not ideal and
comprises one of the “lesser mysteries” in Diotima’s account. Heraclitus seems to agree, but he has
a more clearly negative evaluation. To be mortal is to die, to have an “allotted death.” If we seek
immortality through our children, we are only creating more beings to have “allotted deaths.”
Accordingly, we see in DK20 he writes When they have been born they want to live to have
their allotted deaths (moroi), and they leave children behind to be born as allotted deaths.
As you will recall, this approach to immortality is not the only on offer in Diotima’s account.
One can seek through deeds to make one’s name, at least, immortal. For example, another way is to
take the path of Achilles, and seek immortal glory through military deeds. If one is a member of the
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honored war dead (one whom Ares, god of war, has slain) one can expect inclusion in the memory
of future generations.277 Heraclitus recognizes this sort of immortality in DK24 - Gods and
humans honor those men whom Ares has slain.
The greater the hero that dies, the greater his immortality through honor after death.
Heraclitus submits DK25 – Greater deaths (moroi) obtain greater portions (moirai) – as a kind of
companion to DK24. A more glorious death results in a longer “afterlife” for your reputation.
Moira, is a word with a range of meanings that included: a) a share of material goods, b) allotted life
span, and c) destiny/fate.278 Thus in saying that the magnitude of your death determines the
magnitude of your fortune, he is making clear that the manner of one’s death correlates with the
magnitude of one’s “worth” after death.
The problem with these approaches to immortality is that we cannot be sure they will be
successful. We may have children who bring shame on us or who consign our name to obscurity
through neglect. Glory through death in battle is just as unruly a “child.” We have no real control
over our reputation after death. Our glory can easily be forgotten or twisted by the machinations of
the living. We simply do not know what our “afterlife” will be and thus Heraclitus corrects us:
DK27 - What awaits humans after they have died is everything that they do not suspect nor
suppose. In effect, he is challenging his readers to put aside their assumptions about life and death,
and to be more open to possibilities not considered by “private wisdom.”

2.

Initiation and Epistemic Isolation
We have seen that there are distinct similarities between Diotima’s speech in the Symposium

and some fragments of Heraclitus on immortality and life after death. This is not, however, the full
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extent of the fragments which bear the imprint of Eleusis. At the core of Heraclitus’ philosophy is a
group of fragments that bears on the relationship between logos and the common (to xynos): DK1,
DK2, DK17, and DK34. Usually these are taken, by Kahn279 for example, as pronouncements about
the difficulty and failure of humans to make sense of their own experience despite the resources
given to them by their reasoning abilities. While there is truth in this interpretation, it leaves out the
influence that Greek religious practices like the Mysteries had on Heraclitus in developing these
ideas
For example, Kahn notes the “epistemic isolation” inherent in these fragments. Consider
DK1: And of this account (logos) that is-- always-- humans are uncomprehending, both before
they hear it and once they have first heard it. For, although all things come about according
to this account (logos), they resemble people without experience of them, when they have
experience both of words and of things of the sort that I explain when I analyze each in
conformity with its nature and indicate how it is. But other men are unaware of all they do
when awake, just as they forget all they do while they are asleep. Kahn notes how the last line
reveals “the almost pathetic epistemic isolation of a man trying to convey the vision of an obvious
and immediate truth to men who stagger past, unable to notice what they are doing all day long, as if
it were a dream they cannot grasp or hold on to.”280 Kahn struggles with what this might mean
about Heraclitus’ relationship to Ionian science. He even compares this line to Bishop Berkeley’s
reaction to Newtonian optics.281 Ultimately Kahn can only conclude that these fragments that reveal
Heraclitus’ “initial concern is less with the structure of reality than with the extreme difficulty of
grasping this structure.”282
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What Kahn misses is the connection between this “epistemic isolation” and struggle with
“grasping [the] structure” of reality of these fragments, on the one hand, and the epistemic isolation
and struggle that was a part of Greek mysticism, on the other. Recall the accounts of Plutarch,
Aristotle, and others of how transformative the mysteries were for the initiated. An initiate was “set
free and loose from all bondage, walks about, crowned with a wreath, celebrating the festival
together with the other sacred and pure people, and he looks down on the uninitiated, unpurified
crowd in this world in mud and fog beneath his feet.”283 This is the sort of state that Heraclitus
thinks will lead people to the logos, but he is aware that this state cannot simply be communicated in
words. Just as descriptions and analyses of the Mysteries do not make us into initiates, Heraclitus is
worried that his readers will falsely conclude they understand him; that they will confuse the exoteric
for the esoteric. In effect, DK 1 is Heraclitus warning his readers that reading his book will not be
enough. Without experiencing the things he talks about, readers might as well be asleep.
We see a similar caution in DK 17: Many people, as many as encounter things, do not
think (phronein) that they are such [scil. as they are] and even after they have learned about
them they do not understand them, but they think [scil. that they do]. People frequently
misunderstand things they think they have learned. Without the right state of mind – a mind that is
receptive to ideas outside its own prejudices—people will not truly hear what experience (and
Heraclitus) is trying to tell them. They are like those described in DK34: Being uncomprehending,
when they have heard they resemble deaf people-- the saying bears witness about them:
'being present, they are absent.' Hearing about the logos or the Mysteries is simply not enough to
make me comprehend either of them. Like a distracted student, I may know the words, but I have
not thought about what they mean. In short, in DK1 and DK17 Heraclitus is trying to communicate
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that knowledge is like the experience of the Mysteries, it cannot be communicated to others through
words alone; it must be experienced.
Indeed, he says as much directly in another fragment: DK55 - All the things of which
sight [opsis] and hearing are knowledge (mathesis) I honor most.284 In other words, personal
experience is the preferred road to knowledge. In another fragment DK19 – “Criticizing some
people as unbelieving, Heraclitus says: not knowing how to hear or speak” or as Kahn translates it
“Not knowing how to listen, neither can they speak.” The initiated know how to listen, they hear
with comprehension. The uninitiated are metaphorically incapable of either hearing or speaking. In
other words, some people resemble the “deaf” alluded to in DK34. Since they have “uninitiated”
minds, they cannot communicate what is communicated to them.
This is what separates Heraclitus from radical empiricism. The senses are important, but
fallible. Something else is necessary to organize the senses: DK107 - Bad witnesses for humans
are the eyes and ears of those who possess barbarian souls.285 To the Greeks, a barbarian was
someone who did not speak Greek. A person with functioning senses, but a soul that does not
comprehend what they are sensing is comparable to a “barbarian” witnessing a discussion in Greek.
This is because lacking a language in common with the Greeks he observes, he is missing a crucial
factor in interpreting what he observes. The importance of sharing a common language or
interpretive framework is no doubt one reason for the requirement that initiates into the Mysteries
be Greek speakers. Without a knowledge of Greek an initiate could not be expected to understand
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what she heard. This emphasis on common language is another sign of the influence of the
Eleusinian Mysteries on Heraclitus.
This points us further to DK2 -- But although the account (logos) is in common (xunos),
most people live as though they had their own [idian] thought (phronêsis). Without a common
language/interpretive framework, you cannot have an experience in common. Without that you
cannot have a rational understanding of experience. Of course, this was a practical limitation as well.
As I wrote above, one could hardly comprehend what took place during the Mysteries without
understanding the language used in the ritual. Heraclitus might also be intimating the same practical
limitation is true of his own doctrines; one could hardly understand what is “common” if one had
no idea what xynos meant.
Heraclitus’ statements are shot through with Eleusinian inspiration. In the Homeric Hymn to
Demeter the anonymous poet “privileges seeing, and especially seeing with understanding and
pleasure.”286 The motif is repeated many times during the poem and reaches its climax when
Demeter demands that she see her daughter before she will end the famine.287 Indeed, the goddess in
the poem and the initiates to her rites progress from a stage of ignorance (myesis) to “the highest
level of initiation in the Mysteries … epopteia, or seeing.”288 The darkness/light, blindness/seeing,
ignorance/knowledge imagery abounds in all that we know about the Mysteries, from the procession
to the darkened Telesterion with torches, to the gradual reveal of we-know-not-what when the
hierophant emerged from the Anaktoron, bringing light into the darkened temple.

3.

The Logos is Common: Social and Communal Themes Inspired by the Mysteries
Initiates were not in this darkened temple alone, of course; they were together as a group

with other initiates who shared with them the common experience of this literal “enlightenment.”
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This suggests another connection between the Mysteries and Heraclitus: the importance of the social
or communal. Consider the following fragment: DK2 - But although the account (logos) is in
common (xunos), most people live as though they had their own [idian] thought (phronêsis).
DK2 is a plain example of a theme we see throughout the fragments: the true nature of things is
open to all, but many fail to understand it. Now it would be easy to see this theme, and this
fragment, as just another kind of elitism, and to interpret Heraclitus as claiming for his followers a
special status that most humans do not have. But this would only be half right.
While it is true that Heraclitus claims that most people do not understand the logos, he also
claims that the logos is common (xynos). If the logos is common/shared it cannot be only the few that
have access to it. The logos is not private property; it is public. The problem is that, despite this
commonality, most people think their private (idios) thinking is the logos. Accordingly, the “elitism”
of Heraclitus’ philosophy is not of the chosen few who possess special (i.e. private) knowledge.
Indeed, reliance on special knowledge alone seems to be a kind of hindrance, a turning away from
what is common.
We can see this is this case is in the following two fragments where he takes some of his
predecessors to task for their methodological failings:
DK40: Much learning does not teach intelligence: for otherwise it would have taught
Hesiod and Pythagoras, and Xenophanes and Hecataeus.
DK57: The teacher of the most people is Hesiod; they are certain (epistasthai) that is he
who knows (eidenai) the most things-- he did not understand (gignoskein) day and night,
for they are one.
DK129: Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus, devoted himself to investigation more than
all other men, and after he made a selection of these writings [scil. probably: the
writings of other people] he devised his own wisdom; much learning, evil artifice.
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In his paper on the subject Herbert Granger points out that polymathy (i.e. knowing many things) is
probably being singled out because Heraclitus viewed it as a kind of “secondhand learning.”289 To
know the things that Hesiod, etc. claim they know, they would have had to consult the accounts of
others either orally or in writing. Heraclitus is suspicious of polymathy, argues Granger, because it
“endows the polymath with a false sense of achieving a privileged epistemic position that only a
handful of human beings would ever be able to attain.”290 But for Heraclitus, the logos is common, not
private or privileged. Understanding is open to all, not just few who are fortunate enough to be wellread or well-traveled. Granger concludes that for Heraclitus “[t]here is no need for humans to scurry
about, collecting odd pieces of information, however interesting that information may be in itself,
since the fundamental truth about reality lies no farther away than in the homely truths of every
man's daily life.”291
Granger is correct that Heraclitus rejects the idea that only a few have the capacity to attain
knowledge. He declares this directly in DK113: “Thinking (phroneein) is in common for all.” And
in DK116: All humans have a share in knowing themselves and in thinking with moderation
(sophronein). Indeed, Heraclitus’ view seems to be that the only true sort of knowledge is that which
is, in principle, publicly accessible regardless of personal status. This sort of egalitarianism about
knowledge strongly resonates with the culture of the Eleusinian Mysteries. Consider the stark
contrast between the Mysteries and the Homeric/Hesiodic orthodoxy about the gods. That
orthodoxy promised “immortal fame or Elysion to the aristocratic warrior, whereas the Mysteries
gave their beneﬁts to all mortals, regardless of sex and social status. These beneﬁts were won not by
good birth and individual achievement, but through initiation and submission to a mass collective
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experience in which all share equally.”292 The experience was shared in common and its benefits
were shared in common. I would therefore submit that the Mysteries were a paradigmatic case of a
logos that was xynos (common).
First, we should recall how the Mysteries differed from other religious practices in the poleis.
Foley explains this situation:
In civic cults (as well as in many other rites of initiation), the participants’ status as male or
female, slave or free, citizen or resident alien played a central role, such cults (or rites) firmly
embedded the participants in particular social roles. The rites at Eleusis, unlike many other
rites of initiation, were tied to no stage of the life cycle (although initiates were with one
exception adults) or aspect of civic life.293
The Telesterion was able to accommodate thousands so these diverse initiates experienced the
Mysteries together as a mass. As Nancy Evans puts it: “In the Eleusinian Mysteries, the social unit
brought together was general humanity, anthropoi, without the social or political distinctions upon
which sacrifice within the polis was based.”294
In addition, most Greek religious practices brought participants closer to the gods through
the mediation of priests, priestesses, and rigid hierarchies of animal sacrifice. By contrast the
Mysteries offered initiates the chance to experience “the divine through the power of the individual
senses.”295 In short, the Mysteries were a firsthand, collective experience. Precisely the sort of
epistemic situation that Heraclitus lionizes.
In fact, it is hard not to see a connection between the experience of the initiate and the
association Heraclitus frequently makes between the “common” and the divine. For example, in
DK114 compares the “common” with the divine:
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Those who speak with their mind (xun noôi) must rely (iskhurizesthai) on what is
common (xunôi) for all, just as a city does on its law, and much more strongly
(iskhurterôs). For all human laws are nourished [trephontai lit. thicken, also foster or raise]
by one law, the divine one: for it dominates as much as it wants to, and it suffices for
all, and there is some left over.
Note that the comparison seems to focus on the elements of the divine law that are unqualified or
absolute. The only limit of the domination of the divine law is its desire to dominate. The divine law
is so plentiful it is more than enough for all. By this drumbeat of superlatives, Heraclitus is trying to
reinforce the centrality of the communal in the minds of his readers.
Heraclitus is trying to impart through metaphor and puns the vital importance of bringing
the experience of the Mysteries into everyday life. Remember that “[i]nitiates [of the Mysteries]
become temporarily detached from their regular environment and enter into a ‘liminal’ experience in
which the normal categories and hierarchies by which they deﬁne their world are sometimes
terrifyingly blurred, transformed, or inverted.”296 This experience created, however briefly, two
changes in the minds of the initiates: (1) solidarity with other initiates—what Plato or a Platonic
author calls hetaira297 (camaraderie, companionship) in his Seventh Letter, and (2) felt like “strangers”
to themselves.298 This one-two punch put initiates in the mental state that Heraclitus wanted his
readers to foster: openness to commonality and critical distance from the self and its claim to its
private wisdom.
This experience is the model for the following fragments about the self and the soul: DK45
– He who travels on every road would not find out the limits of the soul in the course of
walking: so deep is its account (logos) and DK101 – I searched for myself. One can only search
for oneself if one has become estranged from oneself in some way (DK101); when the familiar
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becomes (temporarily) unfamiliar. To use a modern phrase, this “soul-searching” opens up new
possibilities that could not have been imagined before this critical distance from the self has
occurred. As a result, we see that the logos of the soul (psyche) is much deeper than we had imagined
(DK45).
II.

Heraclitus Skoteinos and Apollo Loxias: Heraclitean and Delphic Obscurity
In this section, I will consider the role the Delphic Oracle had on both the style and content

of Heraclitus writing. In subsection A, I will discuss why Heraclitus chose to write in a way
reminiscent of the oracular ambiguity we find in Apollo’s oracles. In subsection B, I will examine
how the “Delphic maxims” of that oracle were an influence on the ethical ideas of Heraclitus and
other early ethical thinkers.
A.

The Delphic Oracle and the Art of Ambiguous Advice

If Heraclitus is trying to point us to the common, experience, etc. then why does he write in
a way that encourages different interpretations, plays with ambiguity, and generally frustrates
readers? What is he really trying to say? The previous section provides with the beginnings of an
answer. The Eleusinian Mysteries inspired Heraclitus. Like most mystery cults, the Eleusinian
initiated swore not to tell what they saw and heard during the ceremonies. If Heraclitus was, as I
have argued, trying to model a philosophical method on the experience of the Mysteries, he would
not be able to simply say so directly.299 Thus, a certain level of obscurity in his writing was necessary
to conceal his inspirations from the uninitiated.

It is less obvious why we have no fragment of Heraclitus’ work that indicates his inspirations directly. It may be that we
simply have lost the fragments that mentioned this. It may be that Heraclitus thought the influence would be obvious,
given the connection of his family to the Mysteries in much the same way we assume the work of Catholic priest was
influenced by their Catholic background. It may be that he thought that the inspiration would be obvious to any literate
Greek given the popularity of the cult. Certainly at least one ancient commentator got the hint. Recall the epigram I
quoted in Chapter 3:
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This problem was further complicated by his philosophical views. As we have seen from his
critiques of Hesiod, Pythagoras, etc. Heraclitus was dubious that one could learn anything by reading
alone. Reading can encourage repetition instead of understanding. Hence, we have his statement in
DK50: After you have listened not to me (emos) but to the account (logos), it is wise to
recognize (homologein) that all things are one. How could he be sure that his readers would not
simply regurgitate his words or worse, like the ritualistic followers of Pythagoras (DK129), create a
patchwork doctrine from his ideas? His answer seems to be that the best way to avoid this kind of
misappropriation is to make his writing too playful and difficult to pin down to appropriate. Luckily,
there was a ready model available for Heraclitus: The Oracle of Apollo at Delphi.
Oracles and other types of divination pervaded the ancient world.300 A sanctuary that
provided divination, called a manteion or chrēstērion, was a place where one could ask the advice of the
gods on an issue.301 For example, Zeus’ oracle at Olympia would give questioners information about
future athletic victories and the oracle of Demeter near Patrai in the second century C.E. would
reveal if a sick person would live or die.302 But by far the most famous oracle in the ancient world
was housed in the Temple of Apollo at Delphi. Its importance seems to have emerged in the
seventh century B.C.E. The same period which saw the advent of the hoplite phalanx, the
development of civic constitutions, the expansion of the Grecophone world through trade and
colonization, new investment in sanctuaries, and the development of common myths about the
gods.303

Heraclitus’ failure to directly mention Eleusis may even be (and most probably is) another example of the tendency of
ancient authors not to cite their sources. Widespread citation being a development of a much later era. After all,
Heraclitus was not a Hellenistic, but an Archaic Greek who was writing during the birth of Classical Greek scholarship.
There were no such norms yet.
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Delphi’s importance seems to have been linked to its role in supplying “charters” for almost
all the new cities and sanctuaries that were founded outside of mainland Greece.304 This common
source of legitimacy acted as a stabilizing force for the new communities and forged greater
connection between the Ionian diaspora and the mainland. As Michael Scott puts it in his history of
Delphi:
Surviving within this increasingly dynamic and unstable melting pot often required a
response from developing communities to problems not encountered before. Within a world
that was, at the same time, firmly of the belief that the gods were in charge of everything, the
attraction of a system of oracular consultation, which allowed for divine confirmation of
community decisions, and therefore the ability to ensure the development of a consensus of
opinion for particular courses of action, is eminently understandable.305
Hence it is clear why the Greeks believed Delphi to be the literal “center of the world.”306
There were several different forms of divination on offer at Delphi, but by far the most
celebrated were the prophecies of the woman called the Pythia.307 Accounts differ on how she
prophesied but all seem to agree on the following. She entered the restricted area of the temple
called the adyton and sat upon a tripod.308 From this tripod she would answer the inquirer’s question
by uttering her boai (cries or songs).309 Most of her surviving responses are in hexameter, but it is
unclear whether she uttered her boai in this form, or if the male prophētai merely interpreted her
response in that way.310 She could only be consulted for one day per month (probably the seventh)
and only during nine months of the year “since during the three winter months Apollo was
considered absent from Delphi, and instead living with the Hyperboreans (a mythical people who
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lived at the very edges of the world). During this time, Delphi may have been oracle-less but was not
god-less; instead the god Dionysus was thought to rule the sanctuary.”311
The Pythia, like other oracles, was famous for the obscurity or ambiguity of the answers she
provided. Croesus of Lydia sought the advice of many oracles including the Pythia. As a matter of
fact, the Pythia’s most famous response was the same as that given by the oracle at the shrine of the
hero Amphiareios to Croesus.312 Both oracles told Croesus that “if Croesus were to wage war against
the Persians, he would destroy a great empire.”313 Famously, Croesus concluded that the “empire”
was that of the Persians and thus felt confident to invade Persia. The prophecy, however meant that
his own Lydian empire would be destroyed. Another example of Pythian obscurity comes from the
Croesus Logos in Herodotus. This time the Historian quotes the response as follows: “But whenever a
mule becomes king of the Medes/Then, tender-footed Lydian, flee by the pebbled River
Hermus/And do not delay, nor feel shame at being a coward.”314 Croesus again took this prophecy
literally. He believed the prophecy meant that the literal offspring of a male donkey and a female
horse would have to become king of the Medes. Since it was impossible for a mule to become king
of the Medes, he was safe. However, the prophecy meant that a figurative “mule,” the halfPersian/half-Mede Cyrus, would become king of the Medes. As a result, Croesus failed to heed yet
another warning of the threat looming to the east of his kingdom.
It might seem strange that given this record, people would consult the Delphic oracle at all.
If the Pythia’s boai were so hard to interpret, they were arguably useless as predictions of the future.
This would be a mistake, however. Most inquiries to the oracle were not like Croesus’
straightforward request for a revelation of the future:
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Very rarely, it seems, did consultants ask the oracle direct questions about the future (so
Croesus’s second question about whether he would win the war against King Cyrus of Persia
was again an odd form of question). Instead, most questions put to the oracle seem to have
been in the form of “would it be better and more profitable for me to do X or Y?” or else,
“to which god shall I pray before I do X?” This is to say, consultants presented problems to
the Pythia in the form of options, or rather sought guidance for how their goals might come
about, rather than asking directly what would happen in the future.315
Scott is insightful on this issue. Ambiguity may, as Plutarch reasons, have protected the sanctuary
from the anger of the powerful men that consulted it. 316 Ambiguous answers would have provided
“cover” for the oracle and allow priests to place blame on literal-minded consultants like Croesus.
More importantly, however, the ambiguous answers meant that the consultants needed to return to
their cities and deliberate on the matter further. The ambiguous advice would thus become a new
focus for a community previously deadlocked in debate. In other words, “[c]onsulting the Pythia
thus did not always provide a quick answer to a straightforward question, but rather paved the path
for a process of deliberation that allowed the community to come to its own decision.”317
Scott argues that function of the oracle was less like a fortune-telling service and more like “a
‘sense-making mechanism’ for the individuals, cities, and communities of ancient Greece.”318 He
correctly connects this to Heraclitus’ statement in DK93 that The lord whose oracle [manteion] is
the one in Delphi neither speaks nor hides, but gives signs [semainei]. The Greek for “gives
signs,” is derived from the root word sēma which means “sign” or “signal.”319 Someone “makes a
sēma” when “he or she speaks from a superior vantage point, as when a scout goes to the top of a
hill and then comes back down to indicate what he or she saw.”320 The word is ultimately derived
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from the Sanskrit dhyāna which means a kind of “inner vision.”321 Metaphorically, this refers to
someone speaking authoritatively or with special insight into the matter under discussion. 322 Apollo,
as a god, has a supreme vantage point and thus has special insight to offer those that seek his aid.
The presumption of the exchange between questioner and god is that Apollo is granting inner vision
or insight. He is not simply “telling” an answer but letting the questioner see, at least in some partial
way, from the god’s eye view. In other words, Apollo does not “speak” but he is not hiding the
truth either. Instead, he “indicates” so that the questioner can work out the truth behind the
appearance themselves through their own experience, so to speak.
I submit that Heraclitus is modeling his own communication style on that of the Oracle. By
joining this with his other statements about polymathy and experience we can see that he is relying
on something (very roughly) like the following line of reasoning. We know that the logos is common
to all (like the experience of the Mysteries), yet some people act as though wisdom were their private
property. For example, some people ape the written or spoken ideas of others (polymaths) instead
of experiencing this common logos. Others experience things yet misinterpret them because of their
“barbarian souls.” Thus, wisdom cannot be imparted by language alone or experience alone but
must come from common experience structured by a common language. The Delphic Oracle seems
to use language and yet its prophecies are not amenable to being plagiarized because they all need to
be interpreted to be understood. Proper interpretation requires more than just a common language;
it requires common experience.
For Heraclitus, the paradigm common experience was initiation into the Mysteries. In that
setting, the shared (another meaning of the term xynos) experience of the ritual itself went beyond
the various “private” experiences of the participants and brought them close to the divine.
This same word signifies meditation practices in Buddhism, Hinduism, and Jainism. The “Zen” in Zen Buddhism is
this same word rendered in Japanese.
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Presumably, if you were familiar with the Mysteries as an initiate, they were more comprehensible to
you in that unique way. The same, theoretically applies to Heraclitus’ own writings, which try to
simulate the liminal experience of the Mysteries using another religious technique: oracular
ambiguity. For ancient Greeks, oracular ambiguity was another way to bring communities together
for a common/shared experience—the experience of resolving the ambiguity. The anecdotes about
misunderstanding an oracle, or resolving the ambiguity incorrectly, can be seen as cautionary tales
about applying one’s limited private perspective to divine pronouncements. As Julia Kindt writes:
Ambiguous oracles provide an opportunity for mortals to rethink the premises on which
their own interpretations and the knowledge derived from them are based. People who
consider the complexity of phenomena in the world mirrored in the complexity of the
oracular language are successful. Those, in contrast, who think too narrowly and see only
what they want to see will fail.323
Arguably, this is what was lacking in Croesus that led to his failure to resolve the Oracle’s
ambiguities correctly. He was applying his “private wisdom” to the oracles he received and not
embracing the full complexity of the phenomena they could be describing.
In summary, oracular ambiguity forces a person to abandon their pretensions to private
wisdom in favor or a shared/common view that is closer to the divine perspective; this is an
extremely Heraclitean lesson. It is thus unsurprising that Heraclitus adopted the Oracle’s
communication style as the best way to communicate the logos to his readers. To highlight this fact,
Heraclitus seems to be “giving us a sign” of this in the structure of DK 93 (The lord whose oracle
[manteion] is the one in Delphi neither speaks nor hides, but gives signs [semainei].) itself. Some
scholars have noted that the fragment, in Delphic fashion, does not identify Apollo by name, but by
his title and location.324 Delphic Apollo was called Loxias (“ambiguous,” from loxos, lit. “slanting”)
for good reason; perhaps the same reason that Heraclitus was called skoteinos (“obscure”).
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DK93 is usually paired with DK92: The Sibyl with her raving mouth […]. We don’t have
the full quotation, so it is difficult to ascertain what Heraclitus was aiming at here. Kahn and is
convinced that there must have been some critique of the prophetess that followed, which Plutarch
neglected to include.325 I am inclined to agree with Robinson, however, who writes that Heraclitus is
saying something to the effect that “just as the Sibyl, for all her mirthless ‘ravings,’ conveys the voice
of Apollo, so he, Heraclitus, however strange he may sound, conveys the logos of ‘that which is
wise’”326 The Sibyl’s “raving mouth” gives signs in much the same way that the Pythia’s rhyming
mouth does: indirectly. Neither experience nor language are self-interpreting and the answers of the
Pythia and the Sibyl exemplify this fact.
Plutarch argued that Apollo’s ambiguity was a spur to philosophical thinking. For just as an
oracle from the god to double the size of the altar required his worshipper to learn geometry, so too
does the god’s ambiguity teach them “logical reason.” “[w]hen the god gives out ambiguous
[amphibolous] oracles, he is promoting and organizing logical reasoning [dialektikēn] as indispensable
for those who are to apprehend his meaning aright.”327 The “trick” was seeing beyond the obvious
or apparent meaning of the oracle. As Heraclitus tells us in DK54: Invisible fitting-together
(harmonie), stronger than a visible one. We must not rely on our “private thought” and risk being
fooled like Croesus, or like Homer in DK56:
Regarding the knowledge of things that are evident, humans are fooled in the same
way as Homer. Who was wiser than all the other Greeks. For boys who were killing
lice fooled him by saying, 'The ones we see and grasp, we leave behind; the ones we
do not see or grasp, we take away.'
This fragment seems to be based on an anecdote about the life of Homer that went something like
this:
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… Homer, after having spent some time on Samos, went to the island of Ios. There he was
approached on the beach by some boys fishing, whom he asked whether they had caught
anything. Instead of admitting that they were going home empty-handed, they answered by
presenting the riddle. Unable to make sense of their words, Homer is reported to have
passed away. 328
Since the boys were fishing, Homer assumed that “the ones” they were referring to were fish.
Accordingly, it made no sense to him that they would “leave behind” fish that they caught but “take
away” fish that they had not. Thus, DK56 in many respects resembles DK 17: Many people, as
many as encounter things, do not think (phronein) that they are such [scil. as they are] and even
after they have learned about them they do not understand them, but they think [scil. that
they do] [eōutoisi de dokeousi]. Many people, including Homer, believe the “private knowledge” or
preconceptions that they bring to experience. Homer was asking about fish, so he assumed that the
boys would answer about fish. Instead, the boys were jokingly referring to lice. Since those that they
could find and grasp they threw away and those they could not remained on them. Homer resolved
the ambiguity incorrectly. Similarly, Heraclitus reminds us (DK18) that If one does not expect the
unexpected one will not find it (exeurein), for it cannot be searched out (anexereuneton) nor
arrived at (aporon). If we expect the expected, that is all that we will find. We will find nothing but our
“private knowledge” in everything that we encounter in experience.
As I alluded to above, there was one area of the shared experience of ancient Greeks that
Heraclitus could expect his readers to know that they must puzzle through to understand: oracles
and riddles. This is also what I think Plutarch means when he says the Oracle’s ambiguity “promotes
and organizes” logical reasoning [dialektikēn]. The stories about Croesus and others that failed to
“expect the unexpected” put us all on notice (i.e. “organizes” our thinking) that we cannot simply
take our preconceptions for granted. Consequently, deciphering oracles gives us practice in applying
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this kind of thinking in other areas of life (i.e. promoting logical reasoning). I submit that Heraclitus
is similarly interested at “promoting and organizing” dialectic in his readers. Accordingly, he chooses
a “Delphic” style to reproduce the potential of ambiguous oracles for doing so.
B.

The Delphic Maxims and Early Ethics

Yet Heraclitus takes more than his style from Apollo’s Oracle. Much like Socrates after him,
he reworks some of the Oracle’s ethical precepts as well. It is well-known that the Temple of
Apollo at Delphi had maxims inscribed that were viewable to those that entered the sanctuary:
“Know thyself” (gnothi sauton), “Nothing in excess” (meden agan), and “An oath leads to perdition”
(eggua para d’ate).329 The first of these seems to have been an influence on Socrates’ parting thought
that “the unexamined life is not worth living.”330 This along with the second maxim seems to have
been a major theme in pre-Platonic ethical thinking in plays, poems, histories, and other works. This
“morality of measure and moderation” is what Kahn calls the “Delphic view” of morality.331 The
Delphic view contrasts with the “heroic ideal” which praises “unlimited self-assertion” and the
“drive for pre-eminence.”332 Kahn summarizes the differences by saying that “the heroic world of
the epic
… is dominated by the competitive, self-assertive conception of arete expressed in the
formula ‘always be best’ (aei aristeuein), and reflected in Croesus’ ambition to be the happiest
of men. The Delphic view, on the other hand, which Herodotus expresses in his judgment
on Croesus, invokes divine jealousy to discourage the kind of self-aggrandizement that poses
a threat to the civic community. In military terms, the model for the heroic ideal is personal
combat between champions. The model for the ideal of moderation and restraint, on the
other hand, is the serried rank of hoplite soldiers, whose security and success depend on
their advancing and withdrawing in unison, since each hoplite covers his neighbor’s flank
with the left half of his shield.333
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The Delphic view’s bywords were justice and temperance (sōphrosunē), whereas the heroic ideal spoke
only of excellence (arete) and focused on courageous self-assertion.
Heraclitus’ ethical and political views were clearly influenced by this tug-of-war between
Apollo and Homer. This is clearest in DK112: “To be moderate [sōphronein, “sound thinking”]: the
greatest virtue [arete]. Wisdom: to speak the truth and to act in conformity with the nature
[scil. of each thing].” Here, Kahn explains, Heraclitus seems to be reworking the “quiet virtue of
temperance or self-control (sōphrosunē)” into a kind of intellectual virtue, “sound thinking”
(sōphronein).334
Yet Kahn is unsure what to make of Heraclitus’ ethical views. He sees a tension between
DK112 and statements like DK24 - Gods and humans honor those men whom Ares has slain
and DK119 – Character [ethos], for a human, is his personal deity [daimon]. Kahn sees these
fragments as evidence that Heraclitus held to the heroic ideal. However, I think Kahn is mistaken
here. There is no contradiction between the Delphic view, as Kahn himself lays it out, and honoring
war dead. Kahn himself says that the military model was the hoplite phalanx, and we know that
fallen hoplites were collectively, and sometime individually, honored by their poleis. Nowhere does
Heraclitus say that gods and men only honor those that have fallen in personal combat.
Further, Kahn seems to think that since DK119 implies “that a man's fortune depends upon
his character rather than on the gods”335 that Heraclitus is rejecting traditional religious conceptions.
But Kahn concludes too much here. If there was one “traditional conception” of fortune or fate in
ancient Greece, it was that a man’s character and the gods were determinative. Consider the curse of
the House of Atreus. Tantalus, a Lydian king invited the gods to dinner. Thinking himself cleverer
than the gods, he attempts to trick them into eating the flesh of his son, Pelops. The gods recognize
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the ruse and punished Tantalus in Tartarus with hunger and thirst forever. The gods restore Pelops
to life, but like his father he would also make poor choices. Desirous of marrying the princess
Hippodamia, he plots with his servant Myrtilus to rig her father’s chariot to fail so that he might win
her hand in marriage. Having won his bride, he refused to reward Myrtilus as promised. When
Myrtilus tried to take Hippodamia as compensation, Pelops killed him. In his dying moments,
Myrtilus inflicted a curse on Pelops and all his descendants. Pelops’ sons Thyestes and Atreus
competed for the throne of Mycenae. Its king, Eurystheus, promised to make king the man that
could produce the golden fleece of a lamb. Atreus had squirreled a golden fleece away years ago. He
had promised this fleece to Artemis but had kept it for himself. Unbeknownst to him, his wife was
the lover of his brother Thyestes. She gave the fleece to him and Thyestes was made king of
Mycenae. Certain that Zeus wanted him to be king as the older son, Atreus declared the sun would
rise in the west and set in the east the next day. When it did, he usurped his brother’s kingship. He
banished his brother, and soon discovered his wife’s infidelity. To get revenge, he invited Thyestes
to dinner and fed Thyestes’ own sons to him. When Atreus reveals this to his brother, Thyestes
cursed the House of Atreus. Aegisthus, Atreus’ adopted son and the biological son of Thyestes and
Atreus’ niece/wife, would eventually murder Atreus. This curse would not end until after the Trojan
War with Atreus’ sons Agamemnon and Menelaus.
We can easily see that every step of the way, that each member of this cursed house enacts
the curse by their own immoral actions. They break promises, cheat the gods, violate xenia (guestrite), butcher their own kin, etc. The sufferings of the cursed are both a cursed fate brought about by
the gods, as well as the consequences of their own choices. Thus, there is a real sense in which the
poor characters of the Pelopids resulted in the ruin they experienced. They were inclined to
transgress, and thus their divine punishment was transgression against them. Recall again the three
Delphic maxims: “Know thyself” (gnothi sauton), “Nothing in excess” (meden agan), and “An oath
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leads to perdition” (eggua para d’ate). Taken together, they all recommend living within one’s own
limits, and keeping one’s word. About every Pelopid discussed above violates one or more of these
maxims.336
Each time, hubris, the sin of transgressing boundaries, was the cause of the meted
punishment. One is put in mind of another Heraclitean fragment, DK43: One must extinguish
arrogant violence (hubris) more than a conflagration. Here Heraclitus reveals the deep
connection between his philosophy and the political problems of his time. In other words, in a rare
moment of unambiguousness, he is condemning a common source of stasis (civil war), i.e. hubris. As
we saw in Chapter 1, the Hellenic world before, during, and after Heraclitus’ life was driven by civil
and international wars, sudden changes of government, and reversals of fortune for both individuals
and nations. As we have seen, Heraclitus turned lessons he learned from Greek religion into an early
philosophical method. This method emphasized experience over rote learning, rational analysis over
imitation, and the common over the private. Given these factors and his historical milieu, it is
unsurprising that he repeatedly emphasizes conflict in his thinking. What is surprising, however, is
how he understands conflict; what lessons he thinks it can teach us. Thus conflict, and the
relationship of conflict to law and justice will be the topic of the next chapter.

Conclusion
In this chapter I have shown the influence that Greek religion had on Heraclitus’
philosophy. I showed how the Eleusinian Mysteries and the Oracle of Delphic Apollo helped form
the content of Heraclitus’ views and the manner in which he expressed them. From the Mysteries,
Tantalus thinks himself cleverer than the gods, so for his hubris (violating the first and second maxims) he is
punished in the afterlife. Pelops breaks his promise (violating the third maxim) so a curse falls upon his descendants.
Atreus keeps the fleece he promised Artemis to himself (violating all three maxims) so he is made a cuckold and denied
the kingship. When, as the eldest son, the gods eventually allowed him the throne of Mycenae, he fails again. He feeds
his nephews’ flesh to Thyestes, taking on another curse and further angering the gods. This leads to his murder by
Aegisthus, and the flight of his natural born sons to Sparta.
336
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we get his complicated views of the relationship between mortals and immortals, his theme of
epistemic isolation despite the commonality of the logos, and the importance of shared experience to
remedy our epistemic failings. In short, that people fail to know the logos because they try to find it
alone through books or their own investigation. What they end up with is their own “private”
understanding and not an understanding of the logos. To remedy this, they should become like those
initiated into the Mysteries, participants in a shared/common experience. The logos is common, so
we must seek it through common experience.
We saw that Heraclitus was aware that authoring a conventional book would not be the best
way to communicate these ideas. Readers would not get a truly common experience from a book,
and they would be tempted to selectively interpret it like the polymaths he criticizes. Thus, he looked
to the Oracle of Apollo for a model. The Oracle communicated knowledge using words
unconventionally. Just as the intention of the Oracle’s ambiguous poetry is to provide direct insight
to the hearer, Heraclitus’ ambiguous aphoristic style is meant to do the same. Working through a
cryptic saying is thus an analog of the shared experience of initiates witnessing the Mysteries.
Heraclitus’ writing is intended to not to simply speak a truth but lead you to that truth by inducing
you to have an experience. In this case, the experience of working through his gnomic writing.
We also saw Delphi influenced Heraclitus’ ethics through the Delphic Maxims: “Know
thyself” (gnothi sauton), “Nothing in excess” (meden agan), and “An oath leads to perdition” (engua para
d’ate). In particular we saw how his views on hubris were influenced by the maxims’ suggesting that
we live within our own limits and not transgress boundaries. These ideas would help to form part of
the core of his ethical/political views, the subject matter of Chapter 4 of this essay.
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CHAPTER 4: CONFLICT, LAW, & JUSTICE IN THE POLITICAL FRAGMENTS
Chapter 3, on the role that religion had in shaping Heraclitus’ ideas, ended with the
beginning of a discussion on the role that hubris plays in Heraclitus’ ethical/political ideas.337 We saw
that this idea of hubris was connected to the early ethical thinking inspired by the Delphic maxims:
“Know thyself” (gnothi sauton), “Nothing in excess” (meden agan), and “An oath leads to perdition”
(eggua para d’ate). We also saw that hubris was not simply a religious and ethical failing, but a political
problem. Hubris was the term given to the transgressive violence that led to stasis (civil war) in Greek
cities and thus hubris was connected to early political thinking as well as religious thinking.
This term’s range of meaning clearly affected Heraclitus, but his unique take on conflict
modulates his own views of hubris. In Heraclitus’ day conflict was pervasive. As one modern
historian puts it “[w]herever there were borders in ancient Greece there was war.”338 War could
occur between or within poleis. Sometimes the lines between those categories could blur, as the
Persian Wars amply show. Some poleis were divided between their pro-Persian and anti-Persian
citizens, effectively making an international war a civil war.
Early political and legal thinking attempted to generate remedies to the problems associated
with a world in conflict. The intent of laws punishing hubris, for example, was preventing the initial
stages of stasis (civil war). We see concern over conflict as early in Greek thinking as the poets.
Homer, for example, wishes that “strife [eris] perish from among gods and men.”339 Hesiod, as we
shall see below, distinguished between two distinct types of conflict, one bad and another good. In
early philosophy, as we saw in Chapter 1, Anaximander suggested the cosmos itself individuated into

I will be using “ethical” and “political” quite interchangeably as in Heraclitus and most ancient Greek thinkers the
topics were not easily separated.
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things by a type of conflict he called “injustice” (adikia). Indeed, we have little more of
Anaximander’s writing than the following fragment where he claims that
… the principle (arkhê) and element of beings is the unlimited (to apeiron) … And the things
out of which birth comes about for beings, into these too their destruction happens,
according to obligation: for they pay the penalty (dikê) and retribution (tisis) to each
other for their injustice (adikia) according to the order of time.340
We also saw that this metaphysical idea was related to Anaximander’s political project for the
constitutional reform of Miletus. Thinkers of this period did not neatly separate cosmological ideas
and political ideas.
Heraclitus had his own thoughts on politics. He had his own take on the interplay between
conflict, law, and justice in preserving the polis. His views hinge on his understanding of conflict as
the interdependence between opposed things. This understanding is coterminous with his doctrine
of the “unity of opposites.” Recall that this doctrine does not hold, as some think, that contradictory
qualities are identical, but asserts something like the “interconnectedness of contrary states in life
and in the world.”341 Heraclitus’ idea of conflict is the application of this idea to politics.
He is not interested in the eradication of conflict, but the careful management of conflict
that is beneficial to the polis. Law (nomos) and justice (dike) are the tools by which a functioning polis
accomplishes this. Law (nomos) creates cohesion among a disparate citizenry. It creates something
akin to “national identity.” This curtails civil conflict, but necessarily assumes the possibility of
international conflict such as the defense of the polis from foreign domination. Justice (dike)
presumes internal conflict for which it is a remedy. Heraclitus’ model of the polis restricts conflict to
adversarial legal competition, rather than street violence or competition for control over the polis
itself; lawsuits rather than gang war.
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Inasmuch as understanding “conflict” is crucial to understanding Heraclitean political
thinking, in part I I will briefly examine how I will be using the word “conflict” to refer to an idea
that Heraclitus uses several words to indicate. In short, Heraclitus sees an interdependence between
opposed things that previous thinkers either ignored or downplayed. In Part II I will discuss
Heraclitus’ position on the role that law (nomos) and justice (dike) have in his political thought and
how they in turn relate to conflict. Heraclitus believed that we cannot do away with conflict could
because it is an essential part of how poleis function. Instead, he recommended harnessing conflict to
maintain the cohesion of the polis. This approach will allow me to interpret fragments with hitherto
overlooked political implications. Finally, in Part III I will briefly examine the question of whether
Heraclitus adhered to any identifiable political ideology. In my view, there is no compelling evidence
that he was the anti-democrat that some interpreters have made him out to be, but neither is there
persuasive evidence that he was pro-democratic.
I.

Conflict: Polemos and Eris
To understand Heraclitus, we must employ a technical definition of “conflict” to grasp the

subtlety with which Heraclitus explicitly (i.e. polemos, eris, diapheromenon, etc.) and implicitly discusses
the concept. Heraclitus refers to “conflict” by using the words polemos (war, battle) in DK53 (War
[polemos] is the father of all and the king of all, and has revealed that the ones are gods and
the others humans, and has made the ones slaves and the others free) and eris (strife, discord,
dispute) in DK80 (One must know that war [polemos] is common [xynos], that justice [dike] is
strife [eris], and that all things come about by strife and constraint).
As one can see, in DK53 and DK80, Heraclitus seems to be using polemos and eris in a
comparable way. In DK53, he identifies polemos as the phenomenon or concept that differentiates
categories from one another. War is the reason that some are gods, and some are humans, and the
reason some are slaves and others free. In other words, war has an organizing function on both the
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cosmic and societal level. This organizational function is like the one Heraclitus gives the logos. Recall
that in DK1 he says that all things come about according to this account (logos). If one’s
metaphysical and social status come about because of war (polemos), then war must somehow be
connected to the logos.
This implicit connection between polemos and logos carries over into DK80. In that fragment,
Heraclitus declares that war (polemos) is “common” (xynos) in a clear echo of DK2 (But although
the account (logos) is in common (xunos), most people live as though they had their own
thought (phronêsis)). The second clause of DK80 similarly links justice (dike) and strife (eris) in a
rebuke of Anaximander.342 Finally, the last clause of DK80 clarifies that he is using eris (strife) as a
general concept that includes polemos.
Since it would be confusing to jump between polemos (war) and eris (strife) throughout this
essay, I have chosen the English word “conflict” as an approximation of both. My use of “conflict”
in this paper is meant to pick out the concept that I believe that polemos and eris are meant to indicate
in the fragments. The English word “conflict” can mean physical fighting, prolonged struggle,
internal struggle, or the clashing of opposed things like sentence, principles, or arguments. 343
“Conflict,” comes from Latin “conflīctus,” the participial stem of confligere (con- together +flīgĕre to
strike) which means “striking together.” 344 So, the word, like Heraclitus’ use of polemos, eris, etc.
carries the suggestion of opposed things being together.
Indeed, eris is so similar in usage to the English word “conflict” that some translate eris as
“conflict.” We can see this most clearly in Hesiod’s use of the word. In the Works and Days Hesiod
refers to the two Erides. One Eris that is the cause of “evil war” [pólemón te kakòn] and the other Eris
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is the striving to be better than one’s peers.345 Heraclitus’ fellow Presocratic Empedocles believed
that eris was the fundamental force in the cosmos that caused the four elements to divide from one
another, while love was the force that brought them together.346 It can also carry the connotation of
“struggle” as in the following line from Aeschylus’ Eumenides: “Yes, Zeus of Assemblies has
triumphed; and my struggle [eris] in the cause of good has won a victory that will last for ever.”347 So
the term is used to indicate division, opposition, dispute, or even competition.
As I understand him, one of Heraclitus’ core insights foregrounds the interdependence
between opposed things. As Heraclitus puts the matter in DK51: They do not comprehend how,
diverging [diapheromenon], it accords with itself: a backward-turning fitting-together (harmonia),
as of a bow and a lyre.348 Note that to illustrate his point he chooses artifacts associated with the
god Apollo (i.e. the bow and lyre).349 Both artifacts have parts that are in metaphorical strife (eris)
with one another. Yet it is this “conflict” between the string of the bow and the strings of the lyre
and the body of each object which allow them to function, or to fit-together (harmonia). Harmony is
thus dependent on the conflict within each instrument. The opposed are interdependent.
Accordingly, I will use “conflict” to mean both the opposition between things, but also to indicate
the interdependence of those opposed things.
Heraclitus states this doctrine most explicitly in what I call the “war fragments”: DK53: War
is the father of all and the king of all, and has revealed that the ones are gods and the others
Hesiod, Hesiod: Theogony, Works and Days, Testimonia, trans. Glenn W. Most, vol. 1, Hesiod (Harvard University Press,
2006), ll. 11–26. Indeed, some have argued that Hesiod is using the erides as a way of talking about “the ambiguity of the
world.” Michael Gagarin, “The Ambiguity of Eris in the Works and Days,” in Cabinet of the Muses: Essays on Classical and
Comparative Literature in Honor of Thomas G. Rosenmeyer, ed. Mark Griffith and Donald J. Mastronarde (Atlanta, 1990), 173–
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humans, and has made the ones slaves and the others free and DK80: One must know that
war is common, that justice is strife, and that all things come about by strife and constraint.
But several other fragments also contain clear elements of conflict as well. To understand this, we
need to get a better grip on the developing concepts of law (nomos) and justice (dikê) in the relevant
period. This shall be the subject of section II.
II.

Law (Nomos), Justice (Dike), and Hubris350
Nomos is the word for “custom,” which “according to context may swing towards our

concept of law or towards that of culture.”351 Through most of the archaic period nomos was not the
word for written law; instead other words were employed: “thesmos (‘what is laid down’), rhêtra (‘what
is said’), and graphos, grammata (‘what is written’).”352 Instead, nomos could refer to a “way of life” (i.e.
in describing the behavior of birds as their nomos), conventional opinion or practice (i.e. Democritus
saying “By nomos sweet, by nomos bitter, by nomos hot, by nomos cold; but in truth atoms and void”), or
it could be used as part of compound words like eunomia (good order), anomia (lawlessness), and
autonomia (self-law i.e. not ruled by a tyrant).353
Scholars attribute a titanic shift in applied political thinking to the Athenian lawgiver Solon,
but he maintains this traditional understanding of nomos, instead preferring to use thesmos as the word
for written law.354 Solon’s Athens (594 B.C.E.) was wracked by debt-slavery, aristocratic in-fighting,
and the threat of stasis (civil war). Into this mess Solon provided a new “constitution” for Athens.
His laws, often called the “shaking-off of burdens” (seisachtheia), cancelled debt slavery, repatriated
350
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citizens enslaved abroad, and restructured political participation by property class. Solon was also a
poet, and he writes about his accomplishments in verse:
These things I did by the exercise of my power [kratos], blending together force [biē] and
justice [dike], and I persevered to the end as I promised. I wrote laws [thesmous] for the lower
and upper classes alike, providing straight legal processes for each person. If another had
taken up the goad as I did, a man who gave bad counsel and was greedy, he would not have
restrained the masses [demos]. For if I had been willing to do what was pleasing to their
opponents and in turn whatever the others [i.e. the masses] planned for them, this city would
have been bereft of many men. For that reason I set up a defence on every side and turned
about like a wolf among a pack of dogs.355
In Solon, we have one of the first clear instances of the ideas that laws can bind together and protect
the polis—an idea that Heraclitus will have much to say about.
As we can see from Solon’s reference to “straight” legal process above, legal discourse
during the Archaic period was, as S.C. Humphreys puts it, “about staying in line.”356 The purpose of
law and legal judgments was to ensure that people did not go beyond the limits of appropriate
conduct. We can see this, for example, in the concerns about straight (ithus) versus crooked (skolion)
judgments in Homer and Hesiod.357 This contrast formed part of the foundation of the Greek
concept of procedural justice. Litigants would state their grievances publicly in front of the
community and either a small group or a single respected individual would “judge” the case and
provide the “straightest” resolution. Unlike modern legal systems, “[t]he entire process [was] oral:
Litigants speak their cases, judges speak their settlements, and the members of the crowd voice their
feelings. It is a characteristically Greek scene with substantial community participation, turbulent but
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still orderly.”358 In such a setting, “[c]rooked judgments are a form of hybris, of overstepping the
bounds of proper behavior (cf. hyper, beyond).”359
As we saw in Chapter 3, the word “hubris” was associated with not only violent behavior, but
with other kinds of “boundary crossing” like greed for gain, and the excessive exercise of power.
Indeed, Solon blamed the crisis that precipitated his constitutional reforms “on the rich and
powerful, who fail to limit their desire for wealth and their exercise of power”360 with “no regard for
the august foundations of Justice.”361 This latter feature, the arbitrary use of power, was a constant
source of anxiety in archaic Greek communities. Humphreys suggests that this anxiety was bound
up with the development of the polis itself:
The development of the state, of the conception of a public sphere of action and interests,
was closely bound up with the development of rules for legitimizing, sharing, and limiting
power by dividing responsibilities between elected officeholders who served for a fixed term,
usually in collegiate groups between two and ten in number. However, early laws betray
constant fear that officeholders will refuse to abdicate when their term ends, or will not
enforce the rules for which they are responsible.362
This tension helped create the contrast between arbitrary exercises of power on the one hand and
the rule of law on the other.
It would not be until Thucydides in the late fifth century that nomos would come to mean
primarily written law “and that the Athenians start to make a distinction between nomoi, which have
permanent general validity, and decrees, psephismata, which deal with individuals or with specific
situations.”363 It is in between these two periods that we must contextualize Heraclitus.
Appropriately for the philosopher most associated with change, during his time the use of nomos was
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still in flux. Heraclitus would take up many of the same concerns as Solon. In other words,
Heraclitus was concerned with hubris, justice, and of course law (nomos) itself.
A.

Heraclitus’ Understanding of Law (Nomos)

In the preceding section we saw that law (nomos) in the ancient Hellenic world was a
developing concept that referred variously to ways of life and to laws which preserved these ways of
life. As I have been arguing, the role of law (nomos) in the polis was chief among Heraclitus’ political
concerns. One of his most extensive treatments on the nature and importance of law (nomos) is also
one of the most discussed fragments. DK114: Those who speak with their mind (xun noôi) must
rely (iskhurizesthai) on what is common (xunôi) for all, just as a city does on its law, and much
more strongly (iskhurterôs). For all human laws are nourished (tréphontai) by one law, the divine
one: for it dominates as much as it wants to, and it suffices for all, and there is some left
over. As usual, the fragment is riddled364 with ambiguity, poetic language, and puns which make it
difficult to interpret.
The main questions regarding this fragment are (1) how to construe the comparison made by
iskhurterôs, and (2) how to translate tréphontai. Regarding the first, Kahn and Kirk seem to agree that
the comparison is to the detriment of the law of the polis. In other words, they take him to be
“implying that stronger support is available to seekers of understanding who rely on ‘what is
common’ than a city can get from its law.”365 Schofield, however, thinks that Heraclitus is plain in
other fragments that the common (xunôi) disclosed by the logos is clearly the best way to understand
the structure of nature, etc. He suggests, in effect, that the comparison in strength is not between
nomos and xunôi but between the capacities of the seekers themselves. That is to say that “[i]t comes
down to a question of the differential in the strength required of those who would avail themselves
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of such support: the ἰσχύς of citizens in comparison with that of individuals seeking understanding,
rather than that of the resource – law or ‘what is common’ – on which they can rely.”366 If you want
to know how the polis works you look to its nomos, if you want to know how everything works, you
look to what is common (xunôi). The latter is more difficult than the former.
In translating tréphontai, most translators have opted for something like “are nourished by.”
But this may be a poor choice. Mourelatos and Schofield agree that Heraclitus’ Greek is not the
“colloquial Ionic of fifth and fourth century writers, but a language much more charged, much more
monumental, often deliberately archaic and bearing on the epic language of Homer and Hesiod.”367
Drawing on that epic poetic idiom, Mourelatos argues that it is “probable that the core idea in τρέφω
is “’to shelter, to protect, to keep safe, to preserve intact,’” especially where such protection and
shelter is absolutely vital for survival.”368 This suggests that tréphontai
… portrays human laws as young, immature, unfledged, green, tender, and weak: utterly
dependent on the divine (law)—which explains the qualification καὶ πολὺ ισχυροτέπρως. We
should translate not "are nourished by" but “are under wardship to.” The divine (law) is the
τροφός of institutions: it guards their integrity; preserves them. It is in this sense that we
should understand the Homeric διοτρεφής (the fosterling of Zeus, the ward of Zeus), which
is the obvious archetype of Heraclitus' formulation.369
If we take Mourelatos’ and Schofield’s suggestions into account, we get a translation that goes
something like this: “Those who speak with their mind must rely on what is common more strongly
than a city does on its law. For all human laws are under wardship to the one law, the divine one: for
it dominates as much as it wants to, and it suffices for all, and there is some left over.” In other
words, “[h]uman law is not merely human. It is maintained by divine power, which accomplishes
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whatever is the divine will.”370 Poleis are strengthened by their laws because their laws are maintained
by the divine. 371
This extended analysis of DK114 tell us something important about Heraclitus’s view of
nomos. He believes that it is so important that it has divine support—I am inclined to follow Kahn in
seeing “[i]n his defence of human nomoi … [a reaction against] against an early version of cultural
relativism, provoked by the extensive Greek contacts with older civilisations that began in the
Orientalising period (eight and seventh centuries B.C.).”372 Such contacts would have called into
question the validity of Greek customs, while at the same time forcing Greeks to think of them as
their customs for the first time. Heraclitus and later thinkers felt pressured to defend these customs
as non-arbitrary.
But although Heraclitus concludes that laws and legal processes are not arbitrary, this does
not mean that they are free of conflict. This returns us to DK80: One must know that war is
common, that justice is strife, and that all things come about by strife and constraint. Here
Heraclitus is trying to convey the apparently paradoxical “idea that the essence of justice is not
permanence but a dynamic process of adversarial competition.”373 Put another way, dikê in both the
political and cosmic senses is analogous to “a reciprocal series of lawsuits through which balance is
maintained between opposing forces as in no-fault automobile insurance.”374
This is not the only example of Heraclitus’ connection between conflict and law. We can see
this same emphasis on the conflictual nature of law in other fragments that, on a surface reading,
have no connection to either law or politics. Consider, DK11: Every beast is driven to pasture
370
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[németai] by blows [plēgē]. At first glance, this appears to be a gnomic statement about animal
behavior, or perhaps a comment on human nature. It seems to have nothing to do with law. On this
interpretation, the “blow” is the admonishment of people like Heraclitus who are trying to wake
people up from their ignorant torpor. Heraclitus’ words are metaphorically goading us into good
behavior. Another approach is to give DK11 a metaphysical meaning. Kahn notes that this fragment
and DK125 (A kukeôn too separates out if it is not stirred.) both emphasize the benefits of
motion and action.375 If the herd is not made to move to the pasture they will graze where they are
until there is nothing left to graze. The word, for “blow,” the poetic plēgē, is an allusion to the
“stroke of Zeus” (i.e. his thunderbolt).376 And the word for “beast,” herpetòn, refers to “creeping
things” and is often used by the gods in Homer to refer to humanity.377
However, Heraclitus, ever the purveyor of plural meanings, has more in mind here.
Robinson points out that the word németai (“drive to pasture”) is cognate with the noun nomós
(pasture) which is similar to the word for law or custom (nómos). Indeed, these words differed only
by the accent, an unwritten feature of Ancient Greek. In writing, the words would have looked the
same. Thus one rendering might be that “it takes a thunderbolt to lead men to law.” We find a
similar analogy in Book I of the Republic where Thrasymachus uses “shepherds” as a metaphor for
rulers or lawgivers that metaphorically “fatten” and “fleece” those under their care.378 Here it is used
more benevolently, as surely animals away from pasture would starve.
DK11 also has connections to DK51 and DK52 which refer to “harmony” or “attunement”
(harmonia) because nomos also meant “a style of song with a prescribed harmonia (tuning) and definite

Charles H. Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus: A New Arrangement and Translation of the Fragments with Literary and
Philosophical Commentary (Cambridge University Press, 1981), 194.
375

376

Kahn, 194.

377

Kahn, 65.

378

Plato, Republic (Grube Edition), trans. G. M. A. Grube (Hackett Publishing, 1975), 19–20 (343b - 344c).

114

rhythm.”379 Thus we could poetically render the fragment as “it takes a blow to create harmony
among men.” In addition, plēgē can also refer to the “blow” of the plectrum against the strings of the
lyre.380 Picture Zeus playing human society like a lyre or zither; an image which fits nicely into
Heraclitus' use of theological imagery in other fragments.
Whatever way one chooses to translate it, DK11 evokes another conflictual aspect of law.
People will not always follow beneficent norms on their own; they must be guided to them in some
way. This guidance is analogous to Zeus shepherding animals to pasture. If people will not seek out
nomos, then it is the role of politics to get them there. This means punishments as an inducement to
keep to nomos. Thus nomos, which prevents internal conflict must sometimes be supported by using
conflict (i.e. punishment).
DK11 is not the only apparently non-political fragment that my framework can expose as
political. DK125 - A kukeôn too separates out if it is not stirred, I submit, also has a potentially
political meaning – one that will require more discussion than DK11. To understand this fragment,
we must understand the connection of the kukeôn in DK11 to the Mysteries we discussed in Chapter
3 above.
The Eleusinian mystai were required to drink the kukeon to break their fast381 and swearing
that one had done so was part of the oath mentioned by Clement of Alexandria in the last chapter.
It is the drink that the Homeric Hymn to Demeter claims that the goddess herself broke her fast with:
Metanaeira offered a cup of honey-sweet wine,
But Demeter refused it. It was not right, she said,
for her to drink red wine; then she bid them mix barley
and water with soft mint [pennyroyal] and gave her to drink.
Metaneira made and gave the drink to the goddess as she bid.
Almighty Deo received it for the sake of the rite.382
Simon Hornblower and Antony Spawforth, eds., The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 3 edition (Oxford ; New York: Oxford
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It symbolically links humanity with the goddess as it is a human food; in other words, a food usually
unsuitable for gods.383 It is also a food that seems indelibly associated with Heraclitus. Epicurus
called Heraclitus “Kukêtês.” [i.e. “Kukeôn-drinker” or “Agitator”].384 In his Moralia Plutarch tells the
following story about Heraclitus as an illustration of the virtue of being laconic:
And is not the god [Apollo] himself fond of conciseness and brevity in his oracles, and is he
not called Loxias because he avoids prolixity rather than obscurity? And are not those who
indicate by signs, without a word, what must be done, praised and admired exceedingly? So
Heracleitus, when his fellow-citizens asked him to propose some opinion about concord
[homonoia], mounted the platform, took a cup of cold water, sprinkled it with barley-meal,
stirred it with penny-royal, drank it up, and departed …385
Plutarch takes the lesson to be that citizens should “be satisfied with whatever they happen upon
and not to want expensive things is to keep cities in peace and concord.”386 Plutarch’s interpretation
is clearly wrong, however. The only thing that suggests anything to do with not desiring “expensive
things” is the kukeon itself, which had a reputation for being a drink of the poorer agricultural
classes.387 It is Plutarch’s own interpretive leap that connects this fact with the idea of concord
(homonoia). Yet, the only instance in the fragments where Heraclitus mentions the kukeon explicitly is
DK125—a fragment with no connection to avoiding luxury. I believe that Foley is closer to the
truth when she writes that Heraclitus “may also be commenting on the concord produced by this
simple drink among the disparate (normally unmixable) initiates in the Mysteries.”388
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Accordingly, I submit that whatever else DK125 means, like DK11 it is also a statement
about politics. Many kinds of citizens made up a polis. Individually and as classes, they all vied for
more control and influence over the others. When this struggle went terribly wrong it expressed
itself as hubris and stasis as we have discussed above. Heraclitus is saying that if citizens are to be in
concord [homonoia, lit. “like-minded”] with one another they must mix together to create something
new, something shared (xynos). In the case of the barley, water, and pennyroyal, the shared product is
the kukeon. In the case of citizens, the shared product is the polis itself. Just as the logos is common
(xynos), so too the polis. In inquiry into nature and into politics, the common is our goal.
The common, however, like the kukeon is vulnerable and ephemeral. If nobody stirs a
kukeon, its ingredients separate out, some ingredients rising to the top and others to the bottom. The
two opposite states of the kukeon (mixed and unmixed) are analogous to two states of the polis:
concord (homonoia) and civil war (stasis). Plato similarly picks these two as opposites in the Republic
when Socrates tells Thrasymachus that “injustice has the power”
… first, to make whatever it arises in—whether it is a city, a family, an army, or anything
else—incapable of achieving anything as a unit, because of the civil wars and differences it
creates, and, second, it makes that unit an enemy to itself and to what is in every way its
opposite, namely, justice.389
This, at least, is a point of agreement between Plato and Heraclitus. A polis cannot function properly
if its citizens are at cross-purposes. In the words attributed to Benjamin Franklin: “We must, indeed,
all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately.” Where they differ is their solution to this
problem. Plato thought the solution was a system of government where a sort of rational hierarchy
harnessed individual ability for the benefit of the state. A well-governed polis uses individual
differences through specialization of labor, but theoretically eradicates their tendency to cause
internal conflict through that separation.
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Heraclitus, on the other hand, seems to have thought that the solution was having good
citizens—that is, ones interested in the common good. He advises that if we want to protect the
common, we must personally experience it. We cannot know what that is if we separate out into
groups by interest or by abilities. If we want concord (homonoia) in our polis, we must mix together to
discern what the common is. The law (nomos) is the most obvious thing that forces the “ingredients”
of the polis to mix. It is the most obvious thing that diverse groups in a polis have in common since
it is both an expression of what is distinctive about a polis and the glue that holds it together as a
polis. It is the outcome of internal fights (i.e. enactment of laws in response), and it is how they are
settled (i.e. punishment for hubris). Nomos is something which is fought over (in the courts) and
fought for (against external enemies).
We can see a clearer version idea of what Heraclitus is getting at in DK 125 in DK44: The
people [dēmon] must fight for their law [nomos] just as for their city wall. Walls were an important
political and social feature of most poleis. As Hansen points out, the association between city walls
and the city itself is so strong that it is probable that the original meaning of the Greek word polis was
“stronghold.”390 Camp observes that “fortifications represent by far the greatest physical expression
of public, communal participation, whether we think in terms of money, labor, or organization.” 391
Building walls was not cheap or easy. Their very presence suggests the existence of a shared
endeavor, common set of customs and values, a nomos in the broadest sense of the word.
Some write off DK44 as a commonplace like the aphorism ascribed to the sixth century
Lesbian poet Alcaeus (Alkaios): “Not stone nor timber, nor the craft of the joiner make the polis,
but whosesoever are men who know how to keep themselves safe, there are walls and there a
Mogens Herman Hansen, “The Polis as a Citizen-State,” in The Ancient Greek City-State: Symposium on the Occasion of the
250th Anniversary of the Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters July, 1-4 1992, vol. 1 (Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes
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polis”392 Note the association between the citizens and the walls. They define the polis like building
blocks. This is what the inept Athenian general Nikias was trying to invoke in his 413 B.C.E. speech
during the Sicilian campaign that “Men make the city and not walls or ships without men in
them.”393 This trope is also what Aeschylus appeals to in the Persians: “While [Athens] has her men,
her defences [herkos, lit. fence, wall] are secure.”394
But notice what is different about Heraclitus’ fragment from these other sayings. Heraclitus
is not identifying the walls and the people, but the walls and nomos. He is subtly playing on, instead
of simply repeating, the trope to emphasize how important nomos is. Nomos is so important it has the
same defensive and definitional role as city walls do. But that is not all. Consistent with his
conflictual interpretation of nomos, Heraclitus does not simply identify nomos and the city wall, he says
that the people must fight for it. Nomos is not enough to protect the polis by itself. The people must
actively protect it to ensure it protects them. Just as they must “mix” to ensure concord, they must
fight to preserve what is common.
Here we must return to the problem of hubris. As one can guess DK43 complements DK44.
According to DK43, One must extinguish arrogant violence (hubris) more than a
conflagration. Whereas DK44 is concerned with external threats to the polis, DK43 is concerned
with internal threats to the polis. In its early development, the nomos of the polis was quite loose and
informal. As Gehrke explains
These loose structures contributed to the almost unchecked expression of the considerable
potential for conflict inherent in these communities (Van Wees 1992). Bitter confrontations
among the wealthy and notables which sometimes had catastrophic social and economic
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consequences and tended to result in tyranny, could not be controlled by traditional
means.395
The response was to formalize nomos in the broad sense (of culture/way of life) into thesmos (‘what is
laid down’), rhêtra (‘what is said’), and finally nomos in the narrow sense (of written law), under the
sanction of religion.396 This order based on law, this “nomocracy,” was meant “to establish secure
foundations for peaceful cohabitation.”397 The goal was thus to establish agreed upon boundaries for
behavior in the polis.
In this context, hubris was a threat to the polis because it was a transgression against
boundaries or limits. Recall that Solon saw the crisis he resolved in terms of hubris. If, as our sources
tell us, the Ephesians called Aristarchos to give Ephesus a Solonic constitution when Heraclitus was
a child, then it is unsurprising that Heraclitus would share some of the normative views about law
that motivated Solon. Hubris, the transgression of boundaries, leads to unbalanced internal violence,
threatening the polis itself. It threatens to blossom into civil war (stasis). By telling us that it is more
important to “extinguish” this political threat to nomos than the physical threat posed by a
conflagration, Heraclitus is signaling that he shares the primary concern of developing political
theory.
Note that just as the “beasts” need to be “driven to pasture by blows” in DK11, and the
law (nomos) needs to be fought for like the city wall in DK 44, DK43 supposes that nomos cannot
protect itself, the people must protect it. Inaction in the face of hubris is as foolish as inaction in the
face of a conflagration.398 A raging fire knows no boundaries, it destroys indiscriminately. It is a
Hans-Joachim Gehrke, “States,” in The Cambridge Companion to Archaic Greece, ed. H. A. Shapiro (Cambridge University
Press, 2007), 396.
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threat to an entire community. Similarly, hubris, especially that hubris that develops into civil war
(stasis), threatened to overthrow all stability in the polis.399 Heraclitus maintains that to protect what
we have in common, we must stand against the raging fire of hubris that threatens metaphorically to
burn the polis down.
The fragments also show that Heraclitus’ praise of nomos was no mere traditionalism. He
seems to be aware of the need for political and legal reform. DK33 proclaims that It is also law to
follow the plan [boulē] of the one [henós].” This fragment is hard to interpret because of the words
boulē and henós. Boulē could mean “plan” as in the “plan of Zeus” (Dios boulē) described in the Iliad.400
As a practical matter, this is how most translators render the word in English. However, the word
can also refer to “(1) deliberation and (2) the council, as a constitutional body exercising some
executive power, both in oligarchies and in democracies.”401 Henós, typical of Heraclitean ambiguity,
can either mean “one man” or simply “the one.”402 Thus the fragment can mean “it is also law to
obey the (plan/deliberations/council) of (one man/the one).” On the cosmic level, this henós (“one”)
could refer to the logos. If Schofield is correct, then Heraclitus is saying that “anyone who obeys [a
city’s] law thereby obeys the will of one. In other words, ‘political application’ and ‘cosmic allusion’
… [are] not alternatives … but different aspects of what one might call Heraclitus’ cosmic
politics.”403 On the purely political level, grounded in historical context, it could mean that Heraclitus

that must be stopped. As I will argue in the next chapter, Heraclitus is similar to Machiavelli in that his theory of conflict
is something like institutionalized class conflict. Hubris plainly threatens that theory because it threatens to destroy all
institutions.
This threat was especially severe in oligarchies where private disputes between oligarchs could result in civil war or
even constitutional revolution. See Matthew Simonton, “Stability and Violence in Classical Greek Democracies and
Oligarchies,” Classical Antiquity 36, no. 1 (April 1, 2017): 62–65.
399

Homer, Homer: The Iliad: Volume I, Books 1-12, ed. William F. Wyatt, trans. A. T. Murray, 2 edition (Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 1924), bk. 1.5.
400

401

Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, 1981, 181.

402

Kahn, 181.

403

Schofield, “Heraclitus on Law (Fr.114 DK),” 54.

121

approves of legal reformers—men like Solon or Kleisthenes, who singlehandedly changed the nomoi
of their poleis.404
Heraclitus’ contemporaries may have considered this a radical idea. Consider that during his
lifetime nomos was just starting to take on the meaning of “written law.” Previously and after, as we
discussed above, the word could mean everything from “behavior” to “established custom.” In
effect, Heraclitus is asserting his approval for a specialized new use of the term and for the idea of
legal reform in the polis. This is more plausible, again, if Aristarchos gave Ephesus a Solonic
constitution when Heraclitus was a child. This issue would have been divisive, particularly among
aristocrats. Heraclitus lived during a period described by Gehrke as marked by
…the constant and alert willingness of the rich and influential to demonstrate their power
and strength and to display and protect their honor, as well as their inability to yield and
compromise. Again and again, this disposition led to conflicts which often escalated into
violent confrontations, particularly in the seventh and sixth centuries. Nor was it only the
feuds within the elite that proved dangerous, but still more their collective efforts to
establish themselves as a ruling class, and the aspirations of single members to rise above the
community by establishing a tyranny. Against all these efforts stood the law, “the friend of
the weak” as Friedrich Schiller put it.405
By standing in favor of legal reform, Heraclitus was, in effect staking out his position in this process
by siding with the “friend of the weak.”
DK33 also has affinities with DK49: One man, for me, is ten thousand [murioi], if he is
the best [aristos]. The word for “ten thousand,” murios, was the poetic term for numberless,
countless, or infinite. In other words, Heraclitus is trying to emphasize the value of someone with
truly superlative skill. Such a truly aristos person would be the best candidate for a legal reformer.
The line of reasoning may have been something like this. Reformation requires a singular vision so

If Hermodorus was a nomothete, as some have speculated, this fragment could be linked to DK121. More on this in
Section II below.
404

405

Gehrke, “States,” 408.

122

one man or one group of men must be responsible for it (DK33). If a single man is the reformer,
he must be the best man for the task, lest he fail to reform the polis due to his own inadequacy.
In this section we have seen that Heraclitus is concerned with the role that law (nomos) plays
in holding a polis together. We have also seen that Heraclitus unique views about conflict inform his
views about nomos. Since nomoi differ from polis to polis it would be easy to mistake this for cultural
relativism. Heraclitus, however, is clear that a polis’ nomos is supported by the divine. Nomos is thus a
political analogue to the mystical experience of initiates which takes private individuals and makes
them into a group with a common experience. The goal of nomos is to alleviate the political
disruption cause by the clash of private interests and prevent the outbreak of stasis (civil war).
But nomos for Heraclitus is not merely a tool to end conflict, but a source of conflict itself.
Laws prevent and punish internal violence like hubris, but they require conflict to enforce and
preserve them. This latter sort of conflict, however, draws the focus away from private grievance
and private power to the common good of the polis; it moves people away from things to fight
against each other over to something they can fight for together.
If the situation in the polis is particularly bad, it may need legal reform. Whether this reform
comes from a wise council or a wise lawgiver does not matter. What matters is that they are the best
(aristos) person or persons for the job. Such a reformer would be aware of the need for a legal
structure which emphasizes the common good and deemphasizes sources of internal division. They
should be someone who knows that internal conflict can only be prevented by encouraging the
disparate types of citizens to “mix” and pursue their common rather than private good. Conflict
cannot be eradicated, but it can be harnessed to positive ends. Indeed, conflict is not just
ineradicable, but some form of conflict is valuable.
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B.

Heraclitus’ Understanding of Justice (Dike)

Nowhere is the value of conflict to political life more clearly stated than in Heraclitus’
comments about dike (justice). Consider DK23: They would not know the name of Justice if
these things [i.e. unjust actions?] did not exist. This is a strange statement without the bracketed
portion. It remains strange unless we understand the Greek legal process. As discussed above, the
process was a “turbulent, but still orderly” affair whose aim was a “straight judgment” that would
restore the limits that were transgressed in generating the dispute. This process, of course, was
fundamentally conflictual. But the conflict did not end there. In the Greece of Heraclitus’ day, the
“judge handed down a ruling, but was not responsible for carrying it out.”406 Anybody that “won the
case had to carry the ruling out himself. He had no more than a legal claim, but at least he was now
entitled to realize it by means of ‘permitted self-help.’”407 It does not take a legal scholar to see that
this situation just “encouraged the continuation of conflicts on another level — and prompted more
lawsuits.”408 Justice, the corrective to transgression, would not exist without transgression.
Accordingly, Heraclitus concludes that if it were not for eris (strife, conflict), men would not
know justice (dike) because eris is inextricably intertwined with justice. Indeed, Heraclitus explicitly
says this in DK80: One must know that war is common, that justice is strife, and that all
things come about by strife and constraint [chreōn]. The word translated as “constraint” is the
Greek chreōn which means “necessity” or “that which must be.” It has the same root as the Greek
chreōs which means “that which one needs must pay,” obligation or debt. If strife is the tendency to
“go beyond” a limit or boundary, then chreōn is the “necessary” recompense or restitution for that
transgression. But if a debt must be paid, more strife is likely to arise in collecting it.
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This connection between strife and justice is also explicit in DK94: The sun will not
overstep [hyperbesetai] measures, otherwise, the Erinyes, Justice's helpers, will find it out. The
Erinyes (the root of this name is eris) are the personification of strife’s connection with personified
Justice. Here the cosmos is seen as a polis, where the hybris of the sun for “overstep[ping its]
measures,” is punished by the strife that attends justice. The Erinyes (usually translated into English
as “Furies”) are chthonic409 deities that punish humans that break oaths, murder kin, etc.410 In
Aeschylus’ Oresteia they are the spirits of vengeance that plague Orestes after he kills his mother and
her lover for their murder of his father Agamemnon. Having chthonic goddesses punish a heavenly
body symbolically points to there being an order to the cosmos. It also further indicates that no one,
no matter how lofty, is beyond justice. This cosmic justice is of a piece with Heraclitus’ assurance
that the nomos of the polis is supported by the divine (DK114).411
DK28 parallels this cosmic justice: Justice will seize hold of those who fabricate lies and
those who bear witness to them. Dishonesty is a form of boundary violation, of hybris, and thus
well-functioning polis cannot tolerate it. Hence we see in Republic, Book I that the first definition of
justice offered is “speaking the truth and paying whatever debts one has incurred.”412 Indeed, Kahn
explicitly connects DK28 with DK94.413 Heraclitus is either thinking that some form of divine
retribution will punish the liar, or he is saying something like our modern phrase “the truth will
come out.” Lies are unsustainable in the long run. It also is one of several indications in the
fragments that Heraclitus is not saying that we should get into conflict for conflict’s sake. Lies can
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generate conflict, hubris can generate conflict, but they both endanger the common (xynos).
Accordingly, lying and hubris are unjust. Again, notice that “Justice” is active in this fragment. It will
“seize hold of” (katalepsetai) liars like a warrior conquering territory. Indeed, the root of this word is
the same as that used in the following passage of Herodotus: “[Cylon] put on the air of one who
aimed at tyranny, and gathering a company of men of like age, he attempted to seize [katalabein] the
citadel.”414 This subtlety hints again at the connection between eris and dike.
Accordingly, we can see that for Heraclitus conflict in either the cosmos or the polis is not only
ineradicable, but valuable. Indeed, we would have no knowledge of justice if we never came into
conflict over injustices. Further, the only way to punish conflict-generating behaviors is to use
another kind of conflict (i.e. the courts, self-help, etc.), and even at the level of the polis the Furies
are the (metaphoric) helpers of Justice.
To summarize we see that the development of the Greek understanding of law and justice
during the archaic period and the early classical period deeply influenced Heraclitus. His views track
the development of nomos from the broad notion of custom, to the narrow notion of “law.” In
addition, both by the turbulence of Greek legal practice, with its endless reciprocal lawsuits, and the
constitutional and international changes that occurred during his lifetime affected the way that he
thought about politics and ethics in general. We have seen that Heraclitus carefully applies his
principle that the “logos is xynos (common)” to politics/ethics. If the logos is what is common, then it
follows that we should behave in a way that benefits the common. But since the political
embodiment of what is common, nomos, is fragile, it must be fought for against external and internal
threats. Apart from the physical defense of the polis, this protection is rendered through a special
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kind of strife (eris) called justice (dike). Justice requires the active discouragement and punishment of
behavior damaging to the common good of the polis.
But what sort of constitution did Heraclitus think would best exemplify his views about
politics? In other words, was Heraclitus a supporter of oligarchy or democracy? In modern terms,
what was his ideological affiliation? I discuss this issue in the next section.
III.

Oligarchs and Democrats: Developing Political Ideologies of Heraclitus’ Time
Placing Heraclitus on the ideological spectrum from oligarch to democrat is a thorny

problem. It is natural to assume that given his concern for the common good of the polis, there
would be a constitutional arrangement that he prefers. Most commentators, noting his aristocratic
background, and his despairing statements about how few people have understanding, tend to see
him as leaning in an oligarchic or aristocratic direction. Kahn, for example, concludes that, based
DK104, he “had small sympathy for democracy.”415 But is this a fair characterization of Heraclitus?
As with everything else in this essay, context suggests an answer. Simply put, in this case context
cautions agnosticism.
A.

The Meanings of “Oligarch” and “Democrat”

First, we need to know what “oligarch” and “democrat” meant. Both ideologies were still
developing in this period, so we cannot be precise, but we do have some idea what the words might
have meant in a broad sense to their supporters. The words for “oligarch” and “democrat”
“ὀλιγαρχικός and δημοκρατικός - are not found before the end of the fifth century, the time when
the contrast between oligarchy and democracy began to take on ideological dimensions.” 416 In other
words, the conflict did not take on ideological dimensions until after the death of Heraclitus. The
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first use of “democrat” is attributed to the speech writer Lysias who claimed that “no human being
is by nature oligarchical or democratic, but whatever constitution brings advantage to an individual is
the one he would like to see established.”417
Martin Ostwald sees this as evidence for two things: (1) that although the ideas of the two
forms of government existed much early in the fifth century, the terms were perceived as ideological
only during Lysias’ time; and (2) “ideology is not yet regarded as a matter of political principle but of
convenience: men are not oligarchical or democratic ‘by nature’ (ϕύσει), but on the basis of their
personal social and economic interest.”418 But what exactly does (2) mean regarding the definition of
oligarchy?) Aristotle describes the ruling class of an oligarchy as euporoi.419 The word euporos “is
properly rendered as ‘well-to-do’, or even better ‘well-provided with resources.’”420 In other words,
“[t]he size of a citizen's assets determined the degree of his participation in an oligarchy.”421
If this is correct, then concerns regarding the relative resources of civil servants drove the
ideological choice of government. Ostwald finds support for this view by reference to the
democratic reforms of Perikles:
A person had to be εὔπορος, “well-provided with resources” of his own in order to serve the
state in a military or civic capacity. This is precisely the reason why Perikles introduced pay
for jury duty: the administration of justice could not function democratically without
enabling the ἄποροι, “the indigent” who were “not provided with resources”, with an
allowance that would enable them to take at least one day off for jury duty without
jeopardizing their own well-being and that of their families.422

417

Ostwald, 387.

418

Ostwald, 387.

Plato describes the same class as plousioi (i.e. “wealthy”). As my advisor has been at pains to convince me the
difference between the terms is not as important as Ostwald suggests in his essay. This does not, however, render the
rest of Ostwald’s discussion incorrect as little to nothing depends on this distinction.
419

420

Ostwald, “Oligarchy and Oligarchs in Ancient Greece,” 389.

421

Ostwald, 390.

422

Ostwald, 389.

128

So, if this is correct, the ideological argument for oligarchy was most likely put in terms like
arguments for technocracy today: those who are most able to do x, should be the only candidates
considered for doing x. As Ostwald points out: “No government would proudly proclaim as its aim
that it wants to make the rich richer, even if that is, in effect, the result of its policies.”423 At least for
the group that came to be known as oligarchs, the question was not one of majority versus minority
rule. If this were so, it would be hard to understand why Kolophon was called an oligarchy even
though the majority of its citizens, before the Lydian invasion, were large estate owners.424
It is also dangerous to elide the difference between “oligarchy” and “aristocracy.” Some
oligarchs may have advocated for their preferred constitution by references to “rule of the best,” but
this conclusion is more based on our own speculations and reconstructions, “not statements that
have come down to us from antiquity.”425 This is not to say that oligarchy could not have been very
restrictive and elitist. Gehrke makes this point clear by distinguishing between two types of
oligarchy:
Both have a property qualification for citizenship, mostly in landed property. In one, the
τίμημα even for election to office is low enough to make most citizens eligible to a Council
and to other offices in such a way that ratification by an Assembly was no more than a
formality; in some cases, property qualifications serve as the basis only for military duty;
voting is by show of hands rather than by lot; and the terms of public officials are not
necessarily limited to one year. In addition to these forms, there is, as in Thucydides and
Aristotle, a narrow kind of oligarchy, which completely excludes small landowners, which
has a high property requirement and restricts office to a narrow circle, a clique, a family, a
clan, whose rule is as autocratic as the rule of a tyrant.426
Thus, there were oligarchikoi and there were oligarchikoi. Some wanted office requirements narrower
than others, but their defining quality was the belief that property requirements should determine
who could hold those offices.
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Roughly speaking we can talk about oligarchs and democrats in the following way. Oligarchs
wanted to limit enfranchisement to a specific group. Though they may have disagreed about how to
define this group or how small it should be, they all agreed that property holding should determine
political participation. Democrats, on the other hand, wanted to enfranchise all (male) citizens
regardless of their property qualifications. This could include (as in the case of Perikles) using city
funds to provide compensation for participation the political process to support citizens that could
not afford to otherwise. It is to these sorts of features we must look to determine Heraclitus’
ideological leanings.
B.

The Difficulty of Classifying Heraclitus’ Political Views

So did Heraclitus lean towards oligarchy? There is no direct evidence that he did. Mostly
there are inferences from the fact that he uses hoi polloi and hoi oligoi as contrastives when talking
about groups of people who understand the logos. For example, DK2: But although the account
(logos) is in common (xunos), most people [hoi polloi] live as though they had their own thought
(phronêsis).” But as Walter Donlan admits, it was not until the fifth century that we see “[t]he
emergence of words which identify social groups as numerical entities” (like hoi polloi & oligoi) which
“reveals the aristocracy's need to represent itself as a small, separate, tightly-knit coterie, distinct and
remote from the broad, undifferentiated mass.”427 It is possible, but not probable, that Heraclitus
was using the words in this socio-political way.
Assumptions about Heraclitus’ political allegiances also motivate Vitek’s challenge to the
authenticity of DK44: The people [dēmon] must fight for their law just as for their city wall.
Vitek believes that a “[r]ather suspicious feature” of DK44 “is the positive emphasis on people
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(δῆμος) whom Heraclitus usually treated with disgusted loathing, speaking of them as <<the many,
the masses>> (οἱ πολλοί).”428 In other words his argument is that: (1) Heraclitus speaks negatively
of the hoi polloi, (2) hoi polloi and demos are equivalent sociopolitical terms, (3) DK44 speaks positively
of the demos, thus (4) DK44 must not be authentic.
Again, Donlan is helpful here. During the archaic period (i.e. the first part of Heraclitus’ life)
just about the only word the use of which was restricted to a sociopolitical identifier was demos.429
But the use of number-terms like hoi polloi did not take on social significance until the fifth century
(the latter half of Heraclitus’ life). If we are to believe Vitek’s argument, we must assume that
Heraclitus’ obscure book was in the vanguard of this newer usage of hoi polloi instead of demos to
indicate a sociopolitical group of which he is critical. We might even need to assume that Heraclitus
was a pioneer of this usage of hoi polloi.
In fact, what we know about political rhetoric in the sixth and fifth centuries suggests the
opposite. Even in Athens, “[i]magery applied favourably to the demos is hard to find.”430 In fact, one
of the few positive images of the demos that persists is to compare them to the walls of the polis431—
which, as discussed above, is precisely the trope that Heraclitus is playing with in DK44. It follows
that Heraclitus’ use of this trope is not good evidence of his views on the demos. Consequently, the
fragment is probably authentic, but not a clue as to Heraclitus’ political ideology. Put another way,
we cannot make solid extrapolations about Heraclitus’ ideological views from this fragment,
authentic or not; further, we have no reason to doubt its authenticity on the basis that Vitek
suggests.
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Considering DK104 might be a more fruitful line of inquiry: What is their intelligence
[noos] or understanding [phrēn]? They believe the people's bards [demon aiodoisi] and take the
crowd [homilo] as their teacher, for they do not know that 'most men are bad' and that the
good are few. This appears to be a clear disparagement of the demos, but it is not an unambiguous
one. If we are careful, we can see that two features trouble this view: (1) the focus on “people’s
bards” and the “crowd as their teacher” and (2) what appears to be a quote in the closing clause.
Regarding the first, there are numerous examples of Heraclitus’ criticism of poets as misleading
sources of information (i.e. DK42, 56, 57, 106). So, whoever “they” are, Heraclitus is attacking the
popularity of the ideas that “they” are learning; he is not directly attacking the demos itself. Heraclitus
clearly thinks that it is difficult to attain wisdom, so it is not surprising that he rejects the idea that
what is au courant is the best way to find wisdom. Although this clause also mentions that “they”
take “the crowd as their teacher” Heraclitus does not use demon for “crowd”; instead, he uses homilos,
a word which is a word for crowd that does not necessarily carry any socio-political import. Indeed,
in Republic Book VI Plato uses it to mean allying or “consorting”: “Then the philosopher, by
consorting with what is ordered and divine [philosophos homilon kosmios te kai theios] and despite all the
slanders around that say otherwise, himself becomes as divine and ordered as a human being can.” 432
Thus it is far from clear that Heraclitus meant homilos to be a condemnation of the demos rather than
a critique of following popular trends.
Regarding the second matter, it appears the concluding clause is a quote from Bias of Priene.
DK39 explicitly mentions this sage approvingly: In Priene was born Bias, the son of Teutames,
who is held in greater account (logos) than the others.433 Diogenes Laertius ascribes the phrase
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“most are worthless” (hoi polloi kakoi) to Bias434 and Heraclitus may be quoting this phrase without
attribution in DK104 or DK104 and DK39 may have been originally grouped together in the text. If
this is so, then he is simply applying Bias’ quote to whatever he is criticizing in DK104. Further, it is
unclear if the hoi polloi referred to (in DK104) are the poets, the people, or every human being. The
broadest interpretation is a global condemnation of all people. The narrowest, which I prefer
because of the emphasis on the poets, is a condemnation of confusing the popular with prudent.
DK47 reinforces this restricted view: Let us not agree in a haphazard way about the
most important things is a fragment that has attracted little comment. Some like Kahn, suggest
that it is only a reiteration of themes found in other fragments.435 Generally, like Robinson, most
take it to be a comment on Heraclitus’ attitude toward seeking the truth.436 Laks and Most, however,
take “the most important things” to mean politics.437 Assuming that they are correct, what does this
fragment mean? I think if we look at the Greek, we see that he is most probably suggesting that we
should make political decisions after serious deliberation and not simply agree in a “haphazard way.”
The Greek of DK47 is μὴ εἰκῆ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων συμβαλλώμεθα. Literally translated this would
mean something like “We should not without plan/purpose/cause throw together/unite the
big/important matters/things.” We are looking at a similar sentiment to DK104, politics, like
wisdom is hard work and cannot be done well without serious intent. We cannot simply rely on
“thrown together” ideas; we must consider things carefully.
DK84b: It is wearisome to work hard [mochthein] for the same ones [tois autois] and to be
ruled by them [archesthai] is a curious and difficult fragment. If, Robinson438 and Laks/Most439 are
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correct and this fragment has political or sociological import, then we must consider it here. It could
refer to the lot of the slave, who must work for his or her masters. But it could also refer to the
paradoxical nature of citizen sovereignty wherein we work hard for the state, yet we are the state.
Kahn, on the other hand goes against the grain of other’s translation and interprets the final
word (archesthai) to have its other meaning “to begin” rather than “to be ruled.” He thus takes the
dative tois autois to refer to the “object of toil or cause of suffering, not the person for whom one
labors.”440 He prefers to render the fragment as “It is weariness to toil at the same tasks and be
always beginning.” Kahn, as is his custom, interprets this metaphysically and joins it with DK84a
(Changing, it remains at rest). This results in a collective reading that we “never to get to the end
of the job but toil continually at the same work and thus never find rest by changing.”441 A political
interpretation is just as plausible. Something like the polis and its nomos must continually adapt to
changes in internal and external conditions. This construal has the added benefit of using both the
meanings of archesthai. Double meanings are a hallmark of many Heraclitean fragments.
Whatever the proper interpretation of this fragment, it is impossible to make confident
conjectures about Heraclitus’ politics from it. We do not know if he meant it as comment, a critique
or something else entirely. Without more, we cannot properly contextualize it. Accordingly, I prefer
to remain agnostic as to any potential ideological meaning.
One cannot remain agnostic, however, about DK121: “All the adult Ephesians ought to
hang themselves and to leave the city to beardless boys: for they exiled Hermodorus, the
one man of them who mas most beneficial, saying, ‘Let there not be one man among who is
the most beneficial -- otherwise, may he be elsewhere among others.’ We have discussed this
fragment elliptically many times in this paper, so I will be brief here. The best theory seems to be
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that Hermodorus was some sort of nomothete that the Ephesians charged with legal reform after their
conquest by the Persian general Mardonius. For whatever reason, he was exiled for not living up to
their expectations. Heraclitus, according to Diogenes Laertius, seems to have turned down the same
job because Ephesus already had a “bad constitution” (ponera politeia).
I can see two possible scenarios. In the first, Ephesus was a Solonic timocracy, and the polis
charged Hermodorus with converting the city to a democracy under the reforms of Mardonius.
When he refused, they exiled him. Heraclitus’ critique in DK121 would thus be a swipe at
democracy as the form of government fit only for “beardless boys.”
The second scenario incorporates two factors ignored by the first: (1) the probability that
Heraclitus was suspicious of Persian “reforms,” and (2) the historical trend in Ephesus toward
neutrality and appeasement of foreign forces. This account follows the other about halfway. In other
words, Ephesus was a Solonic timocracy, and it tasked Hermodorus with converting the city to a
democracy under the reforms of Mardonius. As part of his reforms, he introduced mechanisms that
would mitigate the influence of Persia on office holding, etc. In other words, he did something
beneficial (oneistos) for the city at the expense of Persia. Given the arc of Ephesian political
temperament, this move was seen as a provocation of their Persian overlords, and they banished
him. In the same vein, it is improbable that these same Persian overlords would have allowed his
exile if he was representing the interests of the Empire in the city.
That Heraclitus was resentful of Persian power is no bare speculation. DK14 in its source
from Clement, includes the Persian Magi among those mystery cult practitioners that Heraclitus
disdains.442 Although the letter and the story are probably apocryphal, Diogenes Laertius seems to be
drawing on a tradition of Hercalitean anti-Medianism in his story that Heraclitus refused a job with
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the Great King himself.443 This same tradition is probably the source of the story that Heraclitus
persuaded the pro-Persian tyrant Melencomas to abdicate as well. 444
But even more persuasively, it fits in line with the view expressed in DK 125a: “May your
wealth never fail you, men of Ephesus, so that your baseness may be exposed!” Ephesian (if not
Ionian) prosperity appears to have been dependent on its careful navigation of foreign policy
relations with prosperous empires like Lydia, Persia, and then Athens. In condemning this wealth,
Heraclitus may have been condemning the Ephesian willingness to give up their independence
whenever doing so filled their coffers. His negative attitude toward the men of Ephesus is thus an
expression of patriotic integrity on his part, which shows that he had a more developed sense of
politics (from our point of view) than his contemporaries.
Overall, examining the explicit content of his fragments reveals a Heraclitus that is
stubbornly difficult to pin down as either an oligarch or a democrat. Even when we examine
“themes” in the fragments we find nothing that definitively reveals his affiliation. One such
“theme” is an emphasis on the “quiet virtues.” While Heraclitus seems to recommend the so-called
“quiet virtues” of “justice” and “temperance,” he reworks them for his own ends. Thus in DK 112
“’Sound thinking [or moral restraint, sōphronein] is the greatest virtue (aretē) and the greatest wisdom:
to speak truth and act according to nature, knowingly’ … the quiet virtue of temperance or selfcontrol (sōphrosunē) has been reconstrued as an intellectual insight that anticipates the SocraticPlatonic connection between virtue and knowledge.”445 An emphasis on sōphrosunē and hybris was part
of the propaganda approach taken by late fifth century oligarchs that preferred to stress the
supposed virtues of their style of government over democracy.
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however, also claimed these virtues for democracy.447 The chief slogans of ancient democrats were
“equality, legality, freedom, and community” in some mixture or other.448 Indeed, we have seen that
legality is a core idea that influenced Heraclitus, so we can see that it is an area where democrats and
Heraclitus overlapped in interest.
More interestingly, however, is the role of community. It is an undisputed feature of
Heraclitus’ thought that he recommends to xynon (the common/public/shared) as the way to the
logos. To xynon, however, is simply the Ionic version of the more familiar Attic to koinon. In
democratic propaganda, “[τ]ὸ κοινόν refers to the state and always expresses an idea of unity; ἐς
μέσον likewise implies the public and visible nature of democratic government, particularly in the
assembly, and the universal accessibility of information and ideas, in contrast to oligarchic
secretiveness.”449 This use of the “common” to imply both open to all and the same for all is
certainly a recurring theme in Heraclitus’ thinking. Consider just two examples, DK2: “But
although the account (logos) is in common (xunos), most people live as though they had their
own thought (phronêsis)” and DK113: Thinking (phroneein) is common [xynon] to all. This is plainly
something akin to both “the idea of unity” (to koinon) and the “universal accessibility of information
and ideas” (es meson). Hence, there is a potential connection between these core concepts of late fifth
century democratic ideology and Heraclitus’ use of similar concepts in the fragments.
Despite this, there is simply not enough to call Heraclitus a democrat. Lacking from his
fragments are clear articulations of important democratic ideas like isonomia (the combination of
equality and the rule of law) and isegoria (the combination of equality and freedom). Heraclitus
believes in something like the rule of law, but oligarchs did as well. Their slogan was Solon’s eunomia
(“good order”), not the democratic isonomia (“equality of political rights”). We do not really know if
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Heraclitus would have been content with the Solonic timocracy of his youth; he says nothing
specific about it. Further, while its plain he believed thinking was open to all, he does not have
anything to say on the democratic idea of freedom of speech (isegoria).
Now it is possible that such statements simply have not survived. Indeed, no Heraclitean
fragment talks about political freedom at all. This is particularly odd since the Greek notions of
eleutheria and autonomia developed in response to the Persian Wars to describe the political freedom
of poleis.450 Heraclitus seems to have missed this new trend altogether. It is possible that he was too
far away from the locus of its development (i.e. Athens) to feel its influence, but we simply do not
know.
I do not mean to conclude that Heraclitus was hostile to the idea of political freedom, just
that he does not discuss it explicitly. Indeed, many of his ideas and anecdotes about him implicitly
commit him to some notion of autonomia. What sense is there to say we should fight for our nomos
like the city wall, or that our nomos is under the guardianship of the divine, if our nomos has no
political importance, etc. To summarize, if Heraclitus made even vague statements on isonomia,
isegoria, autonomia, or elelutheria, I would feel more comfortable calling him a democratic-leaning
thinker. Since we do not, I cannot go so far.
In short, I do not think we can easily read off Heraclitus’ ideological leanings from the
surviving fragments. Concomitantly, I reject the view of many commentators that Heraclitus was
probably “aristocratic” or “oligarchic” leaning. There is simply too much ambiguity in the fragments
themselves and suspect words like demos, polloi, and oligoi were too much in flux during his lifetime to
say that he leaned one way or another. Kahn vacillates on this issue but seems to think Heraclitus
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was either apolitical or simply opposed to democracy. Where Kahn comes closest too my own view
is where he writes of Heraclitus:
I imagine his civic attitude by analogy with the quasi-neutral stance of Solon… Solon saw
himself as a mediating force, opposing the excesses of the rival parties, ‘standing like a
boundary mark between the warring factions’ (fr.25) in order to preserve the common
interests of the city as a whole.451
To which I would add, the turbulent international situation also informed Heraclitus to reject
policies that overtly appeased the Persians or adopted their customs. Kahn himself as much says this
when he claims that the Heraclitean defense of nomos is a reaction against cultural relativism. Hence,
Kahn is on firmer ground comparing Heraclitus to Solon than elsewhere where he blithely asserts
that Heraclitus is a “conservative”452 or that he disliked democracy.453
Conclusion
We have seen that Heraclitus was deeply influenced by the development of the Greek
understanding of law and justice during the archaic period and the early classical period. His views
track the development of nomos from the broad notion of custom, to the narrow notion of “law.” In
addition, he was influenced both by the turbulence of Greek legal practice, with its endless
reciprocal lawsuits, and the constitutional and international changes that occurred during his lifetime.
We have seen that Heraclitus carefully applies his principle that the “logos is xynos (common)” to
politics/ethics. If the logos is what is common, then it follows that we should behave in a way that
benefits the common. But since the political embodiment of what is common, nomos, is fragile, it
must be fought for against external and internal threats. Apart from the physical defense of the polis,
this protection is rendered through a special kind of strife (eris) called justice (dike). Justice requires
the active discouragement and punishment of behavior damaging to the common good of the polis.
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Finally, we examined the evidence concerning Heraclitus’ ideological allegiance. We saw that
he has much more in common with ancient democrats than most scholars give him credit for.
However, this was not enough to make him a committed democrat. He lived in a time when
democratic ideology was still developing its own ideas and language, and thus he lacks any mention
of key democratic concepts like isonomia, isegoria, autonomia, or elelutheria. Without his views on these
concepts, we cannot say clearly that he was on one side or the other of the oligarch/democrat divide
that would characterize political debate during the classical period (ca. 510 – 323 B.C.E.).
In short, we have seen there is a great deal more to found of political/ethical interest in
Heraclitus’ fragments then he is usually given credit for. By focusing on contextualizing his
fragments to his historical period and biography we have been able to draw out a Heraclitus with
broader interests and ideas. But what does this all mean? What, in short was this non-metaphysical
part of Heraclitus’ project? Even further, if Heraclitus was so interested in the value theory side of
philosophy where is the evidence that the ancient philosophers that read him knew about it? In the
previous chapters I have begun to answer these questions. Interpretations of his fragments have
provided the pieces of Heraclitus political/ethical project. In chapter 3, I provided evidence that
Plato’s own ethical ideas about love were influenced by a cultural resource I have argued is common
to both Plato and Heraclitus: the Eleusinian Mysteries. In the next chapter I shall put the pieces of
my interpretation together and try to provide more evidence of Heraclitus’ political/ethical influence
on later ancient thinkers.

140

CHAPTER 5: HERACLITUS’ ETHICAL/POLITICAL PROJECT AND ITS ANCIENT
INFLUENCE
In the previous chapters, I examined the way in which applying some historical and
biographical context to Heraclitus’ famously obscure fragments reveals that he was interested in
more than metaphysics or cosmological speculation. This claim might seem problematic because the
received wisdom is that later philosophers focused on his metaphysical claims and not on any ethical
or political ideas. Despite this, the evidence shows that his ethical ideas clearly had an impact on
later thinkers, and that the impact of his metaphysical ideas was more complicated than conventional
wisdom suggests. In part, the received view of Heraclitus as not interested in ethics is due to the
Peripatetic tradition’s role in the doxographical tradition. The lens of this school has served to focus
our attention on areas of Peripatetic concern in the ideas of all the Pre-Socratics. As A.A. Long puts
it:
As is well-known, [the Peripatetic tradition] interpreted early Greek philosophy according to
its own anachronistic preconceptions—identification of material cause(s), postulation of
ἀρχαί and “elements,” monism versus pluralism, etc. But still more distorting than the
imposition of these categories were three doxographical points that are generally overlooked
in modern scholarship: first, the Peripatetics’ lack of exegetical interest in early Greek
philosophers’ statements about the divine; second, their presumption that the early
philosophers assimilated thinking/mind to αἴσθησις … third, their assumption (somewhat
analogous to the method. of Descartes and Bacon) that what the early Greek philosopher
took themselves to be doing was observing and describing a physical world external to
themselves, a world which did not include the observer in the materials studied.454
In this essay, I have endeavored to correct for the Peripatetic presumptions that we have inherited
by reinjecting history into our understanding of Heraclitus.
In Chapter 3 we saw the influence exerted by the Eleusinian and Delphian religious
traditions on his ideas and his style. In Chapter 4 we saw how Heraclitus extended the ideas inspired
by those religious traditions to political and ethical issues that were pressing during and after his

A. A. Long, “Parmenides on Thinking Being,” Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 12, no. 1
(January 1, 1996): 128.
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time: nomos (law/custom), hubris (violence/overstepping bounds), stasis (civil war), and dike (justice).
In this chapter, I will reinforce my interpretation of Heraclitus as an ethical and political thinker by
drawing attention to his influence on the ethical and political ideas of his successors. 455 In brief, I
believe that a close examination of the textual evidence reveals the impact of Heraclitus’ ethical and
political ideas on thinkers from the pre-Socratic Democritus of Abdera, to Plato and Aristotle, all
the way down to the Stoics.
I.

Heraclitus’ Ethical/Political Views: A Summary
But before I dive into the Heraclitean influence on other thinkers, we should take a brief

detour. Although I have been discussing Heraclitus’ political and ethical views throughout this essay,
I have not yet set all of them down in one place. I will attempt to do that here, so that we can more
fully appreciate the breadth of his thinking. But first a gentle historical reminder. In Heraclitus’ day
there was no recognized separation between politics, ethics, and religion. Answering the questions:
“How should I live?” and “What should I do?” inevitably involved a Greek’s relationship to the two
most important influences on a Greek’s personal happiness: his polis and the gods. If his polis was
chaotic, his life was chaotic. There was and is a deep connection between the political and the
personal aspects of life.
It may be slightly harder for us to understand the connection the ancient Greeks made
between the theological and the political. A Greek’s relationship to his gods was as important to his
maintenance of a good life as a well-ordered city. First, there could really be no well-ordered city in
the Greek mind unless the gods ensured it. The gods were personifications of the forces of nature
and other human abstractions so if a community displeased them, life in that community would
become miserable. Keeping the gods “one your side” was a vital part of ancient politics. One need
only consider the seriousness of the charges leveled against the problematic Alcibiades that he
455
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profaned the Mysteries and (possibly) defaced the city’s Herms or the allegation that Socrates
introduced gods not recognized by the polis to his youthful followers. Second, the ancient Greeks
consider the gods as potential allies in achieving personal or political goals. If you wanted to seek
revenge on an enemy, you would ask the help of the gods; if you wanted to make a binding oath,
your promises were enforced by the gods; if you wanted a successful military campaign, you had to
ask the gods about your chances of success, etc. As an ancient Greek, the gods inextricably
intertwined with nearly every aspect of your everyday life.
With this reminder out of the way, we can now consider Heraclitus’ own views in context.
Based on my arguments of the previous chapters, we can discern three main lessons at the heart of
Heraclitus’ philosophy. The first lesson is that many apparently opposed things are connected; thus
to understand them we must see what is “common” between them. If we apply this idea to politics,
it helps explains some of Heraclitus’ stranger fragments. Consider again DK53: War is the father of
all and the king of all, and has revealed that the ones are gods and the others humans, and
has made the ones slaves and the others free and DK80: One must know that war is
common, that justice is strife, and that all things come about by strife and constraint. War
appears to be the opposite of community and social structures, but it is really the source of those
structures. The polis as a community is defined by its literal and figurative wars with other poleis. The
gods became gods because of their war with the Titans, overthrowing the latter in the world order
(kosmos). The vanquished in war become slaves, and the victors remain free. As discussed in Chapter
4, literal war generated a substantial portion of ancient Greek social and political structure.
Heraclitus’ point is not to glorify war, but to recognize how it is a force in Greek life which
structured that life. In other words, he is saying that one might think that war and
community/society are mere opposites, but they are in fact connected (i.e. “in common”).
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DK80 makes a similar point on a less grand scale. The Greek legal system, as discussed in
Chapter 4, was conflictual. DK80 is in part, a recognition of this. But it is also a recognition that
conflict internal to the polis helps generate the laws that define and protect the polis. Elites overstep
to get more power or property. This brings about internal conflict between elites or between elites
and the demos. Legal judgments or new laws (i.e. Solon) hold future elites back from doing the same.
Strife brings about constraint just as (DK11) Every beast is driven to pasture by blows.456
Heraclitus’ second lesson is that understanding what is “common” cannot be achieved
through the mere accumulation of facts or opinions. Wisdom is not just reading a lot of people’s
books and hearing a lot of opinions so that you can create a kind of amalgam. This is what
Heraclitus disliked about polymaths like Pythagoras. Polymaths, according to Heraclitus, think that
because they have read many books or heard many things that most have not, that they are wiser
than everyone else. But this conclusion assumes that wisdom is private and not common. 457
Polymaths are thus part of that group derided in DK2: But although the account (logos) is in
common (xunos), most people live as though they had their own thought (phronêsis). Polymaths
falsely assume they have a monopoly on wisdom when in reality (DK113) [t]hinking (phroneein) is in
common for all. Applied to politics, this idea translates into a suspicion of some traditional indices

This idea is like Machiavelli’s ideas about institutionalized class conflict in the Discourses, Book I, Chapter 4. In that
Chapter Machiavelli is discussing the conflict between the plebeians and patricians in the early history of the Roman
Republic. Commentators who preceded Machiavelli derided these “disturbances” as something that should be
prevented in the ideal city-state. Machiavelli, however says that “those who condemn the disturbances between the
nobles and the plebeians condemn those very things that were the primary cause of Roman liberty.” Niccolo
Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, trans. Julia Conaway Bondanella and Peter Bondanella, Reissue edition (Oxford ; New
York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 29. According to Machiavelli, “all of the laws passed in favour of liberty” were
born from the conflict between the upper class and the people. He even goes so far as to say that historical examples of
exceptional ability that came from this period of strife are directly attributable to that strife “for good examples come
from good training, good training from good laws, and good laws from those disturbances that many people
thoughtlessly condemn.” Machiavelli, 39. A good republic must have some way for “the people to express their
ambitions, especially those cities that intend to make use of the people in important affairs.” Machiavelli, 30. If that is
not present, then a city becomes truly unstable. In Heraclitean terms, the unity of opposites can be found, not only in
the cosmos, but also within good government.
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Since only a very few (wealthy world travelers perhaps?) could ever achieve this sort of wisdom, it is much like
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of political power such as privilege, birth, wealth etc. Simply put, Heraclitus does not think members
of higher economic strata, like himself, have a monopoly on what is beneficial for the polis. Thus we
have statements like DK125a: May your wealth never abandon you, he said, men of Ephesus,
so that your wickedness can be proven.

Instead, Heraclitus believed that, regardless of

background, any and all citizens had a shared responsibility to ensure the common good. Whether
they be the demos fighting to protect the law (DK44) or a single person who is particularly beneficial
to the polis (DK33,49). This explains the sentiment, although not the historical context, behind
DK121, the fragment about Hermodorus’ exile. What matters is the common good, regardless of
the source. The Ephesians, in rejecting Hermodorus (who promoted the common good) are less
competent than literal legal incompetents (“beardless boys”) since they would reject help for the city
for petty reasons.458
In his essay, “Shared Responsibility for the Common Good: Heraclitus, Early Philosophy,
and Political Thought,” historian Kurt A. Raaflaub approximates what I am calling Lesson (2) by
examining, inter alia, fragment DK44, DK113, and DK116: All humans have a share in knowing
themselves and in thinking with moderation (sophronein) [sometimes translated as “sound
thinking”]. Raaflaub writes:
We can now expand this: not only wall and law, but also sound thinking and speaking are
decisive to protect the common good. And as all citizens must engage in protecting wall and
law, so they all must commit themselves to, and are capable of, sound thinking and speaking,
Hence, whatever Heraclitus thought about the demos’s capacity to participate in government,
ultimately his scorn was directed against all, whether high or low, who were too stupid to
recognize their capacity and obligation to participate in the quest for the common good. His
insistence that soundness and safety lie in what is public and common and that all must contribute to it
This Lesson also has its parallel in Machiavelli’s Discourses, Book I, Chapter 4. In response to the potential objection
that the people that he has so much faith in could be in error about the common good, Machiavelli responds that the
remedy is in “public assemblies where some worthy man may arise and, making a speech, demonstrate to the people that
they are mistaken.” Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, 30. This trust in the “worthy” (perhaps men like Solon) to direct the
people in times where they err is analogous to Heraclitus’ statements that (DK47) Let us not agree in a haphazard
way about the most important things, (DK33) It is also a law to obey the plan of just one man, and (DK49) One
man, for me, is ten thousand, if he is the best. If the demos or the elites are wrong about the common good, through
“haphazard” agreement, then it is the responsibility of any individual who sees this to set them aright.
458
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seems to me a crucial and so far not sufficiently appreciated component of Heraclitus’s
political thinking.459
As we have seen above, Raaflaub is on the right track here. This egalitarian strain in Heraclitus
usually goes unnoticed,460 but it is unsurprising since, as I have argued, the very egalitarian Eleusinian
Mysteries deeply impacted Heraclitus. Just as initiation into Demeter’s Mysteries was open to
(almost) everyone, so too are the attainment of truth and the common good.
The third lesson on follows from the first two. This lesson holds that “wisdom must be
achieved through shared (i.e. common) experience and active participation in seeking it.” The best
illustration of this is the anecdote discussed in Chapter 3. Recall that in his Moralia Plutarch told the
following story about Heraclitus:
And is not the god [Apollo] himself fond of conciseness and brevity in his oracles, and is he
not called Loxias because he avoids prolixity rather than obscurity? And are not those who
indicate by signs, without a word, what must be done, praised and admired exceedingly? So
Heracleitus, when his fellow-citizens asked him to propose some opinion about concord
[homonoia], mounted the platform, took a cup of cold water, sprinkled it with barley-meal,
stirred it with penny-royal, drank it up, and departed …461
Foley is surely correct that the meaning of this anecdote is that concord comes from the intermixing
of citizens to reveal something common in a manner analogous to the “mixing” of people from all
levels of society during the Mysteries.462 The source of this anecdote is most likely DK125: A
kukeon too separates out if it is not stirred. The polis, like the kukeon, is a mixture that separates
into different opposing elements if it is not “stirred;” if its citizens do not actively participate
together in protecting and promoting the common good. For example, citizens must protect the law

Raaflaub, “Shared Responsibility for the Common Good: Heraclitus, Early Philosophy, and Political Thought,” 122–
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because it is common to all (DK44: The people must fight for their law just as for their city
wall; DK114). More specifically, they must guard against hubris, the offense that divides
communities (DK43: One must extinguish arrogant violence (hubris) more than a
conflagration).
Since hubris is a crime of immoderation, it follows that the citizens should strive to be
moderate (DK112: To be moderate: the greatest virtue). Humans may want more than is good
for them or their fellow citizens, so (DK110) For humans, that whatever they wish happens is
not better.463 Heraclitus acknowledges that moderation can be difficult since passion is powerful
(DK85: To fight against ardor (thumos) is hard: for whatever it wants, it purchases it at the
price of the soul [i.e. of life]).464
All this contributes to one of Heraclitus most quotable ideas, the thought that (DK119)
Character, for a human, is his personal deity [daimon]. A citizen’s habits or disposition and not
their wealth or status determine their fate. If we consider the citizen and their polis in parallel, we see
that Heraclitus considers character to be something like the nomos of an individual. Recall that in
DK114465 he wrote that nomos is guarded over by the divine. It might not be too much to say that
Nomos, for a polis, is its personal deity. Citizens must, must actively pursue the common good
together both for the good of the polis and for their own personal good.
As we have seen through this summary, there is much greater political and ethical depth to
Heraclitus than has previously been recognized. While it might lack the sophistication of modern

This moderation extends to personal behavior, like excessive consumption of alcohol. When a person drinks, he is
not in control of himself due to his “wet” soul (DK117: When a man has become drunk, he is led stumbling by a
slave, a mere boy: he does not know where he is going, his soul is wet). Accordingly, good citizen strives to not be
impaired by alcohol; to have a “dry” soul (DK118: A dry soul: wisest and best).
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Those who speak with their mind (xun noôi) must rely (iskhurizesthai) on what is common (xunôi) for all, just as a city
does on its law, and much more strongly (iskhurterôs). For all human laws are nourished by one law, the divine one: for it
dominates as much as it wants to, and it suffices for all, and there is some left over.
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ethical theories, Heraclitus’ fragments show a real effort to combine traditional moral (i.e. Delphic)
ideas about moderation with political ideas about the stability of the body politic. Indeed, we can see
clear echoes of these ideas in the thinking of Democritus at one chronological extreme and the
Stoics on another. In what follows I will examine these echoes to show that Heraclitus’ ethical views
did not go totally unnoticed by later thinkers, despite the emphasis that his metaphysical views often
get.
II.

The Impact of Heraclitus’ Ethical Ideas on Later Thinkers
A.

Democritus

Democritus of Abdera (or maybe Miletos) lived from c. 460 B.C.E. to c.370 B.C.E. He and
his teacher Leucippus are the founding figures of the philosophical school called “Atomism.”
Atomists speculated that all matter was composed of tiny indivisible particles arranged in the “void.”
Among the numerous fragments attributed to Democritus are a considerable number concerned
with ethics.466 He is the earliest philosopher to explicitly suggest a “supreme good or goal, which he
calls ‘cheerfulness’ or ‘well-being,’ and which he appears to have identified with the untroubled
enjoyment of life.”467 Indeed, some believe that prior to Democritus there was no clearly articulated
philosophical ethics. Speaking in favor of this view, Charles Kahn acknowledges that both the
fragments of Democritus and Heraclitus are our earliest records of moral philosophy468, but claims
that the latter are too “brief, enigmatic, and chronologically remote.”469 This last point is an
exaggeration, however. While the brevity of the fragments is ineradicable, we can render them much
Sylvia Berryman, “Democritus,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2016
(Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/democritus/.
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less enigmatic if we situate them in their time and place. In fact, Kahn himself points to several
instances where Heraclitus clearly influenced Democritus.470 Here are a few of the more obvious
ones:
Heraclitus471
DK6. ὁ ἥλιος ... καθάπερ ὁ Ἡράκλειτός φησι,
νέος ἐφ' ἡμέρῃ ἐστίν
The sun […] is new every day.
DK119. ἔφη ὡς ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων
Character, for a human, is his personal
deity [daimôn].
DK85. θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεπόν· ὃ γὰρ ἂν θέλῃ,
ψυχῆς ὠνεῖται
To fight against ardor (thumos) is hard: for
whatever it wants, it purchases it at the
price of the soul [i.e. of life].
DK25. μόροι γὰρ μέζονες μέζονας μοίρας
λαγχάνουσι
Greater deaths (moroi) obtain greater
portions (moirai).
DK13 Pigs take greater pleasure in mire than in pure
water.

Democritus472
B158 ὡς φησι Δημόκριτος νέα ἐφ ᾑμέῃ
φρονέοντες
[…] as Democritus says, humans, “thinking
new thoughts every day” [...]
B171. εὐδαιμονίη οὐκ ἐν βοσκήμασιν οἰκεῖ,
οὐδὲ χρευσῷ. ψυχὴ οἰκητήριον δαίμονος.
Happiness (eudaimoniê) does not reside in
flocks nor in gold: the soul is the residence
of a divinity (daimôn).
B236. θυμῷ μάχεσθαι μέν χαλεπόν ἀνδρὸς δέ τὸ
κρατέειν
To fight against ardor (thumos) is hard; but it
is the mark of a rational man to dominate
over it.
B219. χρεμάτων ὄρεξις ἢν μὴ ὁρίζεται κόρω,
πωνίης ἐσχάτης πολλὸν χαλεπωτέρη μέζονες
γὰρ ὀρέξεις μεζονας ἐνδείας ποιεῦσιν
The desire for wealth, if it is not limited by
satisfaction, is much harder to endure than
extreme poverty. For greater appetites
create greater needs.
B147 Pigs […] go mad for rubbish,
Democritus. 473

according to

An important note on formatting. Laks-Most use boldface type to indicate that the fragment is a quote instead of a
paraphrase. Where there is some doubt as to the attribution of the quote they use italics to indicate it. Unless otherwise
specified, I am merely following this convention herein. For example, although most scholars include the numerous
fragments that Stobaeus attributes to “Democrates” to Democritus, L-M wish to indicate the debate over these
fragments through italics. Although I am following their convention, I side with those that attribute these fragments to
Democritus. Even if this were not so, little in my argument hangs on this attribution. The intention of this section is to
show that Heraclitus had an influence on the ethical-political thinking of later thinkers. It doesn’t matter greatly if this
thinker is called Democritus or “Democrate.” All that matters is someone was inspired to rework his ideas as their own
philosophy.
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As we can see from these comparisons, Democritus took Heraclitus’ work as raw material that he
could draw on and adapt in various ways. B158 and DK6, for example, are cases in which
Democritus offers an interpretation of Heraclitus. Democritus takes the enigmatic The sun […] is
new every day metaphorically to refer to the changing nature of human thought. Democritus
reworks and rephrases the pithy DK119 - Character, for a human, is his personal deity [daimôn]
into the “spelled out” B171: “Happiness (eudaimoniê) does not reside in flocks nor in gold: the soul is
the residence of a divinity (daimôn).” Other places, Democritus seems to be trying to “complete a
thought” begun by a Heraclitan fragment. In DK85 Heraclitus writes (in DK85) that To fight
against ardor (thumos) is hard: for whatever it wants, it purchases it at the price of the soul [i.e.
of life]. This fragment is brimming with interesting insights into Heraclitus’ approach to both
psychology and ethics. It conveys the difficulty of fighting against a strong passion, anger for
example, as trying to stop something that consumes your life force. By noting the danger of this
thumos, Heraclitus is recommending that we fight against it, despite the difficulty. Democritus
correctly sees this but wants to “complete the thought” so-to-speak. Thus we get B236: “To fight
against ardor (thumos) is hard; but it is the mark of a rational man to dominate over it” which makes
things more explicit. In short, Democritus is drawing out the clear implication that although it is
hard, it is not impossible. Finally, for B219 Democritus borrows the structure of a Heraclitean
fragment in its last sentence. Democritus declares that “The desire for wealth, if it is not limited by
satisfaction, is much harder to endure than extreme poverty. For greater appetites create greater
needs (emphasis added)” whereas Heraclitus in DK25 writes that Greater deaths (moroi) obtain
greater portions (moirai). As we saw in Chapter 2, DK25 probably relates to the kind of immortality
one gets through their reputation after death and not to the satisfaction of desires. Democritus most
likely only cares about the pithiness of DK25 and thus borrows its structure but not its meaning.
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Democritus, however, not only makes clear his points of agreement with Heraclitus, he is
also moved to make clear his disagreements with the Ephesian. These disagreements appear to be
roughly epistemological. In fragment B11, Democritus appears to be directly opposing Heraclitus’s
views about the senses. Whereas Heraclitus seems to indicate some sense experience can be
trustworthy (DK55: All the things of which sight and hearing are knowledge (mathesis) I honor
most.), Democritus, as an atomist, calls them “obscure”: B11 - There are two forms of
knowledge (gnômê), the one genuine, and the other obscure [skotie]. And to the obscure one
belong all of these: sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. The other is genuine, and is separated
from this one.

Calling these forms of knowledge “obscure” (skotie) might even be a jab at

Heraclitus nickname Skoteinos (the “Obscure”).
Despite this difference of opinion over the senses, we saw above that Democtrius several
times seems to paraphrase or rework Heraclitus’ ethical ideas as his own. This, however, is not the
extent of the impact of Heraclitus’ ethical ideas on Democritus. Democritus seems to espouse a
Heraclitean view that things typically considered “bad” can be positive, if looked at in the right light.
Accordingly, he claims in B229 that Thrift and hunger are useful; but in the right circumstances so too is
expense. To discern this is the mark of a good man. The first part of this fragment seems to recall
Heraclitus’ saying in DK11 that Illness makes health sweet and good, hunger does so for
satiety, toil for repose. We can only appreciate the positives of “health,” “satiety” and “repose”
because we know their opposites. Heraclitus is content to leave this lesson as is, but Democritus
wants to make it clear that these “bad” things are only useful, much like their opposites “in the right
circumstances.” It is the “mark of a good man” to know these circumstances; To know when we
should not accept hunger, or thrift despite or natural desires to the contrary. Indeed, this is much
like what Heraclitus is saying in DK110: For humans, that whatever they wish happens is not
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better. Here again as with B236/DK85 both philosophers are cautioning against surrendering
oneself to one’s passions. Even when the passions are understandable like the desire to sate hunger.
By far the most interesting overlap between Democritus and Heraclitus on ethical matters
concerns their views on politics. Democritus was keen to recommend conventional morality.
Unfortunately, as with anyone who thinks that conventions have moral force, he is bedeviled by the
possible counterexample of “someone who can escape conventional sanctions, e.g., by doing wrong
in secret.”474 One way to counteract this criticism is to rely on the threat of divine sanction. If you
violate norms, the gods will punish you. This is part of Heraclitus’ response we can see in fragments
like DK28B: Justice will seize hold of those who fabricate lies and of those who bear witness
to them and` DK94: The sun will not overstep measures, otherwise, the Erinyes, Justice's
helpers, will find it out. It is unclear what Democritus thought on this matter as two of his
fragments appear to be at cross-purposes here.475 D81 says that “They alone are loved by the gods,
to whom wrongdoing is hateful”476 suggesting some divine benefits for ethical behavior (at least in
this life). However, D40 suggests that the gods do not bad, harmful and useless things on humans,
rather humans “run into them themselves through blindness and lack of judgment.”477
It is clearer, however, that Democritus seems to have rejected the antithesis that gives rise to
the problem in the first place; the distinction between nomos and phusis. This opposition between the
conventional/legal (nomos) and the natural (phusis) is the underlying assumption behind objections
like the ring of Gyges example from Republic 2, and in the work of other sophistic philosophers.
What basis, if any, do customs and laws have in reality? Are they merely fictions created by humans?

Taylor, The Atomists, 227. The most famous example of a challenge to conventional morality is in Republic II where
Glaucon tells the tale of the ring of Gyges. Aristophanes and Antiphon addressed the same issue earlier, but the ring of
Gyges example is the most famous.
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If so, what moral authority do they have?478 However, their views seem to rely on the presumption
that our individual self-interest, which is part of our nature (phusis), not only contrasts with but is
opposed by conventions like laws and conventional morality.
Democritus has his own take on this argument. He writes in B112 that “It is the aim of law
to benefit the life of men; and it can, provided they wish to benefit from it. For it displays its
goodness to those who obey.”479 This fragment is an outright rejection of the assumption of our
Sophists above that the law is actually opposed to our personal benefit. The last sentence even
implies a reason Glaucon, et. al. are mistaken. The law only benefits people that follow it. If you fail
to follow it, you reap none of the benefits. Our Sophists do not like the law for the same reason that
criminals do not like the law. Democritus would say that their error is assuming that their private
“benefit” can even exist outside the protection of the law which sustains the polis. He writes in B252
that One should consider the affairs of the city to be the most important of all, so that it will be well-directed, neither
being contentious against what is equitable nor attributing to oneself a power contrary to what is useful for the whole.
For a well-directed city is the greatest rectification, and it contains everything; and as long as it is safe, everything is
safe, and if it is destroyed, everything is destroyed. If so-called “private benefit” comes at the expense of the
common good, it undermines the very foundations by which any individual good can be enjoyed: the
safety and stability of the city itself.
As Taylor480 points out, the central idea of B252 bears some resemblance to the point that
Protagoras’ myth makes in the Platonic dialogue that bears his name.481 In it he describes early
humans as disparate and at the mercy of other animals because of their natural weakness. But
Callicles expressed the most extreme anti-nomos position in this debate in Plato’s Gorgias. In that work he argues that
“conventional morality is a contrivance devised by the weak and unintelligent to inhibit the strong and intelligent from
doing what they are entitled by nature to do, viz. exploit their inferiors for their own advantage.” 478 We can see various
versions of this views in the ideas of Antiphon, Thrasymachus, and the aforementioned Glaucon as well.
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because they did not possess the “art of politics” they were unable to fight off the animals. Even
when they tried to band together in cities for mutual protection, they were unable to sustain
themselves because, without politics, they fell to fighting one another. Fearful that mankind would
soon perish, “he sent Hermes to bring justice and a sense of shame to humans, so that there would
be order within cities and bonds of friendship to unite them.”482 When Hermes asked if these new
arts of justice and shame should be distributed to a few like the art of medicine, Zeus commanded
that they be given to all because “cities would never come to be if only a few possessed these, as is
the case with the other arts. 483 While not arguing the exact same thing, Protagoras and Democritus’
arguments have some connections. Protagoras is effectively identifying “justice and shame” as the
psychological antecedents of law and justice in the city. Democritus, on the other hand, focuses on
qualities of cities themselves “law” and “proper direction.” In both cases, the core of the argument
is that we could not enjoy anything good484 if we, like Glaucon, were to consider the law our enemy.
Another way of putting the same point is that there must be something that binds us
together in a community, something which we all agree upon, for us to make any meaningful
accomplishments. Thus we find in B250 Democritus’ writes that It is from consensus [homonoies] that
great deeds and, for cities, wars can be brought to a successful conclusion, otherwise not. This fragment recalls the
anecdote about Heraclitus discussed in Chapter 3. Plutarch recounts that “Heracleitus, when his
fellow-citizens asked him to propose some opinion about concord [homonoia], mounted the platform,
took a cup of cold water, sprinkled it with barley-meal, stirred it with penny-royal, drank it up, and
departed …485 As I argued, the best way to understand this anecdote is that consensus or concord is
only achieved, when like the disparate ingredients of the kukeon or the different initiates at Eleusis,
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we mix together to form something common. If we agree with Glaucon we must assume that
getting whatever we might wish is in our best interests. As we have seen, Democritus argues that this
assumption is mistaken. Without some consensus, we cannot pursue our interests at all. Or as
Heraclitus puts it in DK110: For humans, that whatever they wish happens is not better.
Democritus’ ideas about the importance of law and the well-directed city in B250 and B252
clearly echo central ideas in Heraclitus. For example, DK44: The people must fight for their law
just as for their city wall and DK43: One must extinguish arrogant violence (hubris) more than
a conflagration. As I have repeatedly argued, just as the city wall provides the benefit of protection
to all citizens, so too does the law. The law is a promoter of our most basic need for protection
from external and internal threats and not opposed to our interests. Here again it is only the enemies
of the common good that see the law as against their personal benefit. Whether these enemies are an
invading army or citizens that generate the conditions of civil war. Democritus and Heraclitus also
share the view that it is proper to follow the dictates of wiser authorities than oneself. Democritus
claims that (B247) To submit to law; to a magistrate, and to a wiser man is orderly (kosmonion). Heraclitus
similarly declares that (DK33) It is also a law to obey the plan of just one man and (DK49) One
man, for me, is ten thousand, if he is the best.
As we can see, there is a clear parallel between the styles of the two thinkers. Kahn argues
“that the Heraclitean echoes in Democritus are no mere ornament of style but involve profound
rethinking of Heraclitean ideas.”486 Yet this conclusion is at odds with the idea that Heraclitus’ own
fragments are comparatively too enigmatic or remote to give us a clear picture of his ethical thought.
It is not possible to determine that Democritus re-thought Heraclitus if we cannot discern what
Heraclitus thought. Kahn’s conclusion about Democritus is correct, while his dismissal of the
Heraclitean fragments is not. Remote and enigmatic as Heraclitus may be, Democritus seems to
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think that the Ephesian was clear enough to engage with his ideas. Accordingly, we have established
one thinker who was influenced by Heraclitus’ ethical/political ideas.
B.

Plato
1.

The Use of Heraclitus in Dialogues About Value

There is little doubt that Plato was concerned with ethical and political ideas. In addition, we
have already seen in Chapter 3 that one of the works concerned with an ethical matter (i.e. love),
Plato’s Symposium, was influenced in part by Heraclitus’ ideas. Excluding the reference in Symposium,
Plato makes mention of Heraclitus overtly at least eight times in the dialogues. (Greater Hippias
289a-b, Cratylus 401d, 402a, 411b; Theaetetus 152e, 160d, 177c; and Philebus 43a). The most interesting
of these, for the sake of this essay, is the controversial 487 Greater Hippias,488 where Socrates asks the
self-proclaimed expert Hippias to teach him what the beautiful is. His first answer is “parthenos kale
kalon,” “a beautiful maiden is beautiful.”489 Socrates then proceeds to apply this formula “a beautiful
x is beautiful” to mares and lyres with Hippias’ agreement. When he applies it to pottery, however,
Hippias objects. Hippias reasons as follows: “This utensil, when well wrought, is beautiful, but
absolutely considered it does not deserve to be regarded as beautiful in comparison with a mare and
a maiden and all beautiful things.”490 Socrates suggest that the best response to someone who thinks
a “beautiful pot is beautiful” is to cite the fragment of Heraclitus where he writes that (DK82) The
most beautiful monkey is ugly compared with the human race. Hippias agrees, but Socrates
has another fragment of Heraclitus as a response to the use of the first: (DK83) The wisest human
being will seem to be a monkey compared to a god in wisdom, beauty, and everything else.
Granted, there is some dispute about the authenticity of Greater Hippias, but this does not blunt the point. Assuming,
arguendo, that Greater Hippias was not written by Plato but by a student or imitator, this imitator clearly thought that there
was material of interest to discussions of value in Heraclitus and not only metaphysical or physical speculations.
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Since everything pales in comparison to the gods, even Hippias’ beautiful maiden will suffer by the
comparison.491Since the question was what the “absolute beautiful is” then Hippias’ first answer is
lacking.
We can see here another use of Heraclitus by Plato to discuss questions of value. Much like
the previous example from Symposium, Plato’s use of Heraclitus is as a stepping stone to his own
theories.492 Heraclitus’ ideas show what is inadequate about Hippias’ definition of the beautiful, but
they do not provide a definition of it themselves.493
2.

Heraclitean Themes in Republic, Book V

We can also discern Heraclitean influence in Republic Book V.494 Chief among these is a
theme that carries over from Hippias Major495 how things can apparently be both beautiful and ugly
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In the other dialogues, Plato makes several references to what he takes to be Heraclitus’ core doctrine that
“everything changes,” but he doesn’t mention how this doctrine fits in with Heraclitus’ other ideas. These references
cannot tell us if Plato believed that Heraclitus’ sole interest was in metaphysics/physics or if he had ideas about other
areas of human wisdom. For example, it is impossible to disentangle the “Heraclitean” teachings of Cratylus from those
ascribed to Heraclitus in the dialogue the bears the former’s name. 492 None of the extant Heraclitean fragments suggest
anything like the philosophy of language proposed by the character of Cratylus (i.e. that the names for things have divine
origins). Indeed, later in the dialogue Socrates reveals plainly that his primary aim is to ridicule extreme views about the
nature of language by making a joke:
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By the dog, I believe I have a fine intuition which has just come to me, that the very ancient men who invented names
were quite like most of the present philosophers who always get dizzy as they turn round and round in their search for
the nature of things, and then the things seem to them to turn round and round and be in motion. They think the cause
of this belief is not an affection within themselves, but that the nature of things really is such that nothing is at rest or
stable, but everything is flowing and moving and always full of constant motion and generation. I say this because I
thought of it with reference to all these words we are now considering. (Cratylus 411b-c).
In other words, since thinkers change their views on language so often, they attribute their intellectual dizziness to a
constantly changing world. They take their private views of the world to be world itself. Ironically, Heraclitus would
agree with Socrates as we can plainly see from DK2: “But although the account (logos) is in common (xunos), most
people live as though they had their own thought (phronêsis).” Cratylus may claim to be a Heraclitean but his ideas
do not mesh well with the Ephesian’s words
Since we do not have Heraclitus’ complete work, it is difficult to ascertain if the fragments came from a section of the
book on beauty. Indeed, it is difficult to tell if they even came from the same section of the book at all. On the
assumption that they do come from the same section I think it probable that they belong to the same section as DK114
which declares the guardianship of the divine over human law or in the same section as DK78: The human character
does not possess judgments (gnomai), but the divine one possesses them. In either case I believe the purpose of
these fragments was not to announce some specific doctrine about beauty, but to support Heraclitus’ general theme of
the supremacy of the divine over the mundane.
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at the same time. Just as in that earlier dialogue Socrates is considering how it is possible for there to
be various opposite ways to consider the same things. He concludes that
… the same account is true of the just and the unjust, the good and the bad, and all the
forms. Each of them is itself one, but because they manifest themselves everywhere in
association with actions, bodies, and one another, each of them appears to be many.496
Here Plato has Socrates employing Heraclitus’ unity of opposites idea to support his own views
about the difference between the sensible and the intelligible world. In the sensible world we have
opposites. Recall DK82: The most beautiful monkey is ugly compared with the human race.
In the intelligible world, however, we have unity. Thus we have an instance in Plato’s main argument
in the Republic where he uses Heraclitean ideas to support his own views about value.
There is also the inclusion of the “children’s riddle” in the so-called “argument from
opposites” (478e-479d). Sensible objects appear to have qualified properties. I am big compared to
a mouse, but I am also small when compared to a mountain. Plato compares this to a ambiguous
children’s riddle that went something like this “A man who is not a man saw and did not see a bird
that was not a bird in a tree (xulon) that was not a tree; he hit (ballō) and did not hit it with a stone
that was not a stone.”497 The solution being “a eunuch with bad eyesight hit a bat on a rafter, threw a
pumice stone at it and missed.”498 Socrates declares that trouble is that such riddles are ambiguous
“and one cannot understand them as fixedly being or fixedly not being or as both or neither. This is

beneficial to the city, regardless of conventional mores, in that city’s social arrangements. Thus, for example, guardian
women must share in physical training, war, and other guardian duties the same as guardian men because there is
nothing “better for a city than having the best possible men and women as its citizens.”494 This recalls the ideas
underlying not only DK121 concerning the foolishness of banishing the “beneficial” Hermodorus, but also DK49: One
man [heis lit. “one”], for me, is ten thousand, if he is the best, DK113: Thinking (phroneein) is in common for all,
etc. All of which suggest that cities must not squander the potential of their citizens.
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like Heraclitus’ critique of Homer for misunderstanding a children’s riddle in DK56499 discussed
back in Chapter 3.
More speculatively, we can also detect the presence of Heraclitus in the latter half of Book V
which introduces the idea that philosophy and political power should coincide. To make his point,
Socrates must give Glaucon his definition of a true philosopher (i.e. someone fit to govern the
kalliopolis). He starts with a contrast between someone who believes in beautiful things versus
someone who believes in the beautiful itself (i.e. the philosopher).500 The former is “living in a dream
rather than a wakened state”501 while the latter is awake. In DK1, Heraclitus claims he will analyze
each thing according to its nature, but some people will not understand him. These people, though
conscious are like those that are asleep (But other men are unaware of all they do when awake,
just as they forget all they do while they are asleep). Further in DK89: “Heraclitus says that
those who are awake have a world that is one and in common, but that each of those who are asleep
turns aside into his own particular world.” In other words, in sleep they turn away from the logos.
We can only call a philosopher’s thought “knowledge” (gnome), all else is just opinion
(doxa).502 We can also find this distinction between knowledge and opinion – and the poor valuation
of those who only have the latter – in Heraclitus. We have, for example, DK70: “Heraclitus thought
that human opinions are children's toys.” But more importantly we have DK17: “Most men do not
think things in the way they encounter them, nor do they recognize what they experience, but
believe their own opinions (dokeousi)”503 Accordingly, it is arguable that the metaphysical distinction

Regarding the knowledge of things that are evident, humans are fooled in the same way as Homer. Who was wiser
than all the other Greeks. For boys who were killing lice fooled him by saying, 'The ones we see and grasp, we leave
behind; the ones we do not see or grasp, we take away.'
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between seeming/opinion and reality/knowledge we find in Plato504 was already present in
Heraclitus.
Accordingly, we have seen in this and previous chapters that Heraclitus’ work was an
influence on both Platonic ethics and metaphysics and not always a negative one. Plato seems to
approve of some of Heraclitus’ fragments, some basic ideas about the governance of the polis, and
shares with Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Xenophon the distinction between opinion and knowledge
which became a fundamental point of debate in philosophy as a subject of inquiry. This shows that
we look carefully we can uncover some of Heraclitus’ underplayed legacy as an early philosopher of
ethics through his impact on later thinkers.
C.

Aristotle

We can apply a similar analysis to Aristotle. Aristotle refers to Heraclitus no fewer than eight
times. About five of these appear to be quotations. Four of these appear in Aristotle’s works on
ethics. For example, in Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 8, he cites DK8 (Heraclitus [scil. says] that what is
opposed converges, and that the most beautiful harmony (harmonia) comes out of what
diverges, and that all things come about by strife) when discussing matters of opinion on the
nature of friendship. He contrasts Heraclitus with Empedocles who thought that like attracted like.
He then summarily dismisses both theories as “scientific speculations [] not germane to our present
inquiry.”505 Note the difference between Aristotle’s treatment of DK8 and Plato’s treatment of a
similar fragment DK51: They do not comprehend how, diverging, it accords with itself: a
backward-turning fitting-together (harmonia), as of a bow and a lyre. Plato takes it as having
ethical import and Aristotle categorizes it as scientific speculation. This latter approach is in keeping
with Aristotle’s rigid systemization of previous thinkers into categories. He classifies Heraclitus as
Not to forget that this distinction was also in Parmenides. According to Kahn, this distinction goes all the way back
to Xenophanes claim that we could not know the truth about theological matters. Kahn, 211.
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“scientist” and thus ignores the possibility that DK8 applied to anything other than scientific
matters. In Ethics, Bk. 10, Aristotle makes use of Heraclitus again. This time he is lecturing on
pleasure. Specifically, he is discussing the fact the distinct species of animals seem to have different
pleasures. To this effect he cites DK9: Asses would choose sweepings rather than gold, because
Aristotle explains, “to asses food gives more pleasure than gold.”506 Here again, he treats Heraclitus’
statement as a sort of scientific one, useful only for the categorization of phenomena.
Interestingly, Aristotle uses the next ethical fragment in both his Eudemian Ethics and
Politics.507 In Eudemian Ethics, Book II, Aristotle is lecturing on what “voluntary” and “involuntary”
mean. “Voluntary” he explains seems to mean “conformity with appetition, or with purposive
choice, or with thought.”508 Appetition, subdivides into three categories: wish, passion, and desire.
He considers desire first. Acting in accordance with desire seems voluntary because so acting is
unforced (i.e. not involuntary). But a problem arises when we consider an “uncontrolled man” (i.e.
weak willed). An uncontrolled man “does not do what he wishes, for being uncontrolled means
acting against what one thinks to be best owing to desire.”509 Thus weirdly they seem to be acting
both voluntarily and involuntarily. The same problem, argues Aristotle, reoccurs when we consider
passion (thumou). Again, acting in conformity with passion seems to be voluntary because restraining
passion requires force and is therefore involuntary. Here he gives Heraclitus credit for recognizing
that restraining passion is painful and cites as proof DK85: To fight against ardor (thumos) is hard:
for whatever it wants, it purchases it at the price of the soul [i.e. of life]. Indeed, he thought this
fragment was so useful he cites it again in his Politics. In Politics, Book V Aristotle is discussing the
causes of regime change. Toward the end of that book he lectures on the diverse ways that
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monarchies and tyrannies preserve themselves against overthrow. After recommending things like
moderation and zeal regarding religious observances to the tyrant, he moves onto how to that tyrant
can avoid assassination. His advice is to take care not to inflict dishonor or outrage on any
aristocrats under his power. As he puts it “Hence the greatest care must be taken to guard against
those who think that insolent outrage [hubrizesthai] is being done either to themselves or to those
who happen to be under their care; for men attacking under the influence of anger [thumon] are
reckless of themselves.”510 As support he cites DK85. Here it is clearer that Aristotle is using the
polysemic word thumos (e.g it can also mean “spirit” or “soul”) to mean something like anger, more
specifically, the feeling that one has suffered an affront. Thus, here finally we have a clear case of
Aristotle using Heraclitus’ ideas as a part of a political/ethical analysis.
We have now seen that even a source like Aristotle, whose school is the most responsible for
the predominant narrative about Heraclitus that I am challenging, recognizes both metaphysical and
ethical/political elements in Heraclitus’ thought. It is true that compared to Plato and to our next
subject (i.e. the Stoics) his appreciation of this aspect of the Ephesian’s thought is slight. However,
the fact remains that it is there and thus serves as further evidence for my claim that Heraclitus had
ethical/political ideas. Now, let us turn to the final group of thinkers influenced by Heraclitus: the
Stoics.
D.

The Stoics

Although scholarly estimation of its extent has waxed and waned over the years, most
scholars think that Heraclitus had some influence on the Stoics.511 Most typically, they see his impact
in Stoic cosmology. As A.A. Long and others argue, Stoic cosmology formed in reaction to that of
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the Academy and Lyceum.512 For example, consider the Peripatetic doctrine of the eternity of the
phenomenal world. This doctrine struck the early Stoics as contrary to the observable change that
occurred in nature. This, in addition to the Stoic acceptance of materialism, lead to their rejection of
Peripatetic cosmology. They did, however agree with the Academy and the Lyceum that “the
orderliness of nature points to the existence of a source of motion which is eternal and rational.” 513
This led to the postulation of what the early Stoics called the pyr technikon (the “creative fire”) which
was a rational, eternal, and self-moving substance. The apparently self-moving nature of fire made it
an ideal candidate for this core component of Stoic cosmology. This interest in fire in turn made
Heraclitus, the Pre-Socratic most associated with statements about fire, an attractive source for these
early Stoic thinkers. As monists, they were at pains to explain how diverse phenomena could exist
when there was only one material principle underlying all phenomena. Thus, another feature that
made Heraclitus attractive to early Stoics is something we can see throughout his fragments: his
insistence on the underlying unity between apparently diverse things. This is the Heraclitus who said
things like DK10 (Conjoinings: wholes and not wholes, converging and diverging,
harmonious dissonant; and out of all things one, and out of one all things) and DK50 (After
you have listened not to me (emos) but to the account (logos), it is wise to recognize (homologein)
that all things are one).
The early thinkers of this school were also interested in ethical side of Heraclitus. We can see
this in one of their core ethical doctrines about the “end” (i.e. the purpose) of human life. The
founder himself Zeno of Citium declared that the end of life is “‘living in agreement.’ This is living
in accordance with one concordant reason since those who live in conflict are unhappy.”514 His

512

Long, 45.

513

Long, 45.

A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, Vol. 1: Translations of the Principal Sources, with Philosophical
Commentary (Cambridge Cambridgeshire ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 394.
514

163

successor, Cleanthes of Assos supposedly “added ‘with nature’ and represented it as follows: ‘the
end is living in agreement with nature.’”515 In either case, we have a clear parallel with the ideas of
Heraclitus. Implicitly, this Stoic idea can follow from the numerous Heraclitean exhortations to
follow the logos and the connections between the logos, nature, and the divine throughout the
fragments. Explicitly, however, we have DK112: To be moderate [sophronein516]: the greatest
virtue. / Wisdom: to speak the truth and to act in conformity with the nature [physin] [scil. of
each thing], understanding it. The first line is easily translatable into the Stoic emphasis on selfcontrol, while the second line seems like a version of the quotations from Zeno and Cleanthes
above. I submit that in addition to their attraction Heraclitus’ cosmology, the Stoics also adapted or
adopted his ethical ideas.
Of all the Stoics, this impact of Heraclitus’ ethical and political ideas is most obvious in
Cleanthes. Cleanthes of Assos (c. 330 B.C.E. – c. 230 B.C.E.) was the successor of Zeno of Citium
and the second head (scholarch) of the Stoic school in Greece. His Hymn to Zeus is replete with
references to Heraclitus and outright imitations of his language. In the second paragraph he
describes the cosmos under Zeus:
All this cosmos, as it spins around the earth, obeys you, whichever way you lead, and
willingly submits to your sway. Such is the double-edged fiery ever-living thunderbolt
[ampheke puroeit aeizonta keraunon] which you hold at the ready in your unvanquished hands.
For under its strokes [pleges] all the works of nature [physeos] are accomplished. With it you
direct the universal reason [koinos logos] which runs through all things [dia panton] and
intermingles with the lights of heaven both great and small…517
References to Zeus as the director of nature and wisest of the gods abound in Heraclitus. We can
compare the Hymn’s opening line referring to “many-titled [polyonome lit. having many names], ever
Long and Sedley, 394. The idea may also be traced back to the Cynics for whom living according to nature meant
abandonment of human conventions in favor divine/natural mores. That the Stoics rejected this view of the idea I
believe may be further evidence that the Stoics took from Heraclitus the notion that politics and cities were natural
features of human life and not mere constructs or constraints on it.
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omnipotent Zeus, prime mover of nature, who with your law steer [kubernon] all things [panta]” to
DK32 where Heraclitus he declares that One thing, what is wise: it does not want and does
want to be called only by the name [onoma] of Zeus. The same line of the Hymn also references
DK41: One thing, what is wise: to know the thought (gnome) that steers [ekubernese] all things
through all things [panta dia panta].
The “double-edged fiery ever-living thunderbolt” of the Hymn suggests a combination of
“ever-living” fire of DK30 (This world order [kosmon], the same for all, none of the gods or
humans made it, but it always was and is and will be: fire ever-living [pur aeizon], kindled in
measures and extinguished in measures) and the “thunderbolt” of DK64: All these things the
thunderbolt [keraunos] steers. The “stroke” or “blow” (plege) referred to in the next line is a clear
reference to DK11: Every beast is driven to pasture by blows [plege]. Finally, the koinos logos, the
“universal” or “common” reason of the last line is a core Heraclitean doctrine found in numerous
fragments but most especially DK2 and DK114 both of which we have discussed at great length in
previous chapters.
Cleanthes goes on, in the third paragraph, to add a more explicitly moral dimension to this
cosmology, again drawing directly on Heraclitus:
No deed is done on earth, gods, without your offices… save what bad men do in their folly
[anoia]. But you know how to make things crooked straight and to order things disorderly.
You love things unloved. For you have so welded into one all things good and bad that they
all share in a single everlasting reason. It is shunned and neglected by the bad among mortal
men, the wretched, who ever yearn for the possession of goods yet neither see nor hear
god’s universal law [koinon nomon], by obeying which they could lead a good life in
partnership with intelligence [nō, a contracted form of noos]]. Instead, devoid of intelligence,
they rush into this evil or that, some in their belligerent quest for fame, others with an
unbridled bent for acquisition, others for leisure and the pleasurable acts of the body . . .
<But all that they achieve is evils,> despite travelling hither and thither in burning quest of
the opposite.518
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The “welding” of good and bad things together again recalls the Heraclitean theme of the unity of
opposites. The reference to “universal law” [koinon nomon] is like the divine guardianship of human
law Heraclitus wrote about in DK114. In a similar vein, life in “partnership with intelligence” versus
those that “lack intelligence” recalls numerous fragments where Heraclitus criticizes the lack of
intelligence or understanding [noos] of this or that group (e.g. DK40- polymaths, DK104- bards, and
DK2/114 – those who claim a “private wisdom.”) The list of goals of those that lack intelligence
fame, acquisition, and pleasure clearly recalls DK29: The best men choose one thing instead of
all others, the ever-flowing fame of mortals; but most men are sated like cattle. At least if we
conclude, as I and Sider519 do, that DK29 is a critique of both groups mentioned in the fragments.
Overall, Cleanthes emphasis in this paragraph is consistent with Heraclitus. Both thinkers agree that
both wisdom and good things are “common” and not idiosyncratic. Those that seek “private”
wisdom or “private” good are doomed to fail. They achieve only evil despite their “burning quest of
the opposite.”
Even the final paragraph of the Hymn to Zeus has references to Heraclitus. Cleanthes writes:
“Let us achieve the power of judgment [gnome] by trusting in which you steer all things with justice
… For neither men nor gods have any greater privilege than this: to sing for ever in righteousness of
the universal law [koinos nomos].” The appeal to Zeus to give us the “power of judgment” directly
recalls DK78: The human character does not possess judgments (gnomai), but the divine one
Sider’s analysis of DK29 is as follows. A passive reading suggests that Heraclitus is recommending the behavior of
glory seeking nobility over the cattle-like hoi polloi. Yet if we have learned nothing else about Heraclitus, passive reading is
the wrong reading. Accordingly, Sider submits that DK29 is not as classist as it first appears; he offers the following
alternative analysis of this fragment. First, aristoi need not refer to the noble class. Instead, it could be read to mean a
singular “best” as in an exemplar of virtue or wisdom. Second, there is no evidence that the aristoi and polloi clauses need
to be read as contrasting. David Sider, “Heraclitus’ Ethics,” in Doctrine and Doxography: Studies on Heraclitus and Pythagoras,
ed. David Sider and Dirk Obbink (Walter de Gruyter, 2013), 333. Heraclitus could just as easily be criticizing both classes
or as Sider argues, both clauses could be criticizing the nobility: “the second clause, following the first as explained
above, can now be rendered ‘and the majority [sc. of them, the aristoi] glut themselves like cattle.’” Sider, 327. This would
be in keeping with many fragments (several of which we have discussed herein) where Heraclitus scolds others for their
failings. Third, we can see in other fragments, Heraclitus seems to praise a singular “best” as a moral exemplar that
should be listened to for the sake of the common good. Sider, 327. Accordingly, Heraclitus seems to be recommending
that people follow a singular moral exemplar if they wish to pursue an ethical life.
519
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possesses them. The Hymn expands on this thought to suggest that by trusting in the “steering” of
Zeus (another reference to DK64) with “justice” (a theme of: DK80 – conflict is justice, DK94—
the sun kept in line by justice, DK23—the connection between justice and unjust acts, and DK28B
– justice will punish liars) can grant us the power of judgment that Heraclitus says we lack. The last
sentence is yet another appeal the “common” logos/nomos which features prominently in Heraclitus’
fragments.
Outside the Hymn to Zeus, Cleanthes’ additions to Stoicism have a Heraclitean flair to them.
Controlling the passions was “a basic principle of all Greek ethics, popular and philosophical.” 520
The Stoics, however, are notorious for the dim view of the role the passions play in vice and
unhappiness. We can see this critique at least as early as Cleanthes. Consider the following poem
laying out the Stoic position on the passions:
What is it Passion, that you want? Tell me this.
I want, Reason? To do everything I want.
A royal wish; but tell me again.
Whatever I desire I want to happen.521
Passion acts like a would-be king; its “royal wish” is to get literally everything that it wants. This
plainly is not possible; thus Passion proves that it needs to be reined in, probably by Reason. The
most obvious parallel is between the last line of Cleanthes’ poem and DK110: For humans, that
whatever they wish happens is not better. Passion wants precisely what Heraclitus cautions
against in DK110.522
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There are connections to other fragments as well. Although not a direct parallel, Passion is like the drunk man
described in DK117: When a man has become drunk, he is led stumbling by a slave, a mere boy: he does not
know where he is going, his soul is wet. Like a man whose passions are in control, the drunk cannot direct his own
actions. A more direct parallel is DK85: To fight against ardor (thumos) is hard: for whatever it wants, it purchases
it at the price of the soul [i.e. of life].
522
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The Stoics famously declared that a city was defined by (1) people living in the same place
(2) governed by laws. Cleanthes puts the matter in a rather circuitous manner:
If a city is a habitable structure, in which people who take refuge have access to the
dispensation of justice, a city is surely something civilized; but a city is this sort of habitation;
therefore a city is something civilized.523
In Chapter 3, we discussed in detail how Heraclitus’ notion of the polis was deeply informed by the
community-generating effect of the law. For Heraclitus, The people must fight for their law just
as for their city wall (DK44), and he compares the law of a city to the logos; both are something
that is common for all (DK114). We have already seen from the Hymn to Zeus, the importance that
Cleanthes placed on the moral importance of law, this syllogism merely serves to reinforce that
connection and the connection between Heraclitus and Cleanthes.
Although Cleanthes was the Stoic most overtly impacted by Heraclitus’ writings, his work is
not the only place we can find the pull of the Ephesian’s ideas. Chrysippus, for example, makes a
version of the unity of opposites part of Stoic doctrine in his On Providence:
There is absolutely nothing more foolish than those who think that there could have been
goods without the coexistence of evils. For since goods are opposite to evils, the two must
necessarily exist in opposition to each other and supported by a kind of opposed
interdependence. And there is no such opposite without its matching opposite. For how
could there be perception of justice if there were no injustices? What else is justice, if not the
removal of injustice?524
There is an obvious affinity between Chrysippus calling people foolish to think goods could exist
without evils and say DK8: [W]hat is opposed converges, and that the most beautiful harmony
(harmonia) comes out of what diverges, and that all things come about by strife or DK111:
Illness makes health sweet and good, hunger does so for satiety, toil for repose. Indeed, just
about any statement of the unity of opposites will do, since they all point to, as Chrysippus puts it,
“a kind of opposed interdependence.” It is in the last two sentences, however, that we can detect the
523
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clearest resonances of Heraclitus; we clearly hear DK23: They would not know the name of
Justice if these things [i.e. unjust actions] did not exist. Chrysippus, no less than Heraclitus,
could not have helped notice that the whole point of justice was to make whole what was wronged
by injustice. In a sense, both Heraclitus and Chrysippus are looking beyond the words used, to the
phenomena themselves. By the words alone, justice (dike) precedes injustice (adikia) since in English
and Greek, the latter is the verbal negation of the former. In the social world justice operates in,
however, justice is only necessary if some injustice has been committed. Its purpose is to heal what
has been broken. If nothing breaks, there is no need for healing.
The law must be “fixed” when its broken by injustice. Hence, we can see the connection
between the Stoic talk of unity of opposites and their treatment of law, much like the connection we
find in Heraclitus. Chrysippus says in the opening of his On Law:
Law is king of all things human and divine. Law must preside over what is honourable and
base, as ruler and as guide, and thus be the standard of right and wrong, prescribing to
animals whose nature is political what they should do, and prohibiting them from what they
should not do.
Calling “law” the “king of all things human and divine” not only recalls the traditional epithet of
Zeus, but also DK53 (War is the father of all and the king of all …). The conflict averse Stoics
were probably hesitant to follow Heraclitus’ foregrounding of the role of conflict in the natural and
social world, thus Chrysippus has reworked Heraclitus’ language for Stoic ends. “[P]rescribing to
animals who nature is political what they should do…” clearly recalls Aristotle’s definition of man as
a zoon politikon, but it also could be a callback to Cleanthes use of DK11 (Every beast is driven to
pasture by blows) in the Hymn to Zeus. It reinforces the idea of law not just as a remedy for
resolving disputes between individuals, but as a moral force which promotes good behavior.
To close our discussion of Heraclitus’ impact on the Stoics, we turn to a thinker who is a
source for some of his fragments: the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius. Aurelius presided over the
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empire in the second century C.E. prosecuting its seemingly endless wars against the Germanic
tribes.525 In his Meditations he seems to be influenced by Heraclitus in the following passage on the
“end” of human life:
(1) Each thing <is made with a view to that> for whose sake it is constituted; (2) and each
thing is moved towards that with a view to which it is constituted; (3) and its end consists in
that towards which it is moved; (4) and where its end is, there too exists its interest and its
good. (5) Therefore the good of a rational being is community; (6) for it has long been
proved that we are born with a view to community. (7) Or was it not evident that inferior
beings are for the sake of the superior, and the superior for the sake of one another? (8) But
animate beings are superior to inanimate, and rational to merely animate.526
Aurelius in his somewhat unclear way is arguing that since human beings are rational, animate
beings, our end is one another (i.e. community). Heraclitus declared that (DK113) Thinking
(phroneein) is in common for all, but although this is the case, people act as if it were a private, and
not communal matter (DK2). He contrasts those who recognize the common, the “awake,” with
those who do not, the asleep (DK89: Heraclitus says that those who are awake have a world that
is one and in common, but that each of those who are asleep turns aside into his own
particular world). In other words, he shares Aurelius’ conclusion that a proper object of human
striving is community. It is thus with Aurelius that the Stoic formula “living in accordance with
nature” takes on its most Heraclitean tone. To live in accordance with nature for Heraclitus would
be to live in accordance with the common; to promote what is best for the community over private
desires.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have seen that Heraclitus had intriguing early thoughts on politics and the
ethics of citizenship. We have seen that his metaphysical emphasis on the “common” is also present

Rachana Kamtekar, “Marcus Aurelius,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2018
(Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/marcusaurelius/.
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in his political and ethical thinking. There the “common” takes the form of something like a
“common good” shared by the diverse and conflicting classes and citizens of a polis. His emphasis
on the importance of the law is an extension of this thinking and thus he appears to be an early
advocate of something like the rule of law.
We also saw that, contrary to some previous accounts, later thinkers took note and were
influenced by these political and ethical ideas. Democritus, often credited as the earliest ethicist in
Greek philosophy, clearly borrows Heraclitus’ language and several of his concerns. Plato too also
borrows from Heraclitus, but more subtly, reworking the Ephesian’s ideas where he thought
necessary. Although the influence is smaller, Heraclitus clearly influenced Aristotle. We can see part
of his dispute with Plato in the Politics as an interpretive debate about Heraclitus. A polis should have
a common good, but what things need to be in common? Finally, the Stoics borrowed liberally from
Heraclitus political and ethical ideas. A borrowing which is clearest in Cleanthes Hymn to Zeus but is
also detectable as late as Marcus Aurelius’ declaration that the good of a rational being is
community. While all these later thinkers make more elaborate claims than Heraclitus, we can see in
all of them core ideas that he originated about law, justice, the common, logos, nous, the role of the
divine in human institutions, etc.
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The early Greek philosopher Heraclitus writes in a puzzling, cryptic way which makes his
ideas difficult to work out. Many commentators are content to make some broad statements about
his place in the development of philosophy as a natural philosopher or metaphysician; statements
for which there is ample support.
In this essay, I argue that we can use Heraclitus’ biography and his historical context to
recover his ideas about religion, ethics, and politics. I believe that this method reveals a Heraclitus
who was grasping for an early sort of political theory and ethics in response to the turbulent period
in which he lived. I also believe that the religious practices at Eleusis and Delphi inspired Heraclitus
to express his ideas in the cryptic way that he does. In short, I argue that he was borrowing the
oracular ambiguity of Delphi to make his readers metaphorical “initiates” into his ideas in a way
modeled on the Eleusinian Mysteries.
Further, I examine the way in which Heraclitus ideas arguably influenced later thinkers from
Democritus to the Stoics. Each taking this or that aspect of Heraclitus’ thought to shape their own
ideas about value and/or politics.
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